Supreme Tent of Knights of Maccabees of the World v. Stensland

• Decision Date: 16 December 1903
• Citation: 68 N.E. 1098,206 Ill. 124
• Parties: SUPREME TENT OF KNIGHTS OF MACCABEES OF THE WORLD v. STENSLAND et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

206 Ill. 124

68 N.E. 1098

SUPREME TENT OF KNIGHTS OF MACCABEES OF THE WORLD

v.STENSLAND et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 16, 1903.

Appeal from Appellate Court, First District.

Action by Minnie M. Stensland and others against the Supreme Tent of the Knights of Maccabees of the World. From a judgment of the Appellate Court affirming a judgment for plaintiffs (for opinion, see 105 Ill. App. 267), defendant appeals. Affirmed.

H. H. C. Miller and W. S. Oppenheim, for appellant.

Beach & Beach, for appellees.

RICKS, J.

This was an action in assumpsit brought by appellees against appellant in the circuit court of Cook county. The appellant issued a benefit certificate to Peter A. Stensland on March 25, 1895. At that time the by-laws of appellant provided that if the insured committed suicide, whether he was sane or insane at the time, no benefit should be paid. In 1897 this by-law was changed by extending the time to five years, so that in case of suicide within five years the insurer should be liable only for the amount of all assessments paid. Peter Stensland was found dead at his home on April 2, 1898. His neck was suspended about six inches above the floor by a rope attached to the door knob. His chest, hips, and legs were resting upon the floor. At the time of his death, Stensland's family was away from home. A man by the name of Bense occupied a room in the flat with the Stenslands, and it was he who notified the police of Stensland's death. The coroner's inquest returned a verdict of ‘suicide by strangulation,’ and the proofs of death sent in by appellees stated that the remote cause of death was suicide by strangulation. Appellant refused to pay anything more than the amount of the premium it had received, and this suit was brought upon the certificate.

Appellant interposed a plea of general issue, and a further special plea alleging that the deceased committed suicide. On the trial, appellees showed the death of the insured, and introduced the certificate and proofs of death. The appellant then offered the by-laws which were in force when the certificate was issued and when the deceased died. The appellees put in testimony tending to show that the deceased did not commit suicide, and appellant introduced a rebuttal tending to show that he did commit suicide. The jury brought in a general verdict for the plaintiffs (appellees), and assessed their damages at $2,000, and also found specially that the deceased did not come to his death by committing suicide with suicidal intent. From a judgment on the general verdict an appeal was taken to the Appellate Court for the First District, where the judgment was affirmed. This case comes here by a further appeal from that judgment.

The first point made by appellant is that the court erred in not giving the peremptory instruction offered by the defendant after the introduction of all the evidence. The affirmance of this judgment by the Appellate Court leaves this court with only the bare legal question, was there evidence fairly tending to show the plaintiffs' cause of action? We must hold that there was. We cannot disregard the testimony of the three physicians who swear that in case of strangulation the face is distorted and discolored, and there would be marks on the neck at the point of the constricting material, due to the escape of blood from the blood vessels into the tissues. This expert evidence, coupled with the testimony of several witnesses to the effect that there were no marks whatever on the neck, all went to support the plaintiffs' case. A paper was found on the table by the officers. It was in the handwriting of the deceased, partly in Norwegian and partly in English, and, as translated, is, ‘If you come while I live then then me till hospital,’ and below this the word ‘house.’ We think this is additional evidence tending to show that there was no suicidal intent, for it is unusual for one contemplating self-destruction to provide for the contingency of some one coming while he lives. The following word, ‘hospital,’ indicates serious illness at the time the note was written. This is further corroborated by the generally disjointed and incoherent nature of the note. There was also testimony that the deceased had two weeks previously fallen five stories in an elevator. The widow testified that she kept the clothes line hanging on the door in loops, and no one swears that the rope was tied around the neck of the deceased. Upon all this evidence, we believe that reasonable minds might come to a different conclusion on the question of suicide.

The next point reviewed by counsel for appellant is that the hypothetical question propounded to Dr. Reed was inadmissible. The question, after stating the circumstances, concluded with the words: ‘In your opinion, doctor, could the death of this man have been caused by strangulation with suicidal intent?’ The counsel for the appellant questioned the last two words, ‘suicidal intent,’ and the court ordered that these two words be stricken. In their argument, counsel for the appellant-for the purpose of fairness, they say-quote this portion of the evidence; but they omit altogether the court's order to strike those words, and attribute to the court certain words spoken, as the record shows, by counsel. It was either careless or reprehensible to misquote the judge's words at this time, for it changes the entire complexion of the question. We are convinced that the record shows no error in allowing the question as modified by the court.

The contention that the physicians were not experts on the question of strangulation is likewise without merit. The question before these experts was whether, in case of strangulation, there was any discoloration of the skin or distortion of the features. Dr. Reed, had seen several instances where persons had died from hanging. Dr. McNamara, the attending surgeon and medical director of the Cook County Hospital, had seen 16 or 17 men hung, and had made several post mortem examinations of people who had died of strangulation. Dr. Craig's testimony agreed with that of the others, and he states that he had read on this question in Taylor on Medical Jurisprudence. The contention is that, although these doctors may know the condition of the face or body in cases of ordinary strangulation or hanging, they are not experts in cases of strangulation where part of the body was suspended and a part resting on the floor. This objection is frivolous. The phenomena connected with strangulation are not so technical as to require a specialist on the subject. Of course, a physician, just because he is a physician, is not necessarily an expert witness on matters that involve difficult questions of chemistry or bacterjology; but we think of no better expert witness, in a case like that under consideration, than a physician who has seen a number of cases of strangulation, whether the persons strangled had their feet on the floor or not.

Plaintiffs, on the trial, introduced the sworn proofs of death which were filed with the defendant, but limited the offer to the purpose of showing appellant received notice of the death of the insured. The proofs were signed by Minnie M. Stensland, the widow, and Christ. Runden, guardian of the minor beneficiary. In this proof it was stated that the remote cause of death was ‘suicide by strangulation.’ The plaintiffs were then permitted by the court to introduce evidence contradicting the sworn statement made in this proof of death, that the remote cause of death was suicide by strangulation. It is contended by appellant that the sworn admissions as to the cause of death in the proofs of death were binding, and could not properly be contradicted unless the plaintiffs could show that the statements were made by mistake or obtained by means of fraud. The trial was begun October 8, 1901. On September 26, 1901, appellees gave appellant written notice that, if the written proof of death assigned suicide by any means as the cause of death of the insured, appellees would, on the trial, offer evidence that such proof of death was in that particular erroneous and untrue, and made under misapprehension and in ignorance of the facts, and would show that the insured did not come to his death by suicide. In AEtna Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 48 Ill. 31, this court held that in a...