Supreme Tent of Knights of Maccabees of the World v. McAllister

• Decision Date: 29 December 1902
• Citation: 132 Mich. 69,92 N.W. 770
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: SUPREME TENT OF KNIGHTS OF MACCABEES OF THE WORLD v. McALLISTER et al.

92 N.W. 770

132 Mich. 69

SUPREME TENT OF KNIGHTS OF MACCABEES OF THE WORLD v. McALLISTER et al.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 29, 1902

Appeal from circuit court, Eaton county, in chancery; Clement Smith Judge.

Bill of interpleader by the Supreme Tent of the Knights of the Maccabees of the World against Clara E. McAllister and Eleanor McAllister. Decree for Clara. Eleanor appeals. Affirmed.

Defendant Eleanor is the mother, and defendant Clara is the alleged widow, of William R. McAllister, deceased. October 2, 1890 complainant, a beneficiary association organized under the laws of Michigan, issued to William, then a resident of New York state, a policy of $2,000, payable to Clara E McAllister, his wife, as beneficiary. Subsequently William and Clara removed to Findlay, Ohio, where he died January 16 1901. Complainant files this bill of interpleader to determine which one is entitled to the insurance. Clara and William in 1883 entered into a contract of marriage, but no ceremony was performed. The circuit judge found that this contract was entered into in good faith, and was consummated by a continuous living and cohabiting together as husband and wife, and by holding themselves out to the world as such, until his death. For 18 years these parties lived in Michigan, New York, and Ohio as husband and wife, were received in society as such, were known as such in every place where they lived, and were recognized as such by the defendant Eleanor and other members of her family. She visited them, and they visited her. The circuit judge, in his finding, said: 'It is seldom, where the life in the home for so long a time is laid bare before the court, that the record is as clean, and the loyalty to each other and the trust and confidence in each other are as great and strong, as the proofs show it to have been in this case.' The proofs sustain this finding. William was ill for some time previous to his death, and Clara did menial work to earn money to support him and to pay the insurance dues. The defense to her claim is that she had been previously married to one Baker, and that she never had been divorced. She admits her marriage to Baker in 1875 in the state of New York; that she lived with him until 1882; that they had one child; that they separated, and she came to Michigan. Defendant Eleanor insists that there is no proof of a divorce from Baker, who is still living. The evidence upon this point is that Baker delivered to a Mr. Hall, of Gowanda, N. Y., a document purporting to be a decree of divorce issued from a court in Pennsylvania, dissolving the marriage of Baker and his wife. Mr. and Mrs. Hall both testify that Mr. Hall received such a document from Baker; that they read it; that it purported to be a decree of divorce; that they then sent it to Clara, at Charlotte, Mich., where she was then living. It is proved conclusively that this document, whatever it was, was received by Clara. This was before her marriage with William. Relying upon this as a valid divorce, she and William contracted the marriage. The deposition of Baker was taken on behalf of Eleanor, and he testified that he gave her a document; that he thought it was an agreement of separation, and not a divorce; and that he was never legally divorced from her. The court held that Clara was legally entitled to the fund.

Joseph L. Hooper and L. H. Sabin, for appellant.

Dean & Davids, for appellee.

D. D. Altkin, for complainant.

GRANT J. (after stating the facts).

The marriage was valid if the parties were competent to contract it. No formal ceremony is essential to the validity of a marriage. Hutchins v. Kimmell, 31 Mich. 126, 18 Am. Rep. 164; Peet v. Peet, 52 Mich. 464, 18 N.W. 220. Counsel for defendant Eleanor cite authorities holding that a marriage is void if either party thereto has another wife or husband living. The validity of marriage does not depend upon the good faith of the parties entering into it. Both parties must be competent to contract. Unless both are single, their marriage is void, however innocently they may have entered into that relation. It is not necessary to cite authorities to this proposition. But this rigid rule has not been applied in insurance policies of the mutual benefit associations, now so common, where the parties have acted in good faith. The policy in this case was not issued under section 7740 et seq. of the Compiled Laws. That was an act passed in 1893 (Act No. 119, Pub. Acts 1893), while this policy was issued in 1890. The record does not contain the articles of association under which the policy was issued. The act of 1893 expressly provides 'that when the laws of any such association already provide that an affianced wife, or any person who is dependent upon the member for maintenance, food, clothing, lodging or education, may be made the beneficiary, payment of death benefits may be made to such beneficiaries.'

The briefs do not refer to the original articles of association or cite the act under which the original association was organized. Counsel for defendant Eleanor quote a bylaw of the association applicable to this case, and admitted by them to be consistent with the charter. That by-law reads as follows: 'No life benefit certificate shall be made payable to any person other than the wife, husband, children, dependent, mother, father, sister, etc., of...