Supry v. Bolduc

Decision Date24 July 1972
Docket NumberNo. 6369,6369
Citation293 A.2d 767,112 N.H. 274
PartiesRichard E. SUPRY v. Beatrice BOLDUC.
CourtNew Hampshire Supreme Court

Perkins & Douglas and W. H. Dale Townley-Tilson, Concord, by brief, for plaintiff.

Upton, Sanders & Upton, and J. Gilbert Upton, Concord, by brief, for defendant.

KENISON, Chief Justice.

The question for decision is whether defendant is entitled to the protection of any privilege in an action for slander based upon remarks made by her directed at the plaintiff during a public hearing upon plaintiff's request for a zoning variance.

The case was transferred to this court upon an agreed statement of facts. They indicate that in September, 1970, the plaintiff, Richard E. Supry, applied to the building inspector of the city of Concord for a zoning permit to erect a concrete garage. The application was denied and subsequently referred to the Concord Zoning Board of Adjustment for a hearing on whether a variance from the terms of the ordinance should be issued.

The board of adjustment held a public hearing on the question in October, 1970. The plaintiff appeared and testified in favor of his petition for a variance. The defendant, Beatrice Bolduc, an owner of adjoining property, appeared and spoke in opposition to the petition. Her testimony, given under oath, was recorded, transcribed, and made a part of the record transferred here. After deliberation, the zoning board of adjustment denied plaintiff's petition.

Thereafter, plaintiff commenced this suit alleging that the defendant had slandered him at the public hearing. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss claiming that her remarks concerning the plaintiff were made during a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding and were therefore absolutely privileged. The question of privilege was reserved and transferred by the Superior Court (Dunfey, J.). For purposes of our decision, we treat all facts properly pleaded by the plaintiff and the reasonable inferences therefrom as true and construe them most favorably to the plaintiff.

Zoning boards and commissions are created by the legislature as a part of an administrative organization designed to effect flexible application of zoning rules, regulations and restrictions. They are delegated administrative power with respect to permits, variances and nonconforming uses in order to provide a forum to individual property owners and others to voice the pro and con of zoning law, its application and administration. 'Boards of adjustment, zoning appeals or review and the like are administrative, discretionary, fact-finding and nonlegislative bodies and agencies.' 8A McQuillin, Municipal Corporations s. 25.229, at 125 (1965 rev. vol.) (footnotes omitted). That they may exercise quasi-judicial functions, powers and duties as concomitant to their delegated authority seems generally accepted. Id. at s. 25.230; Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1296 (1956). Still, many elements of a true judicial proceeding which afford safeguards to the participants therein are not made a part of the required procedure at hearings held before such boards and commissions. See 1 Davis, Administrative Law s. 8.03, at 520 (1958). Compare Ellish v. Goldman, 117 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup.Ct.1952), with Bleecker v. Drury, 149 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1945); see RSA 31:82 (providing for admissibility of evidence transferred from zoning board of adjustment on appeal to trial court though evidence would be inadmissible if offered to said court in first instance due to application of rules of evidence).

We find meager support for defendant's contention that her remarks made before the zoning board of adjustment were entitled to the protection of an absolute privilege. 3 Anderson, American Law of Zoning s. 16.29 (1968); cf. J.D. Construction Corp. v. Isaacs, 95 N.J.Super. 122, 230 A.2d 168 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 51 N.J. 263, 239 A.2d 657 (1968). Nor do we feel that the public or private interests sought to be effectuated by public hearings held prior to the allowance or refusal of a...

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38 cases
  • Butler v. Town of Argo
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • June 30, 2003
    ...of expression without inquiry into a defendant's motives.'" Webster v. Byrd, 494 So.2d 31, 35 (Ala.1986)(quoting Supry v. Bolduc, 112 N.H. 274, 276, 293 A.2d 767, 769 (1972)). "`An absolutely privileged communication is one in respect of which, by reason of the occasion on which, or the mat......
  • Rossi v. Town of Pelham, Civil No. 96-139-SD.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire
    • September 29, 1997
    ...that "the administration of government should not be hampered by the fear of lawsuits." PROSSER AND KEETON at 821; Supry v. Bolduc, 112 N.H. 274, 276, 293 A.2d 767 (1972). Selectmen have authority to manage the "prudential affairs" of the town, empowering them to do "`only such acts as are ......
  • Priore v. Haig
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • September 7, 2022
    ...that it mandates complete freedom of expression without inquiry into a [speaker's] motives." (Citations omitted.) Supry v. Bolduc , 112 N.H. 274, 275–76, 293 A.2d 767 (1972). We find the rationale of our sister state courts persuasive.Accordingly, having concluded that a hearing on a specia......
  • McGranahan v. Dahar
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of New Hampshire
    • October 24, 1979
    ...privilege, the question whether the defendant is entitled to claim the privilege is a question for the trier of fact. Supry v. Bolduc, 112 N.H. 274, 293 A.2d 767 (1972). Therefore, the matter can rarely be disposed of on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Thomson v. Cash, 119 N.H.......
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