Supulver v. Gilchrist & Dawson Inc.

CourtNew Mexico Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtPARKER, J.
CitationSupulver v. Gilchrist & Dawson Inc., 28 N.M. 339, 211 P. 595, 1922 NMSC 60 (N.M. 1922)
Decision Date29 September 1922
Docket NumberNo. 2624.,2624.
PartiesSUPULVER ET AL.v.GILCHRIST & DAWSON, INC., ET AL.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Syllabus by the Court.

Under section 1536, Code 1915, a defendant in a larceny case is, after conviction, barred from litigating the question of the ownership of the stolen property with the owner thereof as alleged in the indictment.

Where a party has had no opportunity to plead estoppel or former adjudication, he may nevertheless show the same in proof, and avail himself thereof.

Appeal from District Court, Lincoln County; Ed Mechem, Judge.

Action by George W. Supulver and others against Gilchrist & Dawson, Incorporated, and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded, with instructions.

Where a party has had no opportunity to plead estoppel or former adjudication, he may nevertheless show the same in proof, and avail himself thereof.

Percy Wilson, of Silver City, and H. B. Hamilton, of Carrizozo, for appellants.

Geo. W. Prichard, of Santa Fé, for appellees.

PARKER, J.

The appellee on September 5, 1919, was indicted in Grant county for the larceny and the embezzlement of $2,619.05 in money, the property of the appellant in this case. On September 15, 1919, he entered his plea of guilty to the charges contained in the indictment, and on September 22, 1919, he was sentenced on his plea to serve a term in the state penitentiary of not less than three nor more than five years. Thereupon the money, which had been seized by the officers who arrested appellee, was delivered to appellant. Thereafter, on November 27, 1919, this action was brought by appellee in Lincoln county against appellant for money had and received to the use of appellee in the sum of $2,619.05. The appellant pleaded a general denial. The trial resulted in a general verdict for appellee for $2,369.05, and the jury made special findings as follows:

“Q. Is George W. Supulver, the plaintiff in this case, the same George W. Supulver who was by indictment No. 7364 of the Grant county district court charged with larceny of $2,619.05, of the property of Gilchrist & Dawson. Incorporated? A. Yes.

Q. Is the Gilchrist & Dawson, Incorporated, a corporation, referred to in the indictment No. 7364 of the Grant county district court the same Gilchrist & Dawson, a corporation, which is defendant in this cause? A. Yes.

Q. Is the $2,619.05 in money referred to in said indictment No. 7364 of the Grant county district court the same money for the recovery of which this action is brought? A. Yes.

Q. Is the $2,619.05 in money referred to in said indictment No. 7364 of the Grant county district court the same money which it has been testified in this case was taken from the possession of the plaintiff George W. Supulver? A. Yes.”

At the close of the trial counsel for appellant moved for an instructed verdict upon the ground that the proof showed that the money sued for in the case was the same money taken from the possession of the appellee, and which was the subject of the indictment heretofore mentioned, to which indictment appellee had pleaded guilty, and that therefore there was no issue of fact to submit to the jury. This motion was denied, and the case went to the jury, and resulted in the verdict heretofore mentioned, and, judgment being entered on the verdict, this appeal was taken.

[1] 1. Counsel for appellant argue that the indictment, plea of guilty, and sentence of the appellee operate as an adjudication of the title to the money involved, and estops the appellee from asserting claim to the same by force of the provisions of section 1536, Code 1915, which is as follows:

“The officer who shall arrest any person charged as a principal or accessory in any robbery or larceny, shall secure the property charged to have been stolen, and shall be responsible for the same and shall annex a list of the same on his return of the warrant and upon conviction of the offender the stolen property shall be returned to the owner: Provided, That if the owner of the articles stolen or taken shall prove his legal ownership before any court, it shall be restored to him forthwith.”

By the ancient common law an order for restoring stolen goods could be obtained only by the now obsolete proceeding by appeal. In 1529, however, the statute of 21 Hen. 8, c. 11, was enacted, and provided that justices of gaol delivery might, after conviction, award writs of restitution of the property to the owner. This statute is a part of our common law. 2 Bishop's New Cr. Proc. 755 et seq. Although this statute contemplated a writ to be issued by the court, it was liberally construed, and the actual writ was soon dispensed with, and the property was simply turned over to the owner as his own. Thus in 1 Chitty's Cr. Law (5th Am. Ed.) 820, it is said:

“The justices of gaol delivery are, by the statute 21 Hen. 8, c. 11, directed to award a writ of restitution to the owner, as soon as the felon is convicted. But, it is said, that no such writ has, for upwards of 200 years, been issued; but the constant practice is for the judges or justices, without any precept, to order the goods brought into court to be restored to the parties indicting. And, after the conviction of the offender, the proprietor may take his goods wherever he can find them, so that it be effected without any breach of the peace, because he satisfied public justice, and is entitled to a writ of restitution, whenever he thinks fit to demand it.”

In Isaacs v. State, 23 Md. 410, the statute (Code 1860, art. 30, § 98) is quoted in the syllabus to the effect that the person found guilty of larceny “shall restore the money, goods or things taken, to the owner, or shall pay to him the full value thereof.” In commenting upon the meaning of this section the court said:

“By referring again to the 98th section of the 30th article of the Code, it will be readily perceived that this part or clause of the section is merely declaratory of the rights of the owner to the things stolen, and of the duty of restoration or payment by the prisoner.”

In this particular the statute of Maryland, while different in form, is like ours in substance, in this, that it amounts to a declaration that upon the conviction of a person charged with larceny the owner thereupon has a right to the things stolen without any further adjudication.

In Pennsylvania ...

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3 cases
  • Eagle, Etc., Ins. Co. v. Heller
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • November 17, 1927
    ...only prima facie, evidence of the facts stated therein, which, although jurisdictional, could be contradicted. In Supulver Gilchrist & Dawson (1922), 28 N.M. 339, 211 Pac. 595, it was held that a conviction larceny conclusively established the ownership or right of property as between the t......
  • First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • June 24, 1964
    ...364, 54 A.L.R.2d 316; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. George Colon & Co., Inc. (1932), 260 N.Y. 305, 183 N.E. 506; Supulver v. Gilchrist & Dawson, Inc. (1922), 28 N.M. 339, 211 P. 595; Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co. (D.Ct.Mass., 1960), 181 F.Supp. 298. See also Schimke, Adm'x, v. Earley (1962), 1......
  • Williams v. Miller, 5754
    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • June 28, 1954
    ...were concerned, was whether the gas company was negligent. The defendants also rely on the case of Supulver v. Gilchrist & Dawson, Inc., 1922, 28 N.M. 339, 211 P. 595, 596, where one who had been convicted of embezzlement thereafter brought suit for money had and received for the amount tha......