Surat v. Klamser, 21-1284
| Docket Number | 21-1284 |
| Decision Date | 09 November 2022 |
| Citation | 52 F.4th 1261 |
| Parties | Michaella Lynn SURAT, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Randall KLAMSER, in his individual capacity, Defendant - Appellant, and City of Fort Collins, Colorado, a municipality, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Andrew D. Ringel, Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Denver, Colorado (Mark S. Ratner, Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Denver, Colorado; and John R. Duval, Deputy City Attorney, Fort Collins, Colorado, with him on the briefs), for Defendant – Appellant.
Catherine E. Ordoñez, Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP (Andrew McNulty and David A. Lane with her on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff – Appellee.
Before BACHARACH, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellee Michaella Lynn Surat brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant-Appellant Officer Randall Klamser, alleging he violated her right to be free from excessive force during her arrest for misdemeanor charges of obstructing a peace officer and resisting arrest. Officer Klamser moved to dismiss based on Heck v. Humphrey ,1 arguing Ms. Surat's claim was barred by her underlying convictions. The district court granted Officer Klamser's motion, in part, holding that Heck did not bar Ms. Surat's claim that Officer Klamser used excessive force to overcome her resistance when he slammed her face-first into the ground.
Officer Klamser then moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, but the district court denied his motion. The district court concluded a reasonable jury could have found Officer Klamser used excessive force to overcome Ms. Surat's resistance to arrest. Additionally, the district court determined Officer Klamser's force violated clearly established law. In this interlocutory appeal from the denial of summary judgment, Officer Klamser asserts the district court erred because his use of force was reasonable and, alternatively, because the law did not clearly establish that his action during the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment.
Although we agree with the district court that Officer Klamser's use of force violated the Fourth Amendment, we disagree that clearly established law existing at the time of the incident would have put a reasonable officer on notice that his conduct was unlawful. Accordingly, we reverse.
In reviewing an interlocutory appeal from the denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity, this court "must accept any facts that the district court assumed in denying summary judgment." Amundsen v. Jones , 533 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we draw our facts from the district court's summary judgment order, in which the district court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Surat as the nonmoving party. We also include facts the parties do not dispute on appeal. See Walker v. City of Orem , 451 F.3d 1139, 1155 (10th Cir. 2006) ().
In April 2017, Ms. Surat was celebrating her twenty-second birthday at a bar in Fort Collins, Colorado. At approximately 11:12 p.m., two Fort Collins police officers, Officer Garrett Pastor and Officer Klamser, were dispatched to the bar in response to a reported disturbance involving Ms. Surat's then-boyfriend, Mitchell Waltz. While Officer Pastor spoke with Mr. Waltz, Officer Klamser spoke with the bar's bouncer. Ms. Surat attempted to exit the bar and "lightly bump[ed] [Officer] Klamser" as she walked past him. App. Vol. 5 at 93.
Ms. Surat approached Mr. Waltz and tried to walk away from the scene with him. Upon learning from the bouncer that Mr. Waltz was involved in the disturbance, Officer Klamser yelled to Officer Pastor that Mr. Waltz was not free to go. Officer Pastor began interviewing Mr. Waltz and Ms. Surat tried "to walk toward [Mr.] Waltz." Id. at 94. Officer Klamser, "standing six feet tall and weighing approximately 200 pounds," blocked the 115-pound Ms. Surat from obstructing Officer Pastor's interview. Id. at 97. He "placed [Ms.] Surat under arrest and held her by her wrist." Id. at 94. In response, Ms. Surat "attempted to pry [Officer Klamser's] fingers off of her arm and pawed at [his] arms." Id. Officer Klamser then used a takedown maneuver, "throwing [Ms.] Surat to the ground to subdue her." Id. Ms. Surat "sustained a concussion, cervical spine strain, contusions to her face, and bruising on her arms, wrists, knees, and legs." Id.
After the incident, Ms. Surat was charged with obstructing a peace officer and resisting arrest. Ms. Surat pleaded not guilty to both charges and asserted a theory of self-defense, arguing she used physical force against Officer Klamser to defend herself "from what a reasonable person would believe to be the use ... of unlawful physical force." App. Vol. 4 at 201. The jury rejected her theory of self-defense and convicted her of both charges.
In March 2019, Ms. Surat filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging Officer Klamser violated her constitutional rights by subjecting her to excessive force during her arrest.2 She alleged that in executing her arrest, Officer Klamser "used greater force than would have been reasonably necessary to effect the seizure ... by, among other things, pulling her arm by her wrist and throwing her face-first to the sidewalk." App. Vol. 1 at 32.
Officer Klamser filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Surat's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). He argued the court should dismiss Ms. Surat's excessive force claim because it was barred by Heck , as she relied on facts contrary to her convictions for resisting arrest and obstructing a peace officer. The district court granted in part and denied in part Officer Klamser's motion. The court dismissed with prejudice Ms. Surat's excessive force claim "except to the extent [Ms.] Surat claim[ed] [Officer] Klamser used excessive force to overcome her resistance to arrest." Id. at 154. Because the court understood Ms. Surat to be challenging both the takedown and the initial force of grabbing her arm that triggered her resistance, it concluded Heck barred only the latter portion of her excessive force claim. In denying in part Officer Klamser's motion to dismiss, the district court noted Ms. Surat had a "formidable" burden ahead of her in litigating this claim:
if [Officer] Klamser ever asserts qualified immunity (he ha[d] not done so in the Motion to Dismiss), then [Ms.] Surat's burden is even more formidable. She must prove that it was clearly established as of April [ ]2017, that a police officer attempting to effect a[n] arrest and being subjected to or threatened with physical force or violence, or facing a substantial risk of bodily injury, and who has already tried lawful lesser force to subdue the arrestee, cannot use the takedown maneuver used in this case to eliminate that actual or threatened force or risk of injury.
Id. at 168 ().
After engaging in discovery, Officer Klamser filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. He argued Ms. Surat could not meet the "formidable" burden outlined by the district court because, in light of her obstruction of a peace officer and resistance to arrest convictions, his "takedown" of Ms. Surat was objectively reasonable and did not violate clearly established law. The district court denied the motion. In doing so, it first concluded Ms. Surat had established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Officer Klamser's use of a "takedown" violated Ms. Surat's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force given her misdemeanor offense, minimal resistance, and that she did not pose an immediate threat to Officer Klamser or others. The district court then concluded Officer Klamser was not entitled to qualified immunity because clearly established law would have put a reasonable officer on notice "that an officer may not use a takedown maneuver on an unarmed misdemeanant who poses little to no threat to the officer's safety." App. Vol. 5 at 100.
Officer Klamser timely appealed the district court's ruling. Ms. Surat filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing this court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review Officer Klamser's arguments challenging the district court's denial of summary judgment.
Officer Klamser claims the district court erred in denying his summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity. We begin by setting forth the jurisdictional standards relevant to this appeal. After assuring ourselves of our jurisdiction, we address Officer Klamser's qualified immunity arguments.
Ms. Surat contends we lack jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal because the district court denied Officer Klamser's motion for summary judgment based on a finding of disputed issues of material fact. We disagree that this finding precludes our appellate jurisdiction over Officer Klamser's appeal.
Generally, we may exercise jurisdiction only over appeals from "final decisions of the district courts of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1291. "Orders denying summary judgment are ordinarily not appealable final decisions for purposes of § 1291." Duda v. Elder , 7 F.4th 899, 909 (10th Cir. 2021) (). Under the collateral order doctrine, however, we may also review "decisions that are conclusive on the question decided, resolve important questions separate from the merits, and are effectively unreviewable if not addressed through an interlocutory appeal." Id. (quotation marks omitted). This doctrine allows us to review interlocutory appeals from "the denial of qualified immunity to a public official to the extent it involves abstract issues of law." Id. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472...
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