Suratos v. Foster
| Decision Date | 12 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | 2:10-cv-01010-PMP-NJK |
| Parties | MILAGROS R. SURATOS, Petitioner, v. SHERYL FOSTER, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
This action is a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, by a Nevada state prisoner. This matter comes before the Court on the merits of the petition.
On April 18, 2007, the State charged petitioner with exploitation of an older person and neglect of an older person causing substantial bodily harm. (Exhibit 2).1 The case proceeded to a jury trial, and petitioner was convicted of both charges on November 20, 2008. (Exhibit 69). The judgment of conviction was filed on January 21, 2009. (Exhibit 74). Petitioner was sentenced to aterm of 24 to 96 months imprisonment on Count I, and 24 to 60 months imprisonment on Count II, with the terms running concurrently. (Id.). Petitioner was further ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $22,000.00. (Id.).
Petitioner appealed her conviction to the Nevada Supreme Court. (Exhibit 80). On May 7, 2010, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and denied petitioner's direct appeal on the merits. (Exhibit 109). Petitioner did not file a state habeas petition. On June 24, 2010, this Court received petitioner's federal habeas petition. (ECF No. 1). Respondents filed an answer. (ECF No. 9). Although petitioner was granted the opportunity to do so, petitioner did not file a reply to the answer. (See ECF No. 4, at p. 2).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), provides the legal standard for the Court's consideration of this habeas petition:
The AEDPA "modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-694 (2002). A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases" or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable froma decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Supreme Court's] precedent." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (). The formidable standard set forth in section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is "'a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. _, _, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979)).
A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). The "unreasonable application" clause requires the state court decision to be more than merely incorrect or erroneous; the state court's application of clearly established federal law must be objectively unreasonable. Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409). In determining whether a state court decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law, this Court looks to the state courts' last reasoned decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 944 (2001).
In a federal habeas proceeding, "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct," and the petitioner "shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome the burden set in § 2254(d) and (e) on the record that was before the state court. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1400 (2011).
Petitioner asserts that the state district court erred in failing to dismiss potential juror #12 for cause, thus violating her due process rights. Petitioner's contention lacks merit because she has failed to rebut the state court's presumptively correct finding that the challenged juror could serve fairly and impartially. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1); Greene v. Georgia, 519 U.S. 145, 146 (per curium) ("federal courts must accord a presumption of correctness to state courts' finding of juror bias."). In addressing this claim, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled as follows:
Appellant Milagros R. Suratos claims that the district court erred in denying her challenge to a member of the venire for cause. The decision whether to remove a prospective juror for cause lies within the broad discretion of the district court. Weber v. State, 121 Nev. 554, 580, 119 P.3d 107, 125 (2005). We conclude that the district court did not err because the prospective juror did not express an opinion regarding the merits of the case and was able to confidently state that, despite her sympathy for vulnerable seniors, she could be a fair and impartial juror and her sympathy would not influence her verdict. Seeid. at 581, 119 P.3d at 125 ().
(Exhibit 109, at p. 1). The factual findings of the state court are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner has failed to meet the burden of proving that the Nevada Supreme Court's ruling was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court, or that the ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Habeas relief on Ground One of the federal petition is denied.
Petitioner asserts that the State was estopped from charging her with exploitation in light of the findings of the probate court, in violation of her due process rights. Petitioner does not identify which findings of the probate court she believes were binding on the State and she fails to provide any documentation of the probate proceedings. The record reveals that the probate court did notmake any factual findings regarding the victim's competency, the validity of the victim's will, or any other matter related to petitioner's criminal case. (Exhibit 61, at p. 69 (); Exhibit 63, at pp. 129, 134 ().
Even if the probate court had made factual findings, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable where, as here, one of the parties in the present litigation was not a party in the former litigation. Wilson v. Belleque, 554 F.3d 816, 830 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, 'means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment that issue cannot be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.'" (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Respondents were not parties to the matter litigated in the probate court, thus the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable in this case. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected petitioner's claim as follows:
Suratos claims that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the State from pursing the exploitation charge. This claim lacks merit because no issues of fact or law were litigated and determined by the probate court that approved the settlement of the will contest brought by the victim's heirs. SeeYates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 335 (1957) (), overruled on other grounds by Burks v. Unite States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978); seealsoFive Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. _, _, 194 P.3d 709, 713 (2008) ().
(Exhibit 109, at p. 2). The factual findings of the state court are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner has failed to meet the burden of proving that the Nevada Supreme Court's ruling was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court, or that the ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Habeas relief is denied on Ground Two of the federal petition.
In Grounds Three and Four, petitioner asserts that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support the convictions of neglect causing substantial bodily harm of an older person and exploitation of an older person.
When...
To continue reading
Request your trial