Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests, Inc. v. Joyce

Decision Date15 July 2013
Docket NumberCase No. 4:12CV1501 ERW.
Citation941 F.Supp.2d 1078
PartiesSURVIVORS NETWORK OF THOSE ABUSED BY PRIESTS, INC.; David Biersmith; Holly Hesemann; and Call To Action, Inc.; Plaintiffs, v. Jennifer M. JOYCE, solely in her official capacity as the Circuit Attorney for the City of St. Louis, Missouri; Samuel Dotson, III, solely in his official capacity as the Chief of Police for the Metropolitan Police Department for the City of St. Louis, Missouri; Chris Koster, solely in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of Missouri; and Ronald K. Replogle, solely in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Missouri Highway Patrol; Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Grant R. Doty, Anthony E. Rothert, American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiffs.

John A. Hirth, Attorney General of Missouri, Jefferson City, MO, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

E. RICHARD WEBBER, Senior District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [ECF No. 43] filed by Plaintiffs Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests, Inc. (SNAP), David Biersmith, Holly Hesemann, and Call to Action, Inc.; and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 46].

Plaintiffs have filed an Amended Complaint against Defendants Jennifer M. Joyce, solely in her official capacity as the Circuit Attorney for the City of St. Louis; Samuel Dotson, III, solely in his official capacity as the Chief of Police for the Metropolitan Police Department of St. Louis; Chris Koster, solely in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of Missouri; and Ronald K. Replogle, solely in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Missouri Highway Patrol [ECF No. 21]. In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in an action challenging provisions of recently enacted Missouri Revised Statute § 574.035. Plaintiffs assert three counts in their Amended Complaint, alleging that the statute, also known as the House of Worship Protection Act,” is unconstitutional under the free speech provisions of the First Amendment (Count I), the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Count II), and, as well, the free speech guarantee of Article I, § 8 of the Missouri State Constitution (Count III). Defendants are charged with enforcing the statute.

The challenged statute, Missouri Revised Statutes § 574.035, “House of worship protection act—disrupting a house of worship, violation, penalty,” became effective on August 28, 2012, and provides:

1. This section shall be known and may be cited as the House of Worship Protection Act.

2. For purposes of this section, “house of worship” means any church, synagogue, mosque, other building or structure, or public or private place used for religious worship, religious instruction, or other religious purpose.

3. A person commits the crime of disrupting a house of worship if such person:

(1) Intentionally and unreasonably disturbs, interrupts, or disquiets any house of worship by using profane discourse, rude or indecent behavior, or making noise either within the house of worship or so near it as to disturb the order and solemnity of the worship services; or

(2) Intentionally injures, intimidates, or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate, or interfere with any person lawfully exercising the right of religious freedom in or outside of a house of worship or seeking access to a house of worship, whether by force, threat, or physical obstruction.

4. Disrupting a house of worship is a class B misdemeanor. Any second offense is a class A misdemeanor. Any third or subsequent offense is a class D felony.

In a Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed in this matter, Plaintiffs requested this Court to issue a preliminary injunction, enjoining enforcement of Missouri Revised Statutes § 574.035, until further order of the Court; waive bond or set bond in a nominal amount; and allow Plaintiffs such other and further relief as is just and proper under the circumstances. Plaintiffs alleged that they engage in peaceful protest activities, including leaf-letting and holding signs, on public sidewalks outside churches and other locations used for religious purposes. They further alleged that they regularly engage in such activities to spread their messages near houses of worship in Missouri, and would like to continue to do so without risk of arrest or prosecution. Plaintiffs contended that the restrictions of § 574.035 would chill Plaintiffs and others from engaging in protected expressive activity.

After hearing argument from the parties, the Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction on September 28, 2012, 2012 WL 4481210, finding that the Plaintiffs had not made a sufficient showing that they had a likelihood for success at trial [ECF No. 33]. The Court further found that § 574.035 does not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial degree of its restriction on speech fails to serve to advance its purpose, and that the harm granting an injunction would impose upon individuals exercising their freedom of religion outweighed any harm to Plaintiffs if no order were issued. In its Order, however, the Court emphasized that the findings and conclusions, which led it to determine Plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, were not binding in the forthcoming proceedings on the Plaintiffs' Complaint; and the Court stated that it was not determining the constitutionality of the statute in its decision denying Plaintiffs injunctive relief.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff SNAP and its members regularly picket and distribute leaflets outside of churches, including churches in the City of St. Louis, where clergy, alleged to have sexually abused children, have served. The purpose of SNAP's activities in these locations is to reach an audience of individuals, who may have been physically, sexually, or emotionally abused by clergy members, with SNAP's message that victims of such child abuse are not alone and that victims have certain rights.

When SNAP learns of a new allegation that a child has been abused, some of their members visit the church where it is alleged that the abuse occurred, to make potential victims aware that they have support, and to encourage conversation between parents and their children to determine if other victims might exist.

Plaintiff Call to Action (CTA) and its members participate in peaceful vigils outside of houses of worship across the country, including sites in Missouri, to advance the organization's mission of educating, inspiring, and activating Catholics to act for justice and to build inclusive communities. Messages conveyed by participants in CTA's pickets include support for: full equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people both in the Church and in civil society, including marriage equality; women's rights, including ordination and participation as altar girls; racial justice; and protecting children from abusive clergy.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court may grant a motion for summary judgment only if all of the information before the court shows “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has noted that [s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’ Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citation omitted). “By its terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)(emphasis in original). Material facts are those “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a genuine material fact is one such that “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Further, if the non-moving party has failed to “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, ... there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

The initial burden of proof in a motion for summary judgment is placed on the moving party to establish the non-existence of any genuine issue of fact that is material to a judgment in its favor. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Assoc'd Elec. Co-op., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988). Once this burden is discharged, if the record does in fact bear out that no genuine dispute exists, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party who must set forth affirmative evidence and specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute on that issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). When the burden shifts, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations in its pleadings, but by affidavit and other evidence must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). To meet its burden, the non-moving party may not rest on the pleadings alone and must “do more than simply show there is some...

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