Susan Calvo, John Peters Prof'l Limousines, Inc. v. City of N.Y.
| Decision Date | 21 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | 14-CV-7246 (VEC) |
| Parties | SUSAN CALVO, JOHN PETERS PROFESSIONAL LIMOUSINES, INC., JACKLYN RESTREPO, PEDRO CAMACHO, EAMON YUEL and YONG ZHANG individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, MEERA JOSHI, DAVID YASSKY, and RAYMOND SCANLON, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
This case involves the former policy and practice of the Defendant City of New York ("City") to seize vehicles that were being used illegally as vehicles for hire without a warrant and prior to a hearing. Holding in hand this Court's decision that the City's policy was unconstitutional as applied to so-called first time violators, Plaintiffs now seek class certification. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is DENIED without prejudice.
The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the facts of this case and directs readers to its prior opinion. See Harrell v. City of N.Y. ("Harrell I"), 138 F. Supp. 3d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). For the purposes of this opinion, the following facts merit repetition.
Prior to this Court's summary judgment decision, when a police officer or Taxi and Limousine Commission ("TLC") inspector had probable cause to believe that a vehicle was being operated as an unlicensed vehicle for hire in violation of N.Y. City Administrative Code ("Code") § 19-506(b)(1), the officer or inspector was authorized to seize the vehicle prior to an administrative hearing on the alleged violation. Harrell I, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 485 (citing Code § 19-506(h)(1); 35 R.C.N.Y. §§ 68-23(b)(2), (c)(2)). The TLC would issue a summons for the alleged violation to the operator and the registered owner, if different from the operator, of the vehicle that was seized. Murray Decl. ¶ 4.1 The seized vehicle was not released until the administrative hearing, unless the owner or operator either (1) pleaded guilty to the Section 19-506(b)(1) violation and paid a fine or (2) posted a bond. Harrell I, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 485 (citing Code § 19-506(h)(1); 35 R.C.N.Y. § 68-23(d)(2)). In addition, the TLC required payment of the seized vehicle's towing and storage fees before it would release the vehicle; if the Section 19-506(b)(1) violation was ultimately dismissed, those fees would be returned. See SJ Mem. 4; see also SJ Oral Arg. Tr. 10:9-12 ( ).
The Court concluded that this policy was unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments as applied to vehicle owners with no prior violations in the preceding 36 months ("first-time violators"), and granted Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment as to liability relative to first-time violators. Harrell I, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 496.2 Upon reconsideration, the Court reaffirmed its grant of summary judgment as to liability relative to Plaintiffs Michael Harrell, Jaclyn Restrepo, and Peter Camacho, but denied Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment as to liability relative to Plaintiffs Susan Calvo and John Peters Professional Limousines ("JPPL"). Harrell v. City of N.Y. ("Harrell II"), No. 14-CV-7246 (VEC), 2015 WL 9275683 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2015). In so holding, the Court found that there were questions of fact whether Plaintiffs Calvo and JPPL were actually first-time violators at the time of their complained-of seizures. Harrell II, 2015 WL 9275683, at *4.
The Court then granted Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to add new plaintiffs. Dkt. 80. Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint, adding Eamon Yuel and Yong Zhang as new plaintiffs. Dkt. 101. The parties completed fact discovery, including discovery relevant to class certification. After receiving from the City spreadsheets listing all putative class members ("Class Lists"), the parties were permitted to conduct discovery into one of every five of those putative class members.
Plaintiffs have moved for class certification. Dkt. 165. Defendants oppose Plaintiffs' motion on a variety of grounds, including that the proposed class is not ascertainable, that members of the putative class lack Article III standing, and that the proposed class fails to meet the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs' motion without prejudice.
Article III standing is "the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit." Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 263 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). "The filing of suit as a class action does not relax this jurisdictional requirement." Id. To establish Article III standing, the "plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision."Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
Because these Article III requirements are "an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element [of standing] must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)); see also In re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., Nos. 11 MD 2293 (DLC), 12 Civ. 3394 (DLC), 2014 WL 1641699, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2014) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358). Accordingly, Plaintiff's burden to show Article III standing becomes higher as the case proceeds:
At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim. In response to a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts, which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true. And at the final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). Here, at class certification, Plaintiffs must prove standing by a preponderance of the evidence. See Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 2008) ().
In connection with class certification, "[t]he class must [] be defined in such a way that anyone within it would have standing." Denney, 443 F.3d at 264. Although it is not necessary that each member of the putative class submit evidence of personal standing, "no class may be certified that contains members lacking Article III standing." Id. at 263-64. Put differently,"Article III's jurisdictional requirements [apply] to each member of a class." In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 509 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Denney), rev'd on other grounds, Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). Ultimately, the Article III standing inquiry must be examined through the prism of the class definition, and, in this Circuit, a class cannot be certified if any person captured within that definition lacks Article III standing. See Denney, 443 F.3d at 263-64.3
Plaintiffs' class definition is like a magical shape-shifter; it changed form multiple times within Plaintiffs' own brief and even during oral argument. In their opening brief, Plaintiffs used various class definitions: they first proposed a class of "all 'straight plate' vehicle owners whose vehicles were seized . . . ," Mem. 1 (emphasis added); two pages later, the class definition morphed into "all owners and operators of 'straight plate' vehicles seized . . . ," Mem. 3 (emphasis added);4 the definition later became "all persons who . . . had their vehicle seized," Mem. 8 (emphases added). In their reply brief, Plaintiffs stated that their definition encompassed "all persons who . . . had their vehicle seized," Reply 2 (emphases added), but that definition was offered under a section title stating "[t]he class comprises owners," Reply 2 (emphasis added), and Plaintiffs argued on the following page that they had standing because "everyone on the Class Lists is a registered owner of a seized vehicle," Reply 3 (emphasis added). At oral argument, Plaintiffs represented that they were abandoning a class definition that included the operators of the vehicles that were seized and that their desired class definition encompassed "only the registered owners." Tr. 4:12-19. But as oral argument continued, Plaintiffs proposedyet another class definition: "not only the people who were the registered owners but the people who were treated as the owners of the vehicles by the defendants in the course of the seizure program." Tr. 13:23-14:2.
The problem with Plaintiffs' class definition(s) is not just volatility—although that aspect is troublesome. All of Plaintiffs' proposed definitions identify the class according to the registered owners (or whom the City treated as the registered owners) of the vehicles that were seized. Defendants contend that, under the facts of this case, the mere fact that an individual is a registered owner of a vehicle is not sufficient for Article III standing to challenge that vehicle's seizure. The Court agrees.
The Second Circuit has made clear that in assessing Article III standing, "while...
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