Susan Taylor v. Sextus Taylor

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Citation232 U.S. 363,34 S.Ct. 350,58 L.Ed. 638
Docket NumberNo. 224,224
PartiesSUSAN J. TAYLOR, as Administratrix of the Goods, Chattels, and Credits which were of Howard E. Taylor, Deceased, Plff. in Err., v. SEXTUS E. TAYLOR
Decision Date24 February 1914

Messrs. Frederic D. McKenney, John Spalding Flannery, and William Hitz for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 364 intentionally omitted] No brief was filed for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff in error and defendant in error are respectively the widow and father of one Howard Taylor, a resident of Orange county, state of New York, who, through the negligence of the Erie Railroad Company, met with an accident which caused his death.

Plaintiff in error was appointed the administratrix of his estate, with right to prosecute any right of action granted by special provision of law as such administratrix. She brought suit, as such administratrix, against the railroad company for damages, alleging the employment of her husband in interstate commerce upon a train running from Port Jervis, New York, to Jersey City, New Jersey, the negligence of the railroad company as the cause of his death, and that the action was brought under the act of Congress of April 22, 1908 [35 Stat. at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322], entitled, 'An Act Relating to Liability of Common Carriers by Railroads to their Employees in Certain Cases,' known as the employers' liability law.

By permission or the surrogate of Orange county, she compromised with the railroad, accepting a judgment for $5,000.

Defendant in error filed a petition in the supreme court of Orange county for an order directing plaintiff in error to pay over to him one half of the net proceeds of the judgment in accordance with the statute of distribution of the state. The motion was denied and an order was entered determining that plaintiff in error, as widow of the deceased, was entitled to receive and retain for her own use all of the net proceeds of the judgment. The order was reversed by the appellate division of the supreme court, and the judgment of reversal, on appeal to the court of appeals, was affirmed and the record re- mitted to the supreme court. This writ of error was then prosecuted.

The appellate division was of opinion that the law of the state gave the right of action and determined the distribution of the proceeds of the judgment. Considering the act of Congress and its provisions, the court was of the view that the act of Congress 'should be construed as one granting a new remedy under certain circumstances, where none, or a less adequate one, existed under the state laws, and as not intended to supplant or abrogate a right of action of practically equal extent existing under the laws of this state.' [144 App. Div. 641, 129 N. Y. Supp. 378.] The court further said: 'It is only on the theory that this act of Congress constitutes the exclusive rule applicable to the facts of the case before us that the order of the special term [the order under review] can be upheld. If the remedy afforded by our laws be concurrent with that provided by Congress, then we think that our public policy will not permit an administratrix appointed by our courts under our laws, to use the Federal statute simply for the purpose of defeating our statute of distribution of personal property.' The court of appeals expressed the opinion that the case presented a case of conflict between the Federal and state statutes, and determined that the state statutes must prevail. It was said that the power of Congress 'to regulate interstate commerce must end somewhere, and so far as employees of common carriers engaged in interstate commerce are concerned, it appears to us that it must end with the death of the employee.' [204 N. Y. 140, 97 N. E. 502, Ann. Cas. 1913 D. 276.] And considering that the consequences of a contrary doctrine would give Congress power over the distribution of real estate which might happen to be purchased by the earnings of an employee in interstate commerce, the court declared that the act of Congress, in so far as it attempted to distribute the funds in controversy, was 'invalid and unauthorized.' There were dissenting opinions expressed. The judgment of the appellate division of the supreme court was affirmed, and the record was remitted to the supreme court, to be proceeded upon according to law, and the judgment of the latter court was entered conformably thereto.

We have had many occasions to declare the comprehensive and exclusive power which Congress possesses over interstate commerce. And starting with that power as a factor, we have only to consider the breadth and meaning of the act of Congress.

Section 1 provides that every common carrier by railroad, while engaged in interstate commerce, 'shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin, dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier,' or by reason of any defect in its instrumentalities.

Section 6, as amended April 5, 1910, provides that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several states, and if the action be brought in a state court it shall not be removed to a court of the United States.

Section 9, as amended, is as follows:

'That any right of action given by this act to a person suffering injury shall survive to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee, and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee; but in such cases there shall be only one recovery for the same injury.' [36 Stat. at L. 291, chap. 143, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1324.]

The act has come up for consideration in a number of cases. In Second Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U. S. 1, 56 L. ed. 327, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 44, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169, 1 N. C. C. A. 875, it and its amendments were declared to be constitutional; that having been enacted in pursuance of a power reserved to Congress, state laws must give away to them. They established the policy for all, it was decided, and the courts of a state cannot refuse to enforce them on the ground that they are not in harmony with the...

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