Suslak v. United States

• Citation: 213 F. 913
• Decision Date: 04 May 1914
• Docket Number: 2315.
• Parties: SUSLAK v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

213 F. 913

SUSLAK v. UNITED STATES.

No. 2315.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

May 4, 1914

Odell W. McConnell, of Helena, Mont., for plaintiff in error.

Burton K. Wheeler, U.S. Atty., of Butte, Mont., and S. C. Ford. Asst. U.S. Atty., of Helena, Mont.

Before GILBERT and ROSS, Circuit Judges, and DIETRICH, District Judge.

DIETRICH District Judge.

Suslak the plaintiff in error, hereinafter called defendant, was convicted of violating the White Slave Act (Act June 25 1910, c. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p 1343)), and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment and to pay a fine and costs. The indictment contains 12 counts, all relating to the going of a woman named Grace Beal from Spokane, Wash., to Butte, Mont., on the 5th day of January, 1912. In the first count the charge is that defendant and one Max Fried, jointly indicted with him, caused the woman to be transported for the purpose of prostitution. In the second count unlawful cohabitation is designated as the purpose; in the third count, debauchery; in the fourth, an intent to induce her to become a prostitute; and, in the fifth, an intent to induce her to give herself up to debauchery. In the sixth, seventh, and eighth counts the charge is that the defendant procured for her her railroad ticket; the intent or purpose alleged being either prostitution (sixth count), or debauchery (seventh count), or to induce her to give herself up to debauchery (eighth count). In counts 9 and 10 the charge is of persuading and inducing her to come to Butte for the purpose of prostitution (ninth count), or for debauchery (tenth count); and such in substance are also the eleventh and twelfth counts.

That the woman went from Spokane to Butte at the time alleged and upon the same train with Fried is conceded. So also it is not questioned that prior to that time the defendant had maintained illicit relations with her, and that immediately upon her arrival at Butte he took her from the depot to a room which he had secured for that purpose, and there renewed the illicit relations, and that a few days later she unreservedly gave herself up to prostitution.

It is first assigned as error that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. The point was not raised at the trial by motion or request for an instruction to the jury, and upon that ground alone perhaps we should hold that it is not now reviewable. But, upon a careful reading of the entire record, we have no hesitation in concluding that upon the merits the point is not well taken. While in a measure it is circumstantial, the evidence is abundant. Fried's story is inherently so improbable and is so conflicting in material respects with the testimony, not only of the prosecutrix, but of several other witnesses, that it can be given little weight. The jury were not only at liberty to believe, but could hardly escape the conviction, that he had intimate relations with the woman at Spokane, and upon the trip to Butte, and afterwards, and that he encouraged her to come, and purchased her ticket for that purpose. Such being the case, it was entirely reasonable for the jury to find from the other facts and circumstances that there was an understanding between the defendant and Fried, before the latter left Butte, that he (Fried) should bring the woman back with him, and that he was to use such means as might be found to be appropriate for that purpose. Before Fried left for Spokane, the defendant rented a room in a lodging house for the use of the woman, and when she arrived he was at the depot, where he at once took charge of her and placed her in this room and, as already stated, resumed immoral relations with her. Whatever may have been the character of this rooming house, within a short time she went to the Boston Block, a house of ill repute, where she took a room for which the defendant paid the rent. His 'wife' was a harlot, and, upon the whole, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that he desired Grace Beal to come to Butte, possibly for the immediate gratification of his own 1ust, but for the ultimate purpose of profiting from her life of shame.

The other general question is: Did the defendant have a fair trial? Under this head it is urged, first, that the court admitted certain immaterial testimony. Nine different questions are specified which, over the defendant's objection, the court permitted to be answered. In considering these assignments, it must be borne in mind that the defendant's purpose or intent was an essential ingredient of the several charges laid in the indictment, and in proving intent the evidence may often properly take a wide range; and, especially in cases where, as here, the defendant's conduct is in some respects equivocal, the trial court is vested with a liberal discretion.

In answer to one of the questions objected to, the prosecutrix stated that in the year 1910, at a time when her husband was absent, the defendant invited her to come to Butte, and while lewdly consorting with her there he made her a proposition of setting her up in the 'sporting' business, and tried to induce her to learn how to conduct it successfully. Though somewhat remote, the circumstance is not left entirely isolated, and we do not think the admission of the testimony amounts to an abuse of discretion. The relations of the defendant with the prosecutrix were never entirely broken off, and this circumstance throws some light upon his attitude toward her.

Of the same character is the testimony of the witness Lipson, to the effect that in August, 1911, the defendant told him that he (the defendant) 'wouldn't mind getting Grace Beal to Butte, so he could make a fortune out of her.'

To another question objected to, the prosecutrix answered that she entered upon a life of open prostitution soon after she came to Butte because the rooming house to which the defendant took her turned out to be a rendezvous for harlots, and that, having thus gotten the reputation of a prostitute, she thought she might as well live the life and make more money.

And, in response to still another question, she stated that the defendant used to tell her how attractive the sporting life was, and 'how nice the girls dressed,' etc. The evidence was clearly material. If, upon her arrival in Butte, defendant took her to a house of ill repute, had illicit relations with her, and from time to time sought to make the sporting life appear attractive, it would be a fair inference that, if he had anything to do with her coming to Butte, it was for one of the purposes charged in the indictment.

The other questions relate to the character of the defendant's wife, and his attitude toward her and the life she lived. These facts cannot be said to be wholly irrelevant to the question of the defenant's intent and purpose. But clearly in view of the testimony of the prosecutrix that the defendant told her that his wife was coming back in August, and that he (the defendant) and his wife would take her with them to engage in immoral business, the questions were proper.

The other exceptions relate to instructions given and refused:

1. The court denied certain requested definitions of the terms prostitution, debauchery, and cohabitation, and upon that head instructed the jury as follows:

'Prostitution,

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