Susmano v. Associated Internists of Chicago, Ltd.

• Decision Date: 03 June 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-1975,80-1975
• Citation: 422 N.E.2d 879,52 Ill.Dec. 670,97 Ill.App.3d 215
• Parties: , 52 Ill.Dec. 670 Armando SUSMANO, M. D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ASSOCIATED INTERNISTS OF CHICAGO, LTD. and Mount Sinai Hospital Medical Center of Chicago, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 879

422 N.E.2d 879

97 Ill.App.3d 215, 52 Ill.Dec. 670

Armando SUSMANO, M. D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v.ASSOCIATED INTERNISTS OF CHICAGO, LTD. and Mount Sinai Hospital Medical Center of Chicago, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 80-1975.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District.

June 3, 1981.

Donald L. Johnson and William G. Schur, Marks, Katz, Johnson, Randall, Weinburg & Blatt, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Gerald D. Chiss and Stephen M. Dorfman, Aaron, Schimberg, Hess, Rusnak, Deutsch & Gilbert, Chicago, for defendants-appellees.

McNAMARA, Justice:

Plaintiff, Armando Susmano, M.D., brought this action against Mount Sinai Hospital Medical Center of Chicago and Associated Internists of Chicago, Ltd. to recover damages for allegedly wrongful termination of his written employment contract.Mount Sinai sought summary judgment on count III of plaintiff's complaint, the only count directed against it.After considering the pleadings, affidavit, exhibits, and deposition, and hearing arguments of counsel, the trial court entered summary judgment on count III in favor of Mount Sinai.On appeal plaintiff contends that summary judgment was improperly granted because genuine issues of material fact existed.(The action against Associated Internists is still pending and that party is not involved in this appeal.)The pertinent facts are as follows.

In June or July, 1976, plaintiff, a practicing physician, entered into negotiations with Dr. Philip Freedman, chairman of Mount Sinai's Department of Medicine and president of Associated Internists, concerning an appointment as Director of the Division of Cardiology of Mount Sinai's Department of Medicine.Dr. Freedman sent plaintiff a letter dated August 2, 1976, confirming these earlier discussions; outlining plaintiff's responsibilities for patient care, teaching, and research; establishing an annual "guaranteed" salary of $70,000, to be paid in equal shares by Mount Sinai and "the group"(Associated Internists); and delineating the fringe benefits offered by both Mount Sinai and the group.The letter was written on Mount Sinai's stationery and signed by Dr. Freedman, as "Chairman, Department of Medicine."Plaintiff next received a letter dated August 3, 1976, from Ruth M. Rothstein, Mount Sinai's vice-president and executive director, and Dr. Freedman which confirmed plaintiff's appointment as Director of Mount Sinai's Division of Cardiology, effective January 1, 1977, and discussed his responsibilities.The letter also reaffirmed the base annual salary of $70,000, to be "contributed by (Mount Sinai)(for teaching and administration) and Associated Internists (for patient care.)"This correspondence, also on Mount Sinai's stationery, was executed by Dr. Freedman in his dual capacity as chairman of Mount Sinai's Department of Medicine and president of Associated Internists.To confirm acceptance of the position, plaintiff signed and returned the letter.

On January 1, 1977, plaintiff and Associated Internists, by its president, Dr. Freedman, executed a 16 page document entitled "Associated Internists of Chicago, Ltd., Employment Contract."The agreement designated plaintiff as the "employee" and Associated Internists as the "employer," and set forth the terms and conditions of their employment relationship.Compensation was fixed at $35,000 per year.Pursuant to the agreement, plaintiff was employed in the customary practice of medicine in which Associated Internists was engaged.Either plaintiff or Associated Internists could terminate the contract upon 60 days' written notice to the other party.Additionally, the contract would terminate immediately upon the occurrence of certain events including the following:

"(17)(b) If Employee is no longer a member of * * * the Department of Medicine of Mount Sinai Hospital Medical Center of Chicago * * *."

Additionally, the agreement provided:

"This Contract shall and hereby does terminate, cancel and supersede any and all other written and verbal agreements between the parties hereto, relating to or in any way connected with the employment of Employee by Employer."

Following discussions between counsel for plaintiff and Associated Internists, plaintiff received a letter from Associated Internists, also dated January 1, 1977, which referred to the employment contract.The letter deleted a paragraph from the agreement, and clarified that the $35,000 salary was exclusive of the amount to be paid by Mount Sinai.This correspondence, written on Associated Internists' stationery, was signed by Dr. Freedman as president; plaintiff signed the letter indicating his approval.

On February 15, 1978, Associated Internists, through Dr. Freedman, terminated plaintiff's employment contract as of that date.Plaintiff instituted this suit against Associated Internists and Mount Sinai claiming that the reasons given for termination were false; that the termination was made without compliance with the 60 day notice provision; and that as a consequence of the wrongful termination, he was deprived of income for that 60 day period.The complaint also alleged that the January 1, 1977, employment contract was modified and amended by the letters of August 3, 1976, and January 1, 1977.In count III, plaintiff charged that Mount Sinai knew or should have known that his termination by Associated Internists without the requisite 60 days was wrongful and that, having failed to remit his salary for that 60 day period, Mount Sinai owed him $5,760.Mount Sinai filed an answer denying that the August correspondence amended or modified the later agreement between plaintiff and Associated Internists.

Subsequently, Mount Sinai moved for summary judgment alleging that by the correspondence of August 2 and 3, 1976, plaintiff was appointed director of cardiology at Mount Sinai for an indefinite term beginning January 1, 1977; that the employment relationship was terminable at will by either party; that the August letters formed the sole contract between plaintiff and Mount Sinai; and that Mount Sinai did not review, approve, acquiesce in, or agree to the provisions of the January 1, 1977, contract.In a supporting affidavit, Rothstein swore to the foregoing assertions contained in Mount Sinai's motion for summary judgment.

In his response, plaintiff maintained that all four writings constituted a single transaction; that all the writings were negotiated and executed by Dr. Freedman; and that all the writings refer to the same subject matter.Plaintiff also claimed that Rothstein's affidavit contained improper conclusions of law.Plaintiff attached a copy of his own deposition in which he stated that during negotiations, Dr. Freedman was acting as a representative of both Mount Sinai and Associated Internists and negotiated the terms of the August and January documents as a package.Although plaintiff was not represented by counsel when he signed the August letter, his attorney did review the January agreement.After a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted Mount Sinai's motion for summary judgment.

A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits or exhibits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.(Ill.Rev.Stat.1979 ch. 110, par. 57;Hernandez v. Trimarc Corp.(1976), 38 Ill.App.3d 1004, 350 N.E.2d 202.)A triable issue precluding summary judgment exists where there is a dispute as to material facts or where, the material facts being undisputed, reasonable persons might draw different inferences from the facts.(Kolakowski v. Voris(1979), 76 Ill.App.3d 453, 32 Ill.Dec. 59, 395 N.E.2d 6;Wallace v. Smith(1979), 75 Ill.App.3d 739, 31 Ill.Dec. 463, 394 N.E.2d 665.)Summary judgment provides a means of disposing of cases with dispatch, but is a drastic method and should be allowed only when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt.Lind v. Zekman(1979), 77 Ill.App.3d 432, 32 Ill.Dec. 583, 395 N.E.2d 964;Interlake, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank(1978), 57 Ill.App.3d 524, 15 Ill.Dec. 67, 373 N.E.2d 413.)In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe the pleadings, depositions and affidavits most strictly against the moving party and most liberally in favor of the opponent.Kolakowski v. Voris.

Plaintiff initially argues that there was an issue of material fact as to whether Mount Sinai was bound by the employment contract executed by plaintiff and Associated Internists on January 1, 1977.Plaintiff...