Suter v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 14 November 2013
• Docket Number: No. 4–13–0049WC.,4–13–0049WC.
• Parties: Mary SUTER, Appellant, v. The ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al., (Manpower, Appellee).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

998 N.E.2d 971

376 Ill.Dec. 261

Mary SUTER, Appellant,

v.The ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al., (Manpower, Appellee).

No. 4–13–0049WC.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Nov. 14, 2013.

Andrew Ricci (argued), John V. Boshardy & Associates, P.C., Springfield, for appellant.

Matthew A. Brewer (argued), Knell & Kelly, L.L.C., Peoria, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice STEWART delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The claimant, Mary Suter, slipped and fell on ice on a parking lot as she exited her vehicle to go to work and sustained injuries to her left upper extremity. She filed a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 to 30 (West 2010)). The Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) found that she failed to prove that her accident arose out of and in the course of her employment. The circuit court confirmed the Commission's decision, and the claimant appeals the circuit court's judgment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings on the claimant's claim.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Manpower is a temporary employment agency, and the claimant was employed by Manpower as a temporary worker. Manpower loaned the claimant to work at the Illinois Department of Insurance as a temporary employee. During the time she was employed by Manpower, the claimant worked exclusively for the Department of Insurance at a building called the Bicentennial Building, which is located on Washington Street in Springfield, Illinois. The State of Illinois leased the building for offices for several state agencies, including the Department of Insurance. The lease required the landlord to provide parking spaces for 410 vehicles for State of Illinois employees. In addition the lease required the landlord to provide services such as snow and ice removal from the sidewalks and parking areas.

¶ 4 Manpower did not provide the claimant with any instructions concerning parking. When the claimant started working at the Department of Insurance, she initially parked on the street. On her first day at work, she asked one of her supervisors, Tommy Collier, about available parking. Collier told her that he did not know anything about the parking. During cross-examination, the claimant testified that she was told that she was on her own as far as parking was concerned. Collier, however, also told the claimant to speak with the building manager, Douglas Sim, and he would tell her if there was a space available. Sim was not an employee of the State of Illinois but worked for a managing agent that, in turn, worked for a limited partnership that owned the building.

¶ 5 At the arbitration hearing, Collier testified that “when a temporary person comes in and asks for parking I tell them to see the building manager or they can find their own parking and pay the parking.” He did not know how regular, full-time state employees were assigned their parking spaces or where they parked. Collier testified that when he first started working for the Department of Insurance, he did not immediately have a parking space, but one was later assigned to him. He did not remember who assigned him the parking space.

¶ 6 Sim testified that he had managed the building for 10 years. According to Sim, the landlord made 10 parking lots available for state employee parking, and there were approximately 723 parking spots on the lots. The parking spaces were assigned to state employees on a first-come, first-served basis.

¶ 7 Sim assigned the claimant a specific parking space within one of the lots available for state employee parking. At that time, the claimant had been working for the Department of Insurance for about one week. The parking lot was not available to the general public. Sim testified that he assigned parking spaces to Manpower employees because he knew that they did not make a lot of money. He testified that he did this on his own and that no one from the State of Illinois told him to do so. The spots he assigned to Manpower workers were not available to the general public.

¶ 8 The accident at issue occurred on February 8, 2010. The claimant had arrived for work and parked her vehicle in her assigned parking space. She retrieved her backpack, which contained snacks, and coffee and was closing her car door when she slipped on ice and struck the pavement with her back and left arm. She had severe pain in her left arm.

¶ 9 The claimant went inside the office building and told her supervisor, Kelly Krueger, about her accident and that she had hurt her arm. Krueger contacted Manpower, and someone at Manpower told Krueger to take the claimant to the emergency room. The emergency room staff diagnosed the claimant as having highly comminuted intra-articular left distal radius and ulna fractures. The emergency room staff treated the claimant and referred her to Dr. Thomas Hansen for an open reduction and internal fixation of the fractures. Dr. Hansen performed surgery on the claimant's left arm on February 17, 2010, and the claimant was released to light-duty work on February 22, 2010. She was released from care without restrictions on May 24, 2010.

¶ 10 When the claimant filed her application for adjustment of claim, she named Manpower as a loaning employer and the State of Illinois as a borrowing employer. The arbitrator denied the claimant benefits under the Act, finding that she did not prove that she sustained accidental injuries that arose out of and in the course of her employment. The arbitrator based her decision on a finding that neither Manpower nor the State of Illinois provided the claimant with a parking space. The arbitrator stated that Sim was not an agent or employee of either employer. Therefore, the arbitrator concluded that Sim's actions could not be attributed to either employer; instead, Sim provided the claimant with a parking space on his own “as a voluntary act of human kindness.”

¶ 11 The claimant appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Commission, and the Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision. The claimant appealed the Commission's decision to the circuit court. In the circuit court proceedings, the claimant agreed to a dismissal of the State of Illinois as a party because the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over the State. The circuit court subsequently entered a judgment that confirmed the Commission's decision. The claimant now appeals the circuit court's judgment that confirmed the Commission's decision.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 At the outset, we note that the State of Illinois is not a party to this appeal, only Manpower, and that the claimant alleged that she was injured while working for the State as a temporary employee. In filing her workers' compensation claim, the claimant named Manpower as a loaning employer and the State as a borrowing employer. When Manpower loaned the claimant to the State, the claimant became an employee of the State. Raymond Concrete Pile Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 37 Ill.2d 512, 516, 229 N.E.2d 673, 675 (1967) (“In identifying the employer of a loaned employee the dominant circumstance has been the right to control the manner in which the work is to be done.”). Although the State is not a party to this appeal, we note that when an employer loans an employee to another employer and the loaned employee sustains a compensable injury and the borrowing employer does not pay the benefits due, the loaning employer is liable to pay all benefits due. 820 ILCS 305/1(a)(4) (West 2010).

¶ 14 Turning to the merits of the claimant's appeal, the claimant argues that the Commission incorrectly determined that she failed to prove that she sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of her employment. A workers' compensation claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. 820 ILCS 305/2 (West 2010). Both elements must be present in order to justify compensation. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 131 Ill.2d 478, 483, 137 Ill.Dec. 658, 546 N.E.2d 603, 605 (1989).

¶ 15 “[W]hether an injury arose out of and in the course of one's employment is generally a question of fact.” Hosteny v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 397 Ill.App.3d 665, 674, 340 Ill.Dec. 475, 928 N.E.2d 474, 482 (2009). However, when the facts are undisputed and susceptible to but a single inference, the question is one of law subject to de novo review. See Baumgardner v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 409 Ill.App.3d 274, 279, 349 Ill.Dec. 842, 947 N.E.2d 856, 860 (2011) (“It is only in those cases where the undisputed facts are susceptible to but a single inference that the inquiry becomes one of law and subject to de novo review.”). The facts of this case are not disputed and, therefore, “a question of law is presented.” Maxim's of Illinois, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 35 Ill.2d 601, 603, 221 N.E.2d 281, 282 (1966).

¶ 16 The undisputed evidence in the present case established that, as a matter of law, the claimant sustained an injury that “arose out of” and “in the course of” her employment.

¶ 17 A. “In the Course of” the Claimant's Employment

¶ 18 “The phrase ‘in the course of’ refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident occurred.” Orsini v. Industrial Comm'n, 117 Ill.2d 38, 44, 109 Ill.Dec. 166, 509 N.E.2d 1005, 1008 (1987). “Injuries sustained on an employer's premises, or at a place where the claimant might reasonably have been while performing his duties, and while a claimant is at work, or within a reasonable time before and after work, are generally deemed to have been received in the course of the employment.” Johnson v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2011 IL App (2d) 100418WC, ¶ 21, 353 Ill.Dec. 681, 956 N.E.2d 543. “That is to say, for an injury to be compensable, it generally must occur within the time and space boundaries of the employment.” Sisbro, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 207 Ill.2d...