Sutley v. Dothan Oil Mill Co.

Decision Date17 February 1938
Docket Number4 Div. 982
Citation235 Ala. 475,179 So. 819
PartiesSUTLEY v. DOTHAN OIL MILL CO.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied March 17, 1938

Appeal from Circuit Court, Coffee County; W.L. Parks, Judge.

Suit in equity by the Dothan Oil Mill Company against D.E. Sutley and others to reform a deed and to enjoin the prosecution of an ejectment suit by the named respondent who filed a cross-bill seeking to have the possession of the tract of land involved awarded to him. From a decree for complainant, William B Sutley, as administrator of the estate of D.E. Sutley deceased (original respondent who died after decree rendered), appeals.

Reversed and rendered.

P.B Traweek, of Elba, for appellant.

Farmer, Merrill & Farmer, of Dothan, and Fleming & Paul, of Elba, for appellee.

FOSTER Justice.

The facts are somewhat intricate, and are as follows--taken from brief of appellee:

On November 21, 1929, D.E. Sutley recovered a judgment against Daisey Windham and W.P. Windham in the sum of $397, which judgment was duly recorded in the office of the judge of probate on March 28, 1931, and D.E. Sutley recovered a judgment against W.P. Windham and Daisey Windham on September 17, 1930, in the sum of $797, which judgment was recorded in the probate office of Coffee county, Ala., on April 27, 1931. After the judgments were recorded and on July 3, 1934, an execution was issued on the judgment for $797 and levied on the 20-acre tract of land and other lands by the sheriff, and was sold and D.E. Sutley was the purchaser at the sheriff's sale and received a sheriff's deed to said lands, which deed is dated February 5, 1934.

The bill as originally filed by the Dothan Oil Mill Company, a corporation, was against D.E. Sutley, W.P. Windham, Daisey Windham, W.P. Windham Lumber Company, a corporation, and J.W. Hicks, receiver of the Elba Bank & Trust Company, and was filed for the purpose of correcting a mistake in that certain deed dated March 31, 1930, made by J.W. Hicks, receiver of the Elba Bank & Trust Company, to the W.P. Windham Lumber Company, seeking to reform said deed to the end that it would convey a 20-acre tract of land, and to enjoin the prosecution of an ejectment suit brought by D.E. Sutley against W.P. Windham and Daisey Windham.

The bill sets forth, in substance, the following facts: That W.P. Windham and Daisey Windham were indebted to the Elba Bank & Trust Company by mortgage dated June 26, 1926, and which was secured by the 20-acre tract of land, said mortgage being in the amount of $5,102.22, and was for the purchase price of the 20-acre tract. This mortgage was renewed by mortgage dated June 6, 1927, in the sum of $4,408.93, and was likewise secured by the 20-acre tract of land.

On March 20, 1930, Daisey Windham and W.P. Windham executed a deed to J.W. Hicks, as receiver of Elba Bank & Trust Company, conveying him the 20-acre tract of land and other lands. This deed was not recorded.

On March 31, 1930, which was eleven days later, J.W. Hicks, receiver of the Elba Bank & Trust Company, made a deed to the W.P. Windham Lumber Company, a corporation, in which he conveyed a 60-acre tract of land, but omitted in said deed to describe and convey the 20-acre tract, which the complainant, Dothan Oil Mill Company, contended the said Hicks intended to convey to W.P. Windham Lumber Company, a corporation, but by inadvertence or mistake was omitted in said deed, and the purpose of the original bill was to reform this deed. It was not recorded.

On June 10, 1931, the W.P. Windham Lumber Company, a corporation, made a mortgage to the Dothan Oil Mill Company, a corporation, and as security described the 20-acre tract of land and the 60-acre tract of land.

J.W. Hicks was duly appointed receiver of the said Elba Bank & Trust Company and was acting as such when the conveyance from Daisey Windham and W.P. Windham to him and from J.W. Hicks, receiver, to the W.P. Windham Lumber Company were made, and these conveyances were made on account of certain litigation which was pending at the time the bank failed, between W.P. and Daisey Windham and the Elba Bank & Trust Company. After J.W. Hicks was appointed receiver, a settlement was reached and on the settlement the W.P. Windham Lumber Company, a corporation, contended that it had an equity of approximately $2,000 in 160 acres of land known as the "flowing well place," the W.P. Windham Lumber Company having been incorporated in 1927, and on the settlement W.P. Windham and Daisey Windham conveyed the 20-acre tract and the 60-acre tract here in dispute to J.W. Hicks, receiver of the Elba Bank & Trust Company, and likewise conveyed said receiver the 160-acre tract known as the "flowing well place." That after said conveyances were made to the receiver the court approved the settlement and order or permitted the receiver to convey the 20-acre tract and the 60-acre tract to the W.P. Windham Lumber Company, a corporation, which it, W.P. Windham Lumber Company, a corporation, took in satisfaction of its equity against the 160-acre tract known as the "flowing well place," and the 160 acres were taken by the receiver in satisfaction of all mortgages held by the bank against the Windhams.

These transactions, that is, the conveyance by W.P. and Daisey Windham to J.W. Hicks, receiver, and the conveyance from J.W. Hicks, receiver, to the W.P. Windham Lumber Company, occurred in March, 1930, and the judgment on which execution was issued and under which the land was sold in favor of D.E. Sutley against Daisey Windham and W.P. Windham was dated September, 1930, and was recorded on April 27, 1931.

Following this, and on June 10, 1931, the W.P. Windham Lumber Company, a corporation, made its mortgage to the Dothan Oil Mill Company, a corporation.

The evidence is without dispute on the part of W.P. Windham, W.P. Windham Lumber Company, a corporation, and J.W. Hicks, receiver of the Elba Bank & Trust Company, that the 20-acre tract of land was omitted from the deed from J.W. Hicks, receiver, to the W.P. Windham Lumber Company, by mistake, but as between the parties, that is, the grantor and the grantee, no contention was made that the title did not pass.

This controversy therefore relates to the 20-acre tract, sometimes called 18 acres; and the bill seeks to reform the deed from Hicks to the lumber company. Since one of the judgments in favor of Sutley against the Windhams was rendered November 21, 1929, and the deed by them to Hicks, receiver, was made March 20, 1930, and the other judgment was rendered September 17, 1930; therefore when that deed was executed, Sutley was both a prior and a subsequent judgment creditor; and neither created a lien until after its execution.

The proof was sufficient to justify a reformation, so that an equitable right in it passed to the lumber company by the execution of that deed, and was held by it together with the 60-acre tract when the mortgage was made by it to the complainant. A reformation of the deed by Hicks to the lumber company, as prayed, will pass the title through it to complainant. That was a quitclaim deed. But that fact does not prevent the oil company under its mortgage from being a bona fide purchaser. Gordon v. Ward, 221 Ala. 173, 128 So. 217, and cases cited.

But if the deed from the Windhams to Hicks, as receiver, was void as to Sutley, judgment creditor, under section 6887, Code, because not recorded, the oil company cannot claim to be protected as an innocent purchaser against that right, because the unrecorded deed was a part of its chain of title of which fact it had notice; and also had notice that at the time its mortgage was taken on June 10, 1931, Sutley had obtained a judgment after the date of the unrecorded deed, and also had notice that the deed by Hicks to the lumber company did not include this tract, and it did not acquire a legal title, because its mortgagor had none, all of which is sufficient to prevent the oil company from being protected as an innocent purchaser against any right which Sutley might have as a creditor whose judgment and lien were created after the unrecorded deed was executed to subject to the judgment the 20 acres here under consideration.

Although the tract was under mortgage to the bank when the judgment was rendered, the equity of redemption was subject to levy and sale section 7806(3), Code, and it was that which was passed by the unrecorded deed.

When Hicks, as receiver, agreed to and did accept another tract of 160 acres, known as the "flowing well place," in full settlement, that released the 20 acres from all his claims and mortgages, leaving it free of the mortgage for the benefit of the judgment creditor, if the unrecorded deed was void as to such creditor.

Section 6887, Code, applies to judgment creditors (not creditors as in section 6918), and this has been held to mean those whose judgments were rendered subsequent to the date of the unrecorded deed, without notice at that time of the deed. Chadwick v. Carson, 78 Ala. 116; Wiggins v. Stewart Bros., 215 Ala. 9, 109 So. 101; Hall v. Griffin, 119 Ala. 214, 24 So. 27.

One judgment here in question was rendered before the date of that deed and one afterwards. From this it appears that the unrecorded deed conveying this tract to Hicks was void as to Sutley in respect to his judgment rendered September 17, 1930. It was under that judgment that the execution, levy, and sale of it were had. So that Sutley shows a superior right or claim, not now considering any claim of superior equity in the lumber company resulting from its asserted payments to the bank for the Windhams personally, so as to establish a right of subrogation in respect to the mortgage in priority to the judgment creditor.

It seems to have been on the basis of that...

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7 cases
  • Spradling v. May
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 14 Mayo 1953
    ...notice to a subsequent grantee.' Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Gardner, 131 Ala. 599, 601, 32 So. 622; Sutley v. Dothan Oil Mill Co., 235 Ala. 475, 481, 179 So. 819. This principle is analogous to our recording statutes where it is held that the constructive notice designed by them is to......
  • US v. One 1990 Lincoln Town Car
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • 28 Marzo 1993
    ...notice of the trust when her judgment lien was created. See Preston & Stetson v. McMillan, 58 Ala. 84 (1877); Sutley v. Dothan Oil Mill Co., 235 Ala. 475, 179 So. 819, 823 (1938). While no Alabama court has expressly held that section 35-4-256 applies to constructive trusts, the Alabama Sup......
  • Butler v. Wilson
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 14 Marzo 1940
    ... ... mortgagor and mortgagee and according to the intention of the ... parties. Sutley v. Dothan Oil Mill Co., 235 Ala ... 475, 179 So. 819. Upon being confronted with the ... ...
  • Teaford v. Moss, 6 Div. 195
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 17 Febrero 1938
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