Sutton v. Chicago Rys. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 June 1913
• Citation: Sutton v. Chicago Rys. Co., 258 Ill. 551, 101 N.E. 940 (Ill. 1913)
• Parties: SUTTON v. CHICAGO RYS. CO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

258 Ill. 551

101 N.E. 940

SUTTON

v.CHICAGO RYS. CO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 19, 1913.

Rehearing Denied June 5, 1913.

Appeal from Appellate Court, First District, on Writ of Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; W. H. Dietrich, Judge.

Action by J. W. Sutton against the Chicago Railways Company. From a judgment of the Appellate Court, reversing judgment in his favor, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and original judgment affirmed.

Richard J. Cooney, John A. Verhoeven, and Thomas E. Swanson, all of Chicago (David K. Tone and Henry M. Ashton, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

John W. Walsh and William H. Symmes, both of Chicago (John R. Guilliams and Frank L. Kriete, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

COOKE, J.

Joseph Speicher sued appellee, the Chicago Railways Company, in the superior court of Cook county, to recover for personal injuries. Appellant, J. W. Sutton, represented Speicher, as his attorney, in the suit under a contract whereby Speicher agreed to pay appellant one-half of any amount recovered from appellee, and appellee was served with notice that appellant would claim a lien to the extent of his contract with Speicher under the Attorney's Lien Act of 1909. Laws of 1909, p. 97. Pending a trial of the cause, appellee made a settlement with Speicher, whereby Speicher was paid $325 for himself and $40 for the services of the physician who attended him at the time of his injury. In addition to the payment of these sums, and as a part of the settlement, appellee entered into the following written agreement with Speicher:

‘Chicago, April 28, 1910.

‘Mr. Joseph Speicher-Dear Sir: In consideration of your settling your case against the Chicago Railways Company for three hundred twenty-five ($325) dollars, I hereby agree to see that the Chicago Railways Company pays your attorney, J. W. Sutton, a reasonable fee, whether on account of your written contract with him or otherwise earned by him.

‘Yours very truly,

‘J. R. Guilliams,

‘Atty. for C. Rys. Co.’

Appellant sued appellee in the municipal court of Chicago to recover his fee, and the principal facts were stipulated, a part of the stipulation being that the total amount paid Speicher was $365; and it is conceded by appellee in its argument that the amount named in the written agreement of April 28th may be considered as though it read $365. The case was tried without a jury, and the court found the issues for the plaintiff and entered judgment for $365. On appeal the Appellate Court reversed this judgment, and entered judgment there for appellant for the sum of $182.50. A certificate of importance having been granted, this appeal was perfected.

[1] The only question presented is: What amount, under these circumstances, is appellant entitled to recover? The Attorney's Lien Act does not affect the right of defendants in suits, or persons against whom claims and demands are held for collection, from settling the same; but it requires, after notice, that in making such a settlement they shall, at their peril, retain sufficient funds from the amount of the settlement to satisfy the attorney's lien for his fees. Standidge v. Chicago Railways Co., 254 Ill. 524, 98 N. E. 963,40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 529. The claim of appellant was taken into consideration and recognized by appellee in its settlement with Speicher. The agreement between appellant and Speicher as to the amount of the fee which appellant should receive is unambiguous. Appellant was to receive one-half of the amount recovered, which, under the holding in the Standidge Case, supra, included one-half of any amount received on settlement. The question to be determined, therefore is: What amount did Speicher receive in his settlement with appellee? It is true that Speicher was...