Sutton v. Fitch
| Decision Date | 20 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL 4:22-CV-114-DAS |
| Parties | SEDRIC Q. SUTTON PLAINTIFF v. LYNN FITCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSISSIPPI, CHARLTON SMITH, DEPUTY SHERIFF OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, DWIGHT DONHAM, DEPUTY SHERIFF OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, HON. MARGARET CAREY-MCCRAY, CIRCUIT JUDGE OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Defendants Charlton Smith, Deputy Sheriff of Washington County Mississippi, Dwight Donham, Deputy Sheriff of Washington County, Mississippi, and Hon. Margaret Carey-McCray, Circuit Court Judge of Washington County, Mississippi, have filed motions to dismiss the plaintiff Sedric Q. Sutton's Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Docket 6, 16. Because the parties have consented to a magistrate judge conducting all the proceedings in this case as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the undersigned has the authority to issue this opinion. Docket 12. Having considered the parties' submissions, the record in this action, and the relevant case law, the court is prepared to rule.
On July 26, 2022, the plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi against Lynn Fitch, Attorney General of Mississippi, Charlton Smith, Deputy Sheriff of Washington County, Mississippi, Dwight Donham, Deputy Sheriff of Washington County, Mississippi, and Hon. Margaret Carey-McCray, Circuit Court Judge of Washington County Mississippi. Docket 1. There is extensive factual and procedural history underlying this action which is set forth in detail in the Supreme Court of Mississippi's opinions in Sutton v. State, 238 So.3d 1150 (Miss. 2018) and Sutton v. State, 337 So.3d 208 (Miss.), cert dismissed, 338 So.3d 128 (Miss. 2022). This court relies on these decisions in reciting the relevant factual and procedural history herein.
In July 2014, defendants Charlton Smith (“Smith”) and Dwight Donham (“Donham”) obtained a search warrant for “stolen items” located at 331 Muscadine Street in Greenville, Mississippi. Sutton v. State, 238 So.3d 1150, 1153 (Miss. 2018). While executing the search warrant, officers from the Washington County Sheriff's Department - including Smith -detained and searched the plaintiff and the residence, finding sixty pills, $4,995 in cash, a handgun, and two digital scales. Id. The plaintiff was taken into custody and charged with possession of a controlled substance under Mississippi Code Annotated § 41-29-139(c)(3)(A), a misdemeanor. Id. A Washington County grand jury later indicted the plaintiff as a habitual offender for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute under MCA § 41-29-139(a)(1) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Id. at 1153-54. The plaintiff moved to suppress evidence from the execution of the search warrant, but his motion was denied, and he was convicted of the first count, possession with intent, and acquitted on the second, possession of a firearm. Id. at 1154. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to fifteen years. Id.
The plaintiff appealed, and on March 15, 2018, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed this conviction for possession of a Schedule III controlled substance with intent to distribute finding that “[a]ll of the State's evidence in the case stemmed from an unconstitutional search pursuant to an invalid warrant which failed adequately to describe the property to be seized by the executing officers.” Id. at 1153. The Supreme Court held the Washington County Sheriff's Department's description of the property to be seized as “stolen property” was effectively “no description” and reversed the plaintiff's conviction and vacated his sentence. Id. at 1157. On April 10, 2018, the trial judge entered an order of nolle prosequi. Sutton v. State, 337 So.3d 208, 210 (Miss.).
The plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint for wrongful conviction and imprisonment in the Circuit Court of Washington County, Mississippi. Id. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claims on the basis that he “failed to create a genuine issue of material fact by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not commit the felon[y] for which he was sentenced or the acts or omissions for which he was sentenced did not constitute a felony.” Id. In a February 3, 2022 opinion, the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision finding the plaintiff's conviction was reversed on insufficient language in the search warrant and not on grounds not inconsistent with innocence, and the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that his actions constituted a misdemeanor rather than a felony. Id. at 213.
Here, the plaintiff's claims are based on same underlying events but are asserted against new defendants. The Complaint sets forth three claims which are identified by the plaintiff as follows: (1) Violation of Forth Amendment - Illegal Search and Seizure, (2) Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Violations which resulted in the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and (3) Entitlement to be Compensated for Wrongful Conviction under Mississippi Code Section 11-44-1 to -15. Docket 1. The plaintiff alleges that on or about July 15, 2013, Donham and Smith conducted an illegal search and seizure with a warrant that failed to “meet the unambiguous requirement of the Fourth Amendment in that a warrant must particularly describe the persons or things to be seized” and thus “deprived him of Due Process for confiscating property without a valid warrant.” Id. at 5-6. The plaintiff claims his due process rights were violated resulting in cruel and unusual punishment when the trial court did not allow him to seek necessary medical treatment before trial or during his incarceration. Id. at 6. Again, the plaintiff claims he was wrongfully convicted for possession of a Schedule III controlled substance with intent to distribute, claiming his actions only amounted to a mere misdemeanor. Id. at 9.
On September 9, 2022, defendant Hon. Margaret Carey-McCray[1] (“Carey-McCray”) filed a motion to dismiss alleging absolute judicial immunity. Docket 6. Donham and Smith answered the Complaint on August 13, 2022, and later filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the Complaint is time barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of res judicata and asserting the defenses of qualified immunity and Mississippi Tort Claims Act immunity. Docket 8, 16.
The Court held a case management conference on November 21, 2022 and entered the Case Management Order on November 28, 2022. Docket 13, 14. In violation of Local Uniform Civil Rule 7(b)(3)(A), the plaintiff did not respond to the pending motions to dismiss or notify the court of his intent not to respond. Therefore, on January 6, 2023, this court entered an order requiring the plaintiff to show cause as to why his claims against Carey-McCray, Donham, and Smith should not be involuntarily dismissed as provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for his failure to prosecute by failing to respond to the pending motions to dismiss. Docket 21. The plaintiff was ordered to show cause no later than January 30, 2023 and was advised that failure to comply with the show cause order would result in dismissal of his claims against Carey-McCray, Donham, and Smith.
On January 24, 2023, the plaintiff submitted a “Motion in Response and Opposition to Defendants to Motion to Dismiss.”[2] Docket 24. The plaintiff's response only addresses Donham and Smiths' motion to dismiss.
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); Am. Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir.1991). Dismissal is warranted if “it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir.1995) (quoting, Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)). In deciding whether dismissal is warranted, the court will not accept conclusory allegations in the complaint as true. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir.1982).
When the issue is a statute of limitations defense, the court may order dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “where it is evident from the plaintiff's pleadings that the action is barred[,] and the pleadings fail to raise some basis for tolling or the like.” Jones v. Alcoa, 339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir.2003); see also Kansa Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. Congressional Mortgage Corp. of Texas, 20 F.3d 1362, 1366-70 (5th Cir.1994) ().
Defendant Carey-McCray argues that the plaintiff's Complaint fails to state claim entitling him to relief and further contends she is shieled from liability for acts committed within her judicial discretion by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Docket 7. The court ordered the plaintiff to show cause as to why his claims against Carey-McCray should not be dismissed as provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to respond to the motions to...
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