Sutton v. Rockingham Cnty.
| Decision Date | 30 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21CV95 |
| Parties | JUSTIN L. SUTTON, as personal representative of the Estate of HARTWELL LANIER KING, SR., and BETTY K. SUTTON, Individually, Plaintiffs, v. ROCKINGHAM COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
Plaintiffs Justin and Becky Sutton sue Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-18-2 for the alleged wrongful death of Hartwell Lanier King, Sr., when paramedics failed to provide him with emergency medical transportation. (ECF No. 9.) Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(1), (2), and (6). (ECF No. 15.) For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
On October 3, 2020, King suffered severe respiratory distress and abnormal breathing, elevated heart rate, high grade fever, severe dehydration, and inability to consume solid foods and liquids. (ECF No. 9 ¶ 15.) King was elderly and suffered from quadriplegia which had confined him to an adjustable lift bed for seventeen years. (Id. ¶ 16.) His home health aide summoned a Rockingham County Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”) unit to King's home. (Id. ¶ 15.)
Three paramedics-Taylor Carter, Paul Higgins, and Chasity Wall-and Deputy Sheriff Terry Gautier (collectively, “Individual Defendants”) arrived on the scene. (Id. ¶ 17.) King's daughter, Plaintiff Becky Sutton “pleaded” with the Individual Defendants “to take swift and responsive medical action by transporting Mr. King to the nearest emergency room facility.” (Id.) Becky Sutton was King's attorney-in-fact under a valid power of attorney instrument on file with the Rockingham County Register of Deeds Office which authorized her to make medical decisions for her father. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 20-21, 27.) Individual Defendants “disregarded the effect and enforceability” of Becky Sutton's power of attorney, however, and refused to transport King to the hospital. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) Plaintiffs allege that the Individual Defendants “deemed Mr. King's transportation to the emergency room facility that day as tantamount to ‘kidnapping,' and thus refused to transfer Mr. King out of fear and reprisal that such action would result in the termination of their employment with Rockingham County.” (Id. ¶ 19.) King then “suffered through the evening . . . with rapidly declining vitals and an elevated fever.” (Id. ¶ 22.) Becky Sutton summoned an ambulance again at approximately 10:30 a.m. the next morning after finding her father unresponsive with faint to little pulse, but the new EMS unit was unable to resuscitate him, and he was pronounced dead at the hospital one hour later. (Id. ¶¶ 23-25.)
Plaintiffs Becky Sutton, individually, and King's son Justin Sutton, as representative of his father's estate, filed this action on February 3, 2021. (ECF No. 1.) They filed an Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) on March 11, 2021. (ECF No. 9.) The Complaint alleges claims against Rockingham County and Individual Defendants for violation of King's and Becky Sutton's civil rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and for wrongful death pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-18-2. (Id. ¶¶ 30- 46.) It additionally alleges that Rockingham County maintained liability insurance at all relevant times with Traveler's Indemnity Co. (“Traveler's”), who is also named as a Defendant. (Id. ¶ 9.)
Defendants argue some of Plaintiffs' claims are barred by governmental immunity under North Carolina law. (ECF No. 16 at 6-10.) The North Carolina Supreme Court has not resolved whether governmental immunity challenges personal or subject matter jurisdiction. Myers v. McGrady, 628 S.E.2d 761, 765 n.2 (N.C. 2006) (). The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however, has stated that “the general rule is that sovereign immunity presents a question of personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction.” Green v. Kearney, 690 S.E.2d 755, 760 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010); see also Meherrin Indian Tribe v. Lewis, 677 S.E.2d 203, 207 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (). In this case, “[w]hether to assess the State sovereign immunity defense under Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(2), however, appears to be immaterial.” See Simmons v. Corizon Health, Inc., 122 F.Supp.3d 255, 268 n.5 (M.D. N.C. 2015). “[T]he distinction appears to have no impact on the method of review.” Pettiford v. City of Greensboro, 556 F.Supp.2d 512, 524 n.8 (M.D. N.C. 2008). The Court will therefore consider the defense of governmental immunity as a threshold issue under both Rules 12(b)(1)[1] and 12(b)(2).[2]
Defendants' remaining arguments for dismissal arise under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is meant to “test[ ] the sufficiency of a complaint” and not to “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). To survive such a motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, ” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor, Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). In reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion, the court may “consider documents attached to the complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).
Defendants argue that their motion to dismiss should be granted because: (1) Plaintiffs failed to allege a constitutional violation that resulted from a Rockingham County policy or custom; (2) Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim against Individual Defendants is barred by qualified immunity; (3) Plaintiffs' wrongful death claim against Rockingham County is barred by governmental immunity; (4) Plaintiffs' wrongful death claim against Defendant Gautier is barred by public official immunity; (5) Plaintiffs' wrongful death claim against Carter, Higgins, and Wall is for medical malpractice and should be dismissed for failure to comply with N.C. Civ. P. 9(j); (6) Plaintiffs have not stated a claim against Traveler's; and (7) punitive damages are not recoverable against Rockingham County. (ECF No. 16 at 6-27.)
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution makes it unlawful for any state to “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a private cause of action for damages against any person “who, under color of state law causes the violation of another's federal rights.” Owens v. Balt. City State's Att'ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that defendant “deprived plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, ” and (2) that the deprivation was performed under color of state law. Philips, 572 F.3d at 180.
Here, Plaintiffs claim that they suffered two distinct constitutional deprivations. First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “exhibited deliberate indifference” to King's medical condition. (ECF Nos. 9 ¶ 35; 18 at 15.) However, the Supreme Court has precluded suits alleging this type of government nonfeasance, holding that “the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). For this reason, courts across the country have uniformly rejected suits alleging a failure to provide medical services unless a state actor (1) created the danger or (2) put the plaintiff in custody.[3]Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to establish either exception applies. Defendants did not create the danger to Mr. King or place him in custody. Instead, Plaintiffs merely allege that Defendants refused to provide King with emergency medical services. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a violation of King's constitutional rights.
Second Plaintiffs allege that Defendants obstructed Plaintiff Betty Sutton's right to contract on behalf of King as his attorney-in-fact as pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 32A-2(9). (ECF Nos. 9 ¶ 32; 18 at 11-16.) A violation of state law is not itself actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 193-94 (1984). While state law may create a property interest that is then protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 193 n.11 (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)); see Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005), Plaintiffs do not argue here that Becky Sutton or King had a...
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