Swain v. State, 7 Div. 680
Decision Date | 09 December 1986 |
Docket Number | 7 Div. 680 |
Citation | 504 So.2d 347 |
Parties | Kenneth Ray SWAIN v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Andrew W. Redd, Sylacauga, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Gerrilyn V. Grant, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Kenneth Ray Swain was convicted of rape in the second degree and sexual abuse in the second degree. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment on the rape conviction. He was not sentenced for the sexual abuse conviction.
The State's evidence proved that the defendant, on two separate occasions, raped and sexually abused the thirteen-year-old daughter of the woman with whom he had been living.
We find no evidence of purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor in the use of his peremptory strikes in selecting the trial jury and no violation of the principles of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
First, there was no timely objection. Defense counsel objected only after the jury was empaneled and sworn. "In light of Batson, the proper time to raise such an objection was after the peremptory strikes had been made, but prior to the jury being sworn." Williams v. State, 712 S.W.2d 835, 840 (Tex.Dist.Ct.App., 1986). Even when the motion to quash the jury panel was made it was equivocal, provisional, and conditional "on the outcome of the case." A defendant may not speculate on the outcome of the case in making his objections and proving the allegations on which those objections are based. Cf. Van Antwerp v. State, 358 So.2d 782, 791 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, Ex parte Van Antwerp, 358 So.2d 791 (Ala.1978).
Second, the defendant has not established a prima facie case of discriminatory selection. When objection was made, the record shows the following, and only the following, with regard to this issue:
The fact that not all black jurors were excluded from a black defendant's trial does not compel the conclusion that the defendant was afforded equal protection.
Fleming v. Kemp, 794 F.2d 1478, 1483 (11th Cir.1986).
"As a general matter, a single discriminatory act against one individual can amount to intentional discrimination for equal protection purposes." Bohen v. City of East Chicago, Ind., 799 F.2d 1180, 1186-87 (7th Cir.1986).
Despite the reason for the trial court's ruling, the defendant is not entitled to relief because he failed to make a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges. "As in any equal protection case, the 'burden is, of course,' on the defendant who alleges discriminatory selection of the venire 'to prove the existence of purposeful discrimination.' " Batson, 476 U.S. at ----, 106 S.Ct. at 1721.
To establish a prima facie case, the defendant must show: (1) "that he is a member of a cognizable racial group"; (2) "that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race"; and (3) "that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice [peremptory challenges] to exclude veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race." Batson, 476 U.S. at ----, 106 S.Ct. at 1723; United States v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir.1986). In making a prima facie showing, "the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, ... that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' " Batson, 476 U.S. at ----, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.
Here, the defendant has failed in establishing the third and "most important criteri[on]." State v. Newman, 491 So.2d 174, 177 (La.App.1986). He has failed to present any record of voir dire. Rose v. State, 492 So.2d 1353, 1356 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App., 1986) (Sharp, J, dissenting).
The record before us only shows that the prosecutor struck thirteen blacks and six whites from the jury venire. Although we recognize that "striking a disproportionate number so as to render minority representation on the jury impotent can be enough to make out a prima facie showing," Williams, 712 S.W.2d at 841, the record does not reveal the number of blacks on the jury venire and consequently does not supply a finding of disproportionality.
Other than the bare allegation of defense counsel, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the prosecutor struck the thirteen blacks from the jury panel on the basis of race. "This court cannot find systematic exclusion of blacks based on a mere allusion." People v. Peters, 144 Ill.App.3d 310, 98 Ill.Dec. 731, 494 N.E.2d 853, 862 (1986). "While the Supreme Court declined 'to formulate particular procedure to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection to a prosecutor's challenges,' Batson, [---] U.S. at [----], 106 S.Ct. [at] 1724, we cannot read the opinion to require a prosecutor to explain his right of peremptory challenges upon a defendant's mere objection to a jury and unsubstantiated claims of discrimination." Weekly v. State, 496 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ind.1986) ( ). In Sashner v. State, 500 So.2d 1322 (Ala.Cr.App.1986), we held that "the mere allegation that the prosecutor 'used all her strikes to try to eliminate all of the blacks off the jury' does not constitute a prima facie showing of discriminatory selection of the venire."
The removal of blacks by the use of peremptory challenges does not, by itself, raise an inference of racial discrimination. Phillips v. State, 496 N.E.2d 87, 89 (Ind.1986).
Williams, 712 S.W.2d at 840-41.
There exists a rebuttable presumption that the prosecution has exercised its peremptory challenges on constitutionally permissible grounds. This presumption is justified for three reasons:
State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150, 1164 (1986).
Alabama provisions similar to those of New Jersey are Ala. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 6, 11 and § 12-16-100, Code of Alabama 1975.
For these reasons, we find that the defendant's motion to quash the jury was properly overruled.
The defendant maintains that his statement was due to be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal arrest. He claims that the arrest warrant was invalid because it was based on the purely conclusory statements of a non-victim, non-witness affiant, whose affidavit did not provide probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed the offense of rape. The affidavit, signed by the mother of the thirteen-year-old victim, recited the following:
"Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared [the victim's mother]...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
McWhorter v. State
...a reasonable person to believe there is a fair probability that the suspect is committing or has committed an offense." Swain v. State, 504 So.2d 347 (Ala.Cr. App.1986), citing Fifteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure; United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal 1984-85, 74 Geo. L......
-
Minor v. State
...for such conclusion.'" Smith v. State, 727 So.2d 147, 156 (Ala.Cr.App.1998), aff'd, 727 So.2d 173 (Ala.1999), quoting Swain v. State, 504 So.2d 347, 352 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986). As was the case in Smith, however, we do not conclude that the deficiency was reversible "Section 15-10-3(a)(3), Ala.C......
-
Melson v. State
...a reasonable person to believe there is a fair probability that the suspect is committing or has committed an offense.' Swain v. State, 504 So.2d 347 (Ala.Cr. App.1986), citing Fifteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure; United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal 1984-1985, 74 Geo.......
-
Fortenberry v. State, 7 Div. 614
...that probable cause was present." Crittenden, 476 So.2d at 634; Davis v. State, 500 So.2d 472 (Ala.Cr.App.1986); Swain v. State, 504 So.2d 347, 351-53 (Ala.Cr.App.1986). "Response to police questioning, then, frequently is an ingredient in the probable cause determination." W. LaFave, 2 Sea......