Swampscott Educ. Ass'n v. Town of Swampscott

• Decision Date: 15 May 1984
• Citation: 464 N.E.2d 953,391 Mass. 864
• Parties: , 17 Ed. Law Rep. 1208 SWAMPSCOTT EDUCATION ASSOCIATION et al. 1 v. TOWN OF SWAMPSCOTT et al. 2
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 953

464 N.E.2d 953

391 Mass. 864, 17 Ed. Law Rep. 1208

SWAMPSCOTT EDUCATION ASSOCIATION et al. ¹ v. TOWN OF SWAMPSCOTT et al. ²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Argued Feb. 8, 1984.

Decided May 15, 1984.

Sandra C. Quinn, Boston, for Swampscott Education Association (David W. Downes, Boston, for Local 387, International Brotherhood of Police Officers with her).

Harvey F. Rowe, Jr., Town Counsel, Salem (Paul J. Sahovey, Lynn, with him), for defendants.

Before WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

By an unpublished order, the Appeals Court dismissed the plaintiffs' joint appeal on the ground that the plaintiffs' notice of appeal was not seasonably filed and that certain remedial steps taken in the Superior Court were ineffective to enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal. The Appeals Court, which raised the jurisdictional question on its own motion, did not mention the notice of appeal that the plaintiffs had filed within thirty days following the entry of an order for a declaratory judgment but prior to the entry of the declaratory judgment itself.

Because the defendants were in no way prejudiced by the premature filing of the notice of appeal, the appeal was properly before the Appeals Court under Mass.R.A.P. 4(a), as amended, 378 Mass. 928 (1979). This is the conclusion reached by Federal courts dealing with parallel language in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Yaretsky v. Blum, 592 F.2d 65, 66 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 817, 102 S.Ct. 96, 70 L.Ed.2d 87 (1981); Dougherty v. Harper's Magazine Co., 537 F.2d 758, 762 (3d Cir.1976); 15 C.A. Wright, A.R. Miller, & E.H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3915, at 599-600 (1976 & Supp.1984). Cf. Williams v. Okoboji, 599 F.2d 238, 239 (8th Cir.1979) (notice of appeal filed after filing of motion to set aside the judgment adequate to commence appellate process, even where the trial court retained jurisdiction to decide posttrial motion). ³ This court and the Appeals Court have recognized that a decision on the merits should not be avoided on the technicality that a premature notice of appeal was or may have been filed, where no other party has been prejudiced by that fact. See Cole v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 386 Mass. 303, 306-307, 435 N.E.2d 1021, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1037, 103 S.Ct. 449, 74 L.Ed.2d 603 (1982); Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 6 Mass.App.Ct. 705, 707, 383 N.E.2d 82 (1978). We thus reach the merits of the appeal.

The plaintiffs represent school teachers and police officers in the town of Swampscott (town). They seek a judgment that the town was obliged under G.L. c 32B, § 7A, to pay 99%, rather than 50%, of their group health insurance premiums from July 1, 1975, through June 30, 1978. Their contention is based on the fact that during those years the town paid 99% of the group health insurance premiums of the town's firefighters. They contend that it does not matter that the town's payment of 99% of the firefighters' insurance premiums was made pursuant to compulsory arbitration or a court order. The plaintiffs also argue that the town was obliged to pay a greater proportion of their health insurance premiums than it did during the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1980. We agree with the conclusion of the trial judge, who rejected these contentions.

Swampscott has accepted the provisions of G.L. c. 32B, § 7A, which permits a town to pay more than 50% of the total monthly cost of certain insurance of its employees, such as health insurance. A municipality that has accepted § 7A is obliged to contribute at least 50% of the premium for the group insurance of the employee and his dependents. See Broderick v. Mayor of Boston, 375 Mass. 98, 99, 374 N.E.2d 1347 (1978); G.L. c. 32B, § 7A. If such a governmental unit elects to pay more than 50% of one class of employees' insurance costs, it may not "provide different subsidiary or additional rates to any group or class within that unit." G.L. c. 32B, § 7A, par. 1. ⁴ It is this literal mandate of equal treatment for all groups of employees with respect to employer contributions toward insurance costs that led to the dispute in this case. We agree with the trial judge that this mandate applies only if a town has undertaken voluntarily to pay more than 50% of one group of employees' insurance costs.

There is no dispute that the town contributed 99% of the premium cost of the group health insurance provided to its firefighters from July 1, 1975, through June 30, 1978. During the first year that contribution was made under the direction of a final offer arbitration panel. Under the law then applicable (St.1973, c. 1078, § 4), the town had no right to reject that decision by town meeting vote. During the second two years, the town made the 99% contribution because a Superior Court judgment stated that the town was obliged to continue to contribute 99% of the premium cost of group health insurance for the firefighters. The town did not appeal the legality of the arbitration award or the court judgment.

It is now clear from our November, 1978, opinion in Watertown Firefighters, Local 1347 v. Watertown, 376 Mass. 706, 712, 383 N.E.2d 494 (1978), that, if the town had appealed, the arbitration panel's mandate to contribute more toward the firefighters' health insurance premiums than toward the health insurance premiums of other town employees would have been held to be invalid because it offended the statutory mandate of equal treatment. We reject the plaintiffs' claim that, because the town did not appeal the arbitration panel's award and the court judgment, the town should be treated as having voluntarily agreed, pursuant to G.L. c. 32B, § 7A, to pay 99% of the group health insurance premiums of all its employees during the three relevant years. The arbitration panel decision and the court action involved serious labor disputes. The town officials were justified in...