Swan v. Gaston

• Decision Date: 26 June 1889
• Citation: 6 So. 386,87 Ala. 569
• Parties: SWAN ET AL. v. GASTON.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

6 So. 386

87 Ala. 569

SWAN ET AL. v. GASTON.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 26, 1889

Appeal from circuit court, Etowah county; JOHN B. TULLY, Judge.

Ejectment by John Swan and others against James L. Gaston. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal.

Samuel F. Rice, for appellants.

Dunlap & Dortch, for appellee.

CLOPTON J.

Appellants' title to the land, to recover which they bring the action of ejectment, had its origin in the act of congress of June 3 1856, by which there was granted to the state of Alabama, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of certain railroads, "every alternate section of land designated by odd numbers for six sections in width on each side of each of said roads," with a reservation of any sections or parts of sections which had been sold by the United States or to which the right of pre-emption had attached. If the roads were not completed within 10 years, the lands unsold reverted to the United States. 11 U.S. St. at Large, p. 17. Under authority conferred by the act, the legislature, by joint resolutions, assigned the lands granted for the purpose of constructing a railroad from the north-east to the south-western portion of the state to the North-East and South-West Alabama and the Wills Valley Railroads respectively. Acts 1857-58, p. 430. These roads were not completed within the time prescribed. By an act of the general assembly they were consolidated and incorporated by the name of the "Alabama & Chattanooga Railroad Company," and all the franchises, rights, and immunities granted or pertaining, and property belonging, to either of the companies were vested in the consolidated company. Acts 1868, p. 207. By an act of congress approved April 10, 1869, the grant made by the act of June 3, 1856, was revived and renewed, subject to all the conditions and restrictions contained in the latter act, except that three years from the passage of the act were allowed within which to complete the roads. 16 U.S. St. at Large, p. 45. The Alabama & Chattanooga Railroad was completed May 17, 1871, and became entitled to the lands.

The defendant entered into possession of the land sued for about November 1, 1870, under a deed executed in the name of the Alabama & Chattanooga Railroad Company, by J. C. Stanton, general superintendent and attorney in fact, and has been in possession ever since, claiming in his own right. There being no evidence of any written authority from the governing body of the company, for which Stanton purported to act as agent, to execute the deed, it conveyed no legal title or estate to defendant. Standifer v. Swann, 78 Ala. 88. This was admitted on the trial, and the deed was relied on only as color of title to show the character and extent of defendant's possession. His contention is that his continuous adverse possession matured into a title by operation of the statute of limitations of 10 years. The suit was commenced July 13, 1885. The material question is, at what time did the statute begin to run against plaintiffs' cause of action?

Further statement of the provisions of the congressional acts and rediscussion of their construction is unnecessary. The material provisions will be found stated in Swann v. Lindsey, 70 Ala. 507, where the acts were fully considered and construed. The construction was that, under the provisions of the act of June 3, 1856, the state had absolute power to sell 120 sections, included within a continuous length of 20 miles of the road; and, when the governor certified to the secretary of the interior that any 20 continuous miles of the road was completed, to sell another 120 sections, included in a continuous length of 20 miles, and so, from time to time, until the road is completed; that sales made in pursuance of these provisions vested in the purchaser all title of both the federal and state governments, whether or not the road was completed; and, on the completion of the road within the prescribed time, the indefeasible ownership of the unsold lands vested in the state or its appointee. This construction was followed and reaffirmed in the subsequent cases of Standifer v. Swann, 78 Ala. 88, and Ware v. Swann, 79 Ala. 330. The conclusion reached in each of these cases was that the act of congress operated a grant in præsenti to the state until the completion of the road. Until then the state alone could maintain an action for the possession, and until then the running of the statute of limitations of 10 years could not commence.

This construction is not controverted, but it is insisted that the statute began to operate from May 17, 1871, the date of the completion of the road; and, as more than 10 years elapsed after that time before the commencement of the suit, the statute is a full defense. It may be conceded that, if nothing intervened to prevent it, the statute commenced to run on the completion of the road, as the trust would have been executed, and the object of a suit brought thereafter though in the name of the state, would be to enforce the rights of the company,-a litigation in...