Swanigan v. Dobbs House, AQ-377
| Decision Date | 02 December 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. AQ-377,AQ-377 |
| Citation | 442 So.2d 1026 |
| Parties | Helen SWANIGAN, Appellant, v. DOBBS HOUSE and American Motorists Insurance Co., Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Irvin A. Meyers and Sherry L. Davis, of Meyers & Mooney, Orlando, for appellant.
Robert A. Donahue, of Cooper & Rissman, Orlando, for appellees.
Ordinarily, that single word would reflect our disposition of this appeal. Because we find this court reviewing more and more needless appeals presenting similar points for review, however, it seems appropriate to comment on a recurrent error by appellate attorneys stemming from an apparent misconception of the purpose and limited scope of appellate review.
We begin our discussion by quoting the appellant's point on appeal:
The deputy commissioner erred in finding that the claimant was not entitled to permanent total disability benefits or permanent partial disability benefits in excess of the 15% rating accepted by the employer/carrier as there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support a showing of change of condition as required by Florida law as a basis for a modification. (emphasis added).
Appellant then argues--rather ably, we note--that there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support her claim for modification of worker's compensation benefits. That being so, appellant asks us to reverse the deputy commissioner's order denying modification. The point on appeal, however, as stated by appellant, is self-defeating under applicable standards of appellate review. We do not review whether there was competent, substantial evidence to support the claim disallowed by the deputy; we only review whether the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the deputy's order.
We can readily concede, as argued by appellant, that the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support her claim for modification. Unfortunately, however, the record likewise contains competent, substantial evidence that supports the deputy's findings and order denying her claim. Factually, this case could have been decided either way, depending on the testimony and evidence accepted and believed by the deputy. The issues presented and decided by him were essentially factual. We do not retry the claim at the appellate level and substitute our judgment for that of the deputy on factual issues supported by competent, substantial evidence, and appeals asking us to do so are...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ullman v. City of Tampa Parks Dept.
...do we substitute our judgment for that of the JCC on factual issues supported by competent substantial evidence. Swanigan v. Dobbs House, 442 So.2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). In this case, the JCC's consideration of whether an accident, or a series of work-related incidents, occurred, as rel......
-
Chavarria v. Selugal Clothing, Inc.
...competent substantial evidence will be upheld even though there may be some persuasive evidence to the contrary. Swanigan v. Dobbs House, 442 So.2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Gomez v. Jack Steinberg Neckwear, 424 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); see also GTE v. Miller, 642 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 1st......
-
Iley v. Linzey
...had a valid reason for not attending the pain clinic. Finding no abuse of discretion on this issue, we affirm. Swanigan v. Dobbs, 442 So.2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Next, the employer and carrier contend that the deputy commissioner erred in calculating claimant's AWW and compensation rate......
-
Allman v. Meredith Corp., AT-457
...position for reversal but whether there is competent substantial evidence to support the deputy's order. Swanigan v. Dobbs House, 442 So.2d 1026 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The deputy found that the claimant's testimony regarding his activities and inability to engage in any gainful employment, in......