Swanke v. Oneida County
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin |
| Citation | 62 N.W.2d 7,265 Wis. 92 |
| Decision Date | 30 December 1953 |
| Parties | SWANKE, v. ONEIDA COUNTY. |
Page 7
v.
ONEIDA COUNTY.
[265 Wis. 95] Fischer, Brunner & Strossenreuther, Shawano, Walter F. Kaye, Rhinelander, of counsel, for appellant.
Albert J. Cirilli, Dist. Atty., Rhinelander, Forest W. Rodd, Rhinelander, of counsel, for respondent.
[265 Wis. 104A] CURRIE, Justice.
The respondent county insists in its brief filed in support of its motion for rehearing that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by sec. 75.27, Stats., as amended by ch. 391, Laws of 1949. However, the period within which a former owner is permitted to redeem from tax sale is prescribed by secs. 75.01 and 75.03, Stats., and not by sec. 75.27. At page 94 of 265 Wis., at pages 757, 758 of 60 N.W.2d of our original opinion we erroneously included sec. 75.27 as being one
Page 8
of the sections governing redemption rights of a minor owner. It was counsel for defendant county who contended that sec. 75.27 was applicable thus making it necessary for us to consider such statute and its history.Sec. 75.28, Stats., has at all times material to this appeal contained a provision stating that the limitation period imposed by sec. 75.27 does not apply where the land has been redeemed 'as provided by law'. The gist of our original opinion is that these words 'as provided by law' in the case at bar refer to the provisions of sec. 75.03 prescribing the rights of minors to redeem, as such statute stood at the time the tax sale certificates were issued upon which the tax deeds to the defendant county were based.
[265 Wis. 104B] Minors, idiots, and insane persons, unlike other classes of owners, in some instances may have the right to redeem after the issuance of a tax deed. If a county wrongfully refuses such right of redemption after the issuance of a tax deed, making it necessary for the former owner, as in the instant case, to institute an action to compel redemption, the limitation period of sec. 75.27 has no application thereto because of the exception contained in sec. 75.28.
The limitation period imposed by sec. 75.27 has reference to a cause of action by a former owner out of possession to recover possession after issuance and recording of a tax deed, such action being grounded upon some defect in the tax sale proceedings, or in the subsequent procedure followed in issuing the tax deed, which renders the tax deed voidable during such limitation period. In Carroll v. Richland County, 1953, 264 Wis....
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Wipperfurth v. U-Haul Co. of Western Wisconsin, Inc., U-HAUL
...must be determined independent of the constitutionality of the action. Swanke v. Oneida County, 265 Wis. 92, 99, 60 N.W.2d 756, 62 N.W.2d 7 (1953) " 'Retrospective operation is not favored by the courts, however, and a law will not be construed as retroactive unless the act clearly, by......
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Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Smith, No. 88-2102
...provisions regarding abandonment apply to property covered by the old Act. 20 Swanke v. Oneida County, 265 Wis. 92, 99, 60 N.W.2d 756, 62 N.W.2d 7 (1953). See also, e.g., Vanderpool v. LaCrosse & Milwaukee R.R. Co., 44 Wis. 652, 663 (1878); Filipkowski v. Springfield Fire & Marine I......
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City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Amusement, Inc.
...should be construed so as to avoid constitutional objections to its validity. Swanke v. Oneida County (1953), 265 Wis. 92, 60 N.W.2d 756, 62 N.W.2d 7; David Jeffrey Co. v. Milwaukee (1954), 267 Wis. 559, 66 N.W.2d 362. [22 Wis.2d 252] This is particularly true where the literal construction......
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State ex rel. Larson v. Giessel
...[266 Wis. 556] in the session. A good example of this is discussed in Swanke v. Oneida County, 1953-1954, 265 Wis. 92, 103, 60 N.W.2d 756, 62 N.W.2d 7, 8, involving a mistake made by the 1949 legislature in shortening the limitation period of a statute of limitations, without providing a gr......
-
Wipperfurth v. U-Haul Co. of Western Wisconsin, Inc., U-HAUL
...must be determined independent of the constitutionality of the action. Swanke v. Oneida County, 265 Wis. 92, 99, 60 N.W.2d 756, 62 N.W.2d 7 (1953) " 'Retrospective operation is not favored by the courts, however, and a law will not be construed as retroactive unless the act clearly, by......
-
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Smith, No. 88-2102
...provisions regarding abandonment apply to property covered by the old Act. 20 Swanke v. Oneida County, 265 Wis. 92, 99, 60 N.W.2d 756, 62 N.W.2d 7 (1953). See also, e.g., Vanderpool v. LaCrosse & Milwaukee R.R. Co., 44 Wis. 652, 663 (1878); Filipkowski v. Springfield Fire & Marine I......
-
City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Amusement, Inc.
...should be construed so as to avoid constitutional objections to its validity. Swanke v. Oneida County (1953), 265 Wis. 92, 60 N.W.2d 756, 62 N.W.2d 7; David Jeffrey Co. v. Milwaukee (1954), 267 Wis. 559, 66 N.W.2d 362. [22 Wis.2d 252] This is particularly true where the literal construction......
-
State ex rel. Larson v. Giessel
...[266 Wis. 556] in the session. A good example of this is discussed in Swanke v. Oneida County, 1953-1954, 265 Wis. 92, 103, 60 N.W.2d 756, 62 N.W.2d 7, 8, involving a mistake made by the 1949 legislature in shortening the limitation period of a statute of limitations, without providing a gr......