Swansey v. Elrod
| Citation | 386 F. Supp. 1138 |
| Decision Date | 10 January 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 74 C 2986.,74 C 2986. |
| Parties | Joseph SWANSEY, by Annie Swansey, mother and next friend, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Richard ELROD, Sheriff of Cook County, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois) |
Sally T. Elson, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
Fredric B. Weinstein, Asst. State's Atty., Chicago, Ill., for defendants.
This is a class action civil rights case commenced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the detention of persons between the ages of thirteen and seventeen in Cook County jail.1 The plaintiffs allege that such incarceration constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cause is now before the Court on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and defendants' motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion will be denied; plaintiffs' motion will be granted. Insofar as required this opinion shall constitute the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. F.R. Civ.P. 52(a), 65(d).
Plaintiffs are pretrial detainees who have been transferred from juvenile jurisdiction to adult criminal prosecution pursuant to Ill.Rev.Stat., Chap. 37, § 702-7. Until transferred, these children could not be prosecuted under the criminal laws. Under Illinois law, the transfer procedure is as follows: the State's Attorney moves to transfer to adult jurisdiction; a hearing is then held in front of a juvenile judge; the judge enters an order permitting prosecution under the adult criminal laws if he finds that proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act is not in the best interests of the minor or the public. In ruling on the transfer motion, the statute suggests that the juvenile judge consider these factors:
"(1) whether there is sufficient evidence upon which a grand jury may be expected to return an indictment; (2) whether there is evidence that the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner; (3) the age of the minor; (4) the previous history of the minor; (5) whether there are facilities particularly available to the Juvenile Court for the treatment and rehabilitation of the minor; and (6) whether the best interest of the minor and the security of the public may require that the minor continue in custody or under supervision for a period extending beyond his minority."
Ill.Rev.Stat., Chap. 37, § 702-7(3)(a). In operation, as the testimony of Maurice M. Dore, Assistant State's Attorney of Cook County in charge of the Juvenile Division, and Judge William S. White, presiding judge of the Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, shows, the children who are transferred are charged with committing the most serious felonies in a planned manner. Less than 100 out of some 20,000 delinquency matters are transferred to the adult criminal justice system in Cook County each year. Thus, under this transfer procedure many children who are charged with serious felonies remain under juvenile court jurisdiction if their alleged behavior is not considered severely "criminal" in a sociological sense. To date, neither the State's Attorney's Office nor the transferring judge has actively considered the location of post-transfer detention as a significant factor in the decision to transfer.
When transferred to the adult criminal justice system, a child is physically transferred from the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center (Audy Home) to the Cook County jail. The Cook County jail is a maximum security institution which houses some 2300 pretrial detainees, sentenced misdemeanants, federal prisoners and state prisoners awaiting shipment to other state institutions. The jail was designed to contain 1300 prisoners, it now holds over 2500 prisoners. In the near future, however, a new building will open in the facility which will house 700 to 800 additional individuals.
Children under the age of seventeen are housed in two locations in the jail, Ward 1 and E-Block. Ward 1 is the hospital area within the jail. The vast majority of Ward 1 residents are adults. Some of these adults may have prior felony convictions. Jail officials maintain that members of the plaintiff class are placed in Ward 1 for their own protection against the general jail population. Other residents of Ward 1, however, may be under severe psychological stress. On occasion, other residents of Ward 1 have been placed in leather restraints so that they would not harm themselves or others. Moreover, Ward 1 is extremely overcrowded. Several plaintiffs have had to sleep on mattresses, on carts or tables, or on the floor. No separate eating area is provided in Ward 1.
E-Block is the area wherein most of the inmate population in the 17 to 20 year old age group is housed. This area is also overcrowded; inmates must sleep in extra bunks placed in the dayroom area. Each cell in this area is occupied by more than one inmate.
Members of the plaintiff class testified that various inmates of Ward 1 conversed with them about methods of committing crimes. Jail officials conceded that there is no way, under present conditions, to prevent such conversations. It was also conceded that members of the plaintiff class received the same diet as the general prison population, a diet which is admittedly inadequate for growing adolescents. Additionally, members of the plaintiff class are only allowed the standard two visits per month from family members. Defendants also concede that plaintiffs receive no rehabilitative treatment in Cook County jail. Moreover, none of the jail guards receives any special training in juvenile care. This is despite the fact that jail officials recognize that juveniles present special problems for penal institutions. Jail officials also admit that they are unable to force certain members of the plaintiff class to attend the school in the jail as required by state law. Even if plaintiffs were to attend school, plaintiffs' expert presented uncontradicted testimony that the school was grossly inadequate. Additionally, no recreational program is provided for juveniles.
Plaintiffs presented uncontradicted expert testimony as to the effect of the Cook County jail experience on members of the plaintiff class. Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Marvin J. Schwarz, stated that the jail experience would cause a "devastating, overwhelming, emotional trauma with potential consolidation of these children in the direction of criminal behavior." Plaintiffs' expert further testified that the 17 to 20 year old residents of E-Block and the older residents of Ward 1 would convey extremely destructive values to the plaintiff class. He further noted that there were crucial psychological distinctions between 13 to 16 year olds and 17 to 20 year olds who are being processed through the criminal justice system. From his personal knowledge of Cook County jail, plaintiffs' expert testified that the jail did not and could not recognize these distinctions. The expert also explained why plaintiffs would prefer to remain on Ward 1 with older adults instead of the 17 to 20 year olds housed in E-Block. The older adolescents' peer group structures including the street gang phenomenon present in the jail would viciously exploit the younger group "sexually and otherwise." The Ward 1 residents provide some protection against such dangers but still provide highly destructive models for the children.
In sum, Dr. Schwarz testified that the initial period of incarceration is crucial to the development of a young juvenile: if improperly treated the child will almost inevitably be converted into a hardened permanent criminal who will forever be destructive toward society and himself. Dr. Schwarz noted that this process will likely occur even if the child is innocent and released from custody. Cook County jail provides none of the psychiatric or educational services which could ameliorate the effects of this period of incarceration.
In contrast to the treatment accorded children transferred to adult jurisdiction, the County provides juveniles under Juvenile Court jurisdiction extensive psychiatric and educational services in the Audy Home. The Audy Home is a recently built, short term detention center exclusively used for children under the age of seventeen. It is a relatively secure institution which can prevent its detainees from escaping. It is composed of 29 individual units which are designed to accommodate 16 to 18 persons. Only 20 of these units are being used because the institution's population is presently about 264. With present staff, the Audy Home could hold 365 children, provided they fell into proper categories. In operation, the institution separates children detained on delinquency petitions from children detained because they are minors in need of supervision (MINS) (children who have committed no crime but who the Juvenile Court determines need court supervision). Apparently the Audy Home also separates pending delinquent detainees on the basis of age, seriousness of the alleged offenses, and other social factors.
As a matter of course, Audy Home provides extensive medical, psychological, casework and educational services to its detainees. Recreational programs are provided. It provides an adequate diet for juveniles. The Home allows two visits per week for its detainees. Moreover, Dr. Schwarz testified that the programs and environment of the Audy Home could prevent many of the destructive elements of the initial incarceration period.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the instant complaint asserting that a recent Supreme Court case, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), requires plaintiffs to exhaust state court remedies. The Preiser Court held that when a state...
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