Swanson Grp. Mfg. LLC v. Jewell

• Citation: 790 F.3d 235
• Decision Date: 12 June 2015
• Docket Number: 14–5114.,Nos. 13–5268,14–5003,s. 13–5268
• Parties: SWANSON GROUP MFG. LLC, et al., Appellees v. Sally JEWELL, Secretary of Interior and Thomas J. Vilsack, Secretary of Agriculture, Appellees Klamath–Siskiyou Wildlands Center, et al., Appellants.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)

790 F.3d 235

SWANSON GROUP MFG. LLC, et al., Appellees

v.Sally JEWELL, Secretary of Interior and Thomas J. Vilsack, Secretary of Agriculture, Appellees

Klamath–Siskiyou Wildlands Center, et al., Appellants.

Nos. 13–5268

14–5003

14–5114.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued March 13, 2015.

Decided June 12, 2015.

Kristen L. Boyles and Susan Jane M. Brown were on the briefs for appellants/cross-appellees Klamath–Siskiyou Wildlands Center, et al. Patti A. Goldman entered an appearance.

Mark C. Rutzick argued the cause and filed the brief for appellees/cross-appellants Swanson Group Mfg. LLC, et al.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, ROGERS, Circuit Judge, and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge:

The Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture appeal the grant of summary judgment and issuance of a mandatory injunction to sell a certain amount of timber annually from federal land managed under the Oregon and California Railroad and Coos Bay Wagon Road Grant Lands Act of 1937, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1181a et seq. (“O & C Act”). We must vacate the judgment and remand the case with instructions to dismiss the complaint because the plaintiffs lack standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. The question before this court is not whether parties such as these plaintiffs could have standing to bring the claims at issue but whether the evidence the plaintiffs presented in support of their standing is sufficient. For the following reasons we conclude that none of the plaintiff timber companies or timber organizations have demonstrated Article III standing.

I.

The Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) in the Department of the Interior manages 2.4 million acres of public land in western Oregon, most of which is governed by the O & C Act. In 1916, Congress instructed the Secretary of the Interior to sell the timber from this land “as rapidly as reasonable prices can be secured therefor in a normal market.” Act of June 9, 1916, Pub.L. No. 64–86, § 4, 39 Stat. 218, 220; see also Act of Feb. 26, 1919, Pub.L. No. 65–280, § 3, 40 Stat. 1179, 1180. In 1937, Congress changed course, providing that O & C timberland

shall be managed ... for permanent forest production, and the timber thereon shall be sold, cut, and removed in conformity with the principal [sic] of sustained yield for the purpose of providing a permanent source of timber supply, protecting watersheds, regulating stream flow, and contributing to the economic stability of local communities and industries, and providing recreational facilties [sic].

43 U.S.C. § 1181a. The O & C Act requires that “[t]he annual productive capacity for such lands shall be determined and declared as promptly as possible.” Id. It also instructs the Secretary of the Interior that “timber from said lands in an amount not less than ... the annual sustained yield capacity ... shall be sold annually, or so much thereof as can be sold at reasonable prices on a normal market.” Id.

At issue are timber sales from O & C Act lands in the Roseburg and Medford districts of western Oregon from fiscal years 2004 to 2010. BLM's 1995 resource management plans establish “allowable sale quantities” of timber, which BLM treats as synonymous with the statutory term “annual productive capacity,” see IV BLM, Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Revision of the Resource Management Plans of the Western Oregon Bureau of Land Management app. R, at 712 (2008). The allowable sale quantity for Roseburg is 45 million board feet; for Medford, 57.1 million board feet. The Roseburg and Medford plans provide that “[t]he actual sustainable timber sale level ... may deviate by as much as 20 percent from the identified allowable sale quantity.” BLM, Roseburg District: Record of Decision and Resource Management Plan 61 (1995); accord BLM, Record of Decision for the Medford District Resource Management Plan 72 (1995). Between fiscal years 2004 and 2010, the timber sold from the Roseburg district was only 43% of the allowable sale quantity, averaging 19 million board feet per year; the timber sold from the Medford district was only 56% of the allowable sale quantity, averaging 32 million board feet per year. The amount of Roseburg timber sold was less than 80% of the allowable sale quantity every year; the amount of Medford timber sold reached 80% of the allowable sale quantity in only fiscal years 2005 and 2006.

In 2010, two timber companies and three timber organizations (together, “the companies”) sued for declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy alleged statutory violations by the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture in connection with timber sales in Oregon and Washington. The companies alleged that from fiscal years 2004 to 2010, the Secretary of the Interior failed to sell the amount of timber required by the O & C Act in Roseburg and Medford. As relevant, they sought a declaration under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 –2202, and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(1) -(2), that BLM's failure annually to offer for sale 80% of the allowable sale quantity of timber from Roseburg and Medford violated the O & C Act, and an order compelling BLM annually to offer for sale 80% of the allowable sale quantity of timber and additional timber in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 to make up for past shortfalls. In addition, the companies alleged that the Owl Estimation Methodology, used in planning federal timber sales to ensure compliance with the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq., see Methodology for Estimating the Number of Northern Spotted Owls Affected by Proposed Federal Actions 2 (2008) (“OEM”), was invalid for lack of notice and opportunity for comment under the APA.

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. On June 26, 2013, the district court granted summary judgment to the companies on their O & C Act claim and permanently enjoined BLM “to sell or offer for sale the declared annual sustained yield capacity of timber for the Medford and Roseburg districts for each future year, in accordance with the O & C Act.” Swanson Grp. Mfg. LLC v. Salazar, 951 F.Supp.2d 75, 84 (D.D.C.2013). The court also vacated the OEM for lack of notice and comment, id. at 88, and dismissed the companies' remaining claims, id. at 76. On July 25, 2013, the district court granted the companies' unopposed emergency motion to make the OEM vacatur prospective only. By order of November 5, 2013, the district court denied the Secretaries' request for clarification regarding the legality of continued reliance on OEM source documents. By minute orders of December 20, 2013, the court denied the companies' post-judgment requests for further relief compelling BLM to offer additional timber sales in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 equal to the volume BLM fell short in fiscal years 2004 through 2013; on April 25, 2014, the court denied reconsideration of the denial of further relief. The Secretaries appeal the grant of summary judgment and the denial of clarification; the companies cross appeal the denials of further relief and reconsideration. Our review of the grant of summary judgment is de novo. Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913, 918 (D.C.Cir.2008).

II.

Our analysis begins and ends with consideration of our jurisdiction. The Secretaries challenged the companies' standing under Article III of the Constitution to bring both the O & C Act and APA claims in the district court. In granting summary judgment, the district court ruled, without explanation, that the companies have standing. Swanson Grp. Mfg., 951 F.Supp.2d at 81 n. 8. The Secretaries renew their standing objection on appeal.

“Article III of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual ‘Cases' and ‘Controversies,’ and ... ‘the doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.’ ” Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429, 118 S.Ct. 2091, 141 L.Ed.2d 393 (1998) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) ). As plaintiffs, the companies bear the burden of demonstrating they have standing to pursue their claims. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). “[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” requires “[1] an injury in fact ... which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical, ... [2] a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of ..., [and] [3] it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (footnote, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). At the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, the companies “can no longer rest on ... ‘mere allegations,’ but must ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts,’ which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.” Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations omitted). Statements of fact must be sufficiently specific to rise above the level of “conclusory allegations.” Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). Although “general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice” to show standing at the motion to dismiss stage, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, at summary judgment a court will not “ ‘presume’ the missing facts” necessary to establish an element of standing, Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 889, 110 S.Ct. 3177.

Furthermore, because the companies seek injunctive relief, they must show an imminent future injury. See Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d 499, 501 (D.C.Cir.2011). This creates “ ‘a significantly more rigorous burden to establish standing’ ” than that on...