Swanson v. City of Plano
| Decision Date | 03 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 4:19-cv-412 |
| Parties | CONSTANCE SWANSON, WOMEN'S ELEVATED SOBER LIVING LLC, and SHANNON JONES, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PLANO, TEXAS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant City of Plano's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Facial Challenge to Defendant's Ordinance (Dkt. #52). Having considered the Motion and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that it should be granted in part and denied in part.
This case centers on changes to Defendant's zoning laws. In 2009, Defendant enacted Ordinance No. 2009-6-9 ("Ordinance"), which altered certain aspects of Defendant's Zoning Code. The Ordinance's amended definition of "household" permits two groups of people to make up a "domestic unit": (1) "one or more individuals related by blood, marriage, adoption or recognized legal union or guardianship, and not more than four adult unrelated individuals, plus any minor children," and (2) "persons residing in a household care facility" (Dkt. #68, Exhibit 2 at p. 2). Households are permitted to live in single-family zoning districts as of right. The Ordinance also modified the definition of "household care facility" to limit the provision of "residence and care to not more than eight persons, regardless of legal relationship" (Dkt. #68, Exhibit 2 at p. 2). The only limit imposed by Defendant's Zoning Code on the number of people constituting a household of "one or more individuals related by blood, marriage, adoption or recognized legal union or guardianship, and not more than four adult unrelated individuals, plus any minor children," is that of the maximum occupancy permitted by Defendant's safety ordinances.
In November 2018, Women's Elevated Sober Living LLC ("Elevated"), a Texas limited liability company that provides support services for recovering drug and alcohol addicts, opened a sober living home ("Home") located at 7312 Stoney Point Dr., Plano, Texas. The Home is located in the SF-7 single-family residential district of Defendant's zoning scheme. Elevated operates the Home under an arrangement with Plaintiff Constance Swanston ("Swanston"), who leases the property to Elevated, serves as a member of Elevated, and works to operate the Home. Since its opening, the Home has housed as many as fifteen to nineteen unrelated residents at a single time.
After receiving complaints from various citizens about the Home, Defendant informed Elevated in March 2019 that operating the Home with fifteen residents violated zoning restrictions for the neighborhood in which the Home is located. In response, Elevated applied for a reasonable accommodation in the form of a variance to allow up to fifteen unrelated disabled persons to live in the Home. After the application was submitted to Defendant's Board of Adjustments ("Board"), a hearing was held on May 28, 2019, during which more than fifty local homeowners expressed serious concern regarding the Home's location. Following the hearing, the Board denied the requested variance.
On June 5, 2019, Swanston and Elevated filed their initial complaint against Defendant, alleging causes of action under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (Dkt. #1). One week later, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint as of right, addingShannon Jones ("Jones"), a resident of the Home, as an additional plaintiff (Dkt. #2). On July 31, 2020, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Facial Challenge to Defendant's Ordinance (Dkt. #52), currently before the Court. On August 22, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their response to the Motion (Dkt. #68). On August 31, 2020, Defendant filed its reply (Dkt. #72). And on September 8, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their sur-reply (Dkt. #74).
The purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Dispute over a material fact is genuine when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Substantive law identifies which facts are material. Parrish v. Premier Directional Drilling, L.P., 917 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 2019). Trial courts "must resolve all reasonable doubts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant." Sanchez v. Young Cnty., Tex., 956 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the movant satisfies this burden as to a claim or defense for which summary judgment is sought, evidence must be offered that establishes "beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense." Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis omitted). When the nonmovant bears the burden of proof, the movant may discharge the burden by demonstrating the absence of evidence supporting the nonmovant's case. Byers v. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2000).
Once the movant has carried this initial burden, the nonmovant "must go beyond the pleadings and present specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial in order to avoid summary judgment." Bluebonnet Hotel Ventures, L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 754 F.3d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). A nonmovant must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. Mere denials of material facts, unsworn allegations, or arguments and assertions in briefs or legal memoranda will not suffice to carry this burden—reciting "barebones, conclusory, or otherwise-unsupported assertions" is simply insufficient. Hassen v. Ruston Louisiana Hosp. Co., L.L.C., 932 F.3d 353, 355-56 (5th Cir. 2019); see Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). And courts are not required "to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment." Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 & n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992). Rather, to have a request for summary judgment dismissed, a nonmovant must show with "'significant probative evidence' that there exists a genuine issue of material fact." Hamilton v. Segue Software Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d 1285, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994)). Courts must "'draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party' and 'refrain from making credibilitydeterminations or weighing the evidence.'" Butts v. Martin, 877 F.3d 571, 582 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007)).
The FHA "prohibit[s] governmental entities from discriminating against individuals with disabilities." Providence Behav. Health v. Grant Rd. Pub. Util. Dist., 902 F.3d 448, 457 (5th Cir. 2018). Congress enacted the FHA "to eradicate discriminatory practices within a sector of our Nation's economy," Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Comms. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 539 (2015), and to clearly pronounce "a national commitment to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the American mainstream," Groome Res. Ltd., L.L.C. v. Par. of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 201 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179). The provisions of the FHA are "broad and inclusive," and, as a whole, the statutory scheme must be given a "generous construction." Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 212 (1972).
Section 3604(f)(1) of the FHA makes it unlawful to "discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of (A) that buyer or renter[;] (B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is sold, rented, or made available; or (C) any person associated with that buyer or renter."1 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1). In addition, Section 3604(f)(2) prohibits discrimination against "any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services orfacilities in connection with such dwelling" on account of "a handicap of (A) that person; or (B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available; or (C) any person associated with that person." Id. § 3604(f)(2). "[R]efus[ing] to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling" constitutes discrimination for purposes of the FHA. Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B). Three different theories of liability are available under the FHA for Plaintiffs to establish a discrimination claim: "(1) disparate treatment; (2) disparate impact; and (3) failure to make a reasonable accommodation." Kearins v. Vill. Creek of Eldorado Home Owners' Ass'n, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-00769, 2019 WL 2266635, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:17-CV-00769, 2019 WL 1760521 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2019); see Robinson v. City of Friendswood, 890 F. Supp. 616, 622 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
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