Swanson v. Van Otterloo

• Decision Date: 31 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. C96-4053-MWB.,C96-4053-MWB.
• Parties: Ken SWANSON, Jeanne Swanson, and Arthur Kellogg, Plaintiffs, v. Mike VAN OTTERLOO, Individually and as Sheriff of Plymouth County, Plymouth County, a governmental entity, Tom Bice, Dick Moritz and Craig Bartolozzi, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

Page 1224

993 F.Supp. 1224

Ken SWANSON, Jeanne Swanson, and Arthur Kellogg, Plaintiffs, v. Mike VAN OTTERLOO, Individually and as Sheriff of Plymouth County, Plymouth County, a governmental entity, Tom Bice, Dick Moritz and Craig Bartolozzi, Defendants.

No. C96-4053-MWB.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Western Division.

January 31, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

J. Russell Hixson, Dickinson, Mackaman, Tyler & Hagen, P.C., Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiffs.

G. Daniel Gildemeister, Michelle R. Sherman, Steven J. Andreasen, Gildemeister, Willia & Keanne, L.L.P., Sioux City, IA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BENNETT, District Judge.

                TABLE OF CONTENTS
                I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND .....................1227
                

                II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ............................ 1230
                  III. FACTUAL FINDINGS .......................................... 1232
                       A. Undisputed Facts ....................................... 1232
                       B. Disputed Facts ......................................... 1232
                  IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS ............................................. 1233
                       A. Capacity of Defendants ................................. 1233
                       B. Swanson's First Amendment Claim ........................ 1233
                          1. Patronage dismissals: The Elrod-Branti rule ......... 1234
                          2. Application of the Elrod-Branti rule ................ 1235
                          3. Qualified immunity .................................. 1236
                             a. Procedural bar ................................... 1236
                             b. The merits ....................................... 1236
                          4. Free speech: The Pickering test ..................... 1239
                             a. Application of the Pickering test ................ 1239
                             b. Qualified immunity ............................... 1240
                       C. Municipality Liability ................................. 1240
                          1. Requisites for imposing municipal liability ......... 1240
                          2. Adequacy of the pleadings ........................... 1241
                          3. Was Van Otterloo a final "policymaker?" ............. 1241
                       D. Jeanne's Remaining § 1983 Claim ........................ 1242
                    V. CONCLUSION ................................................ 1242
                

Clashing political aspirations led to a showdown at the Plymouth County Sheriff's Office. In this lawsuit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs, all former employees of the sheriff's office, contend that when one of them made it known that he intended to challenge the incumbent sheriff in the upcoming election, the defendant sheriff and his deputies responded by committing infringements of the plaintiffs' constitutionally-protected rights to political affiliation, free speech, equal protection, and due process. Before the court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 4, 1996, plaintiffs Ken Swanson, Jeanne Swanson, and Arthur Kellogg, all former employees of the Plymouth County Sheriff's Office, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Plymouth County and Mike Van Otterloo, individually and in his official capacity as Plymouth County Sheriff. The original complaint alleged violations of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and pendant state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On March 31, 1997, the plaintiffs amended their complaint adding as defendants Plymouth County deputy sheriffs Tom Bice, Dick Moritz, and Craig Bartolozzi,¹ and expanding the federal and state law claims lodged in their original complaint. In Count I, the plaintiffs allege claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.² Specifically, Ken Swanson ("Swanson") complains that his termination from the Plymouth County Sheriff's Office violated his right to affiliate with a political party and to run for public office, as well as his right to free speech. Jeanne Swanson and Arthur Kellogg also contend that their First Amendment rights to political affiliation and freedom of association were violated and as a result, they were constructively discharged. In Counts II and III, the plaintiffs assert additional claims pursuant to § 1983 for deprivations of equal protection and due process all in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In Count IV, Swanson complains that the defendants committed civil theft in violation of Iowa Code Chapter 714 by improperly confiscating his campaign signs.³ Finally, Count V alleges a claim by Jeanne Swanson and Arthur Kellogg for intentional infliction of emotional distress. On January 20, 1998, the plaintiffs filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss Count V. The court granted this motion on January 30, 1998. The claims relevant to the pending cross-motions for summary judgment are summarized in the following chart:

                -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            Claims Plaintiffs Defendants
                -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Count I:    1st Amendment     Swanson, Jeanne, Kellogg     Van Otterloo and Plymouth County
                -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Count II:   Equal Protection  Swanson                      all defendants
                -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Count III:  Due Process       Swanson, Jeanne, Kellogg     all defendants
                -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                

The defendants submitted timely answers to both the original and the amended complaints. On October 15, 1997, the defendants filed a motion for leave to amend their answer to the amended complaint for the purpose of asserting additional affirmative defenses.⁴ United States Magistrate Judge Paul A. Zoss granted this motion, and the amended answer was filed on November 20, 1997.

Prior to Judge Zoss' grant of their motion for leave to amend answer, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on Counts I through III and Count V of the amended complaint. Because the court has granted the plaintiffs' motion to voluntarily dismiss Count V of the complaint, the court need. not further address the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to this claim. As to the remaining claims, the defendants' have asserted the following arguments in support of their motion for summary judgment.

Defendant Van Otterloo contends that he is entitled to summary judgment on Ken Swanson's First Amendment claim (Count I) because his placement of Swanson on "inactive status" was a constitutionally permissible patronage dismissal. Alternatively, Van Otterloo asserts that even if Swanson's termination was not a patronage dismissal, Van Otterloo is shielded from liability in his individual capacity by virtue of the defense of qualified immunity.⁵

Defendant Plymouth County moves for summary judgment on Counts I, II and III on the ground that the plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action against it on these claims because there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Alternatively, as to the all claims asserted by Jeanne Swanson and Arthur Kellogg (contained in Counts I and III), Plymouth County contends that it is entitled to summary judgment based on the exclusivity provisions of the Iowa Workers' Compensation Act ("IWCA"). Plymouth County also argues that any claims brought against it by Jeanne and Kellogg are barred by the "settlements and releases in their worker's [sic] compensation claims against Plymouth County." Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at ¶ 4(b).

All defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs' due process claims (Count III). The gravamen of this argument is that all of the plaintiffs have failed to identify the requisite "property" or "liberty" interest necessary to assert a due process claim.

The plaintiffs have resisted the motion for summary judgment in its entirety. Additionally, plaintiff Van Otterloo has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on his First Amendment claim against defendants Van Otterloo and Plymouth County. Plaintiffs Jeanne Swanson and Kellogg have also moved for partial summary judgment against all defendants on the issues of exclusivity of the IWCA and the effect of the releases that these two plaintiffs entered into in settling their workers' compensation claims.⁶

The court heard oral arguments on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on January 21, 1998. The plaintiffs were represented by counsel J. Russell Hixson of Dickinson, Mackaman, Tyler & Hagen, P.C., Des Moines, Iowa. The defendants were represented by counsel G. Daniel Gildemeister, Michelle R. Sherman, and Steven J. Andreasen of Gildemeister, Willia & Keane, L.L.P., Sioux City, Iowa.

Oral arguments not only assisted the court in its consideration of the issues raised by the parties, but also narrowed the grounds upon which summary judgment is sought. Specifically, counsel for the defendants conceded that the IWCA does not preempt claims for violations of federal rights. The defendants also acknowledged that the release contained in Kellogg's worker's compensation settlement agreement did not serve as a bar to claims for constitutional violations brought pursuant to § 1983. Additionally, the defendants withdrew from their original position that plaintiffs Swanson and Kellogg failed to identify a cognizable property interest sufficient to warrant their claims for due process violations.

For their part, the plaintiffs acknowledged that they have failed to identify any colorable liberty interest in their due process claims. As a practical matter, this acknowledgment extinguished ...