Swapshire v. Baer
| Decision Date | 18 January 1989 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 87-2190,87-2239,s. 87-2190 |
| Citation | 865 F.2d 948 |
| Parties | 48 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1439, 48 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 38,615 Robert SWAPSHIRE, Gilbert Perry, Appellee, Charles Roberts v. Robert J. BAER; John J. Frank; James E. Mosbacher; William H. Young; and Vincent Schoemehl, Appellants. Robert SWAPSHIRE, Appellant, Gilbert Perry, Charles Roberts, Appellant, v. Robert J. BAER; John J. Frank; James E. Mosbacher; William H. Young; and Vincent Schoemehl, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
H. Kent Munson, St. Louis, Mo., for appellants.
Paul E. Ground, Manchester, Mo., for appellees.
Before McMILLIAN and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges, and HARRIS, Senior District Judge. *
The issue in No. 87-2190 is whether the District Court 1 erred in failing to give preclusive effect to a state-court judgment adverse to appellee Gilbert Perry. The principal issues in No. 87-2239 are whether the District Court properly instructed the jury on appellants Robert Swapshire's and Charley Roberts's respective claims, and whether the District Court erred in excluding from evidence at trial two exhibits tendered by Swapshire and Roberts. The judgment of the District Court is reversed in No. 87-2190 and is affirmed in No. 87-2239.
Perry, Swapshire, and Roberts, all of whom are black, commenced an action against the defendants below, members of the Board of Police Commissioners of the City of St. Louis (Board), on a variety of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Perry alleged that defendants had discharged him from the St. Louis Police Department (Department) on account of his race. Swapshire and Roberts alleged that they had each been denied promotions within the Department on account of their race and on account of their participation in an organization known as the St. Louis Ethical Police Society. The claims were tried together, the jury returning verdicts in favor of Perry on his claim and against Swapshire and Roberts on their claims. The District Court entered judgment on the verdicts and denied defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and Swapshire's and Roberts's motion for a new trial. These appeals followed.
In No. 87-2190, defendants argue that the District Court erred in failing to give preclusive effect to a state-court judgment which affirmed their decision to discharge plaintiff Perry from the Department. Prior to the commencement of the instant lawsuit, the Department had preferred charges against Perry for being outside his assigned "beat" without permission or justifiable excuse and for threatening the life of his supervising officer. Perry denied the charges and claimed he was the victim of racial harassment by his supervising officer. The Department presented its evidence before an administrative hearing officer. Perry was represented by counsel at the administrative hearing, and was afforded all rights associated with a full-dress adversarial proceeding. The administrative hearing officer submitted his recommended findings to the Board, which issued a written decision sustaining the two charges lodged against Perry and discharging him from the Department.
In accordance with Missouri law, Perry then petitioned the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis for judicial review of the Board's decision. While his petition for review was pending before the state court, Perry filed the instant action in federal district court, alleging that defendants had imposed the sanction of discharge (as opposed to a less harsh form of discipline) because he is black. The state court ultimately affirmed the Board's decision to discharge Perry from the Department. Once the state court had rendered its judgment, defendants moved for summary judgment against Perry based on what they perceived to be the res judicata effect of that judgment. The District Court denied the motion. 2
Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738, the of a state court "shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State ... from which they are taken." As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "Section 1738 requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state-court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the state from which the judgments emerged." Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). Missouri law recognizes two types of preclusion. The doctrine of res judicata precludes relitigation of claims in a later lawsuit that were or could have been litigated in a prior lawsuit between the same parties. The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue in a later lawsuit by the party against whom the issue was decided in a prior lawsuit. Compare Prentzler v. Schneider, 411 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Mo.1966) (en banc) () with Oates v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo.1979) (en banc) ().
The District Court declined to give the state-court judgment either type of preclusive effect for two reasons. First, the District Court was of the view that Perry simply could not have litigated his federal claim (namely, that he was terminated rather than given a milder form of discipline, because of his race) in state court because the Board meted out his punishment only after the state court had rendered its judgment. Second, the District Court was of the view that because the state court's standard of review of administrative action is limited under Missouri law, the state court's judgment is not entitled to preclusive effect. 3 We cannot agree with the District Court's reasoning.
Not only could Perry have presented to the state court the question whether the relative harshness of his punishment was race-related, Perry in fact did so. Perry specifically asserted in his state-court petition that he had been terminated by the Board and that the Board's decision to terminate him (rather than to assess a lesser penalty) was, among other things, discriminatory. In short, Perry received his punishment before and not after the state court rendered its judgment and Perry did in fact place the discriminatory punishment question into issue before the state court. 4 Further, "[i]t is well established that judicial affirmance of an administrative determination is entitled to preclusive effect." Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481 n. 21, 102 S.Ct. at 1896. There is no requirement that judicial review must proceed de novo in order for the state-court judgment to be entitled to preclusive effect in federal court under Sec. 1738. Id.
As the District Court recognized, under Missouri law a party is collaterally estopped from relitigating an issue decided against him in a prior lawsuit when four conditions are met. First, the issue decided in the prior adjudication must have been identical to the issue presented in the later lawsuit. Second, the prior adjudication must have resulted in a judgment on the merits. Third, the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. Fourth, the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit. Oates, 583 S.W.2d at 719. As we already have pointed out, the issue presented in Perry's federal lawsuit (namely, whether his punishment was discriminatorily harsh) was also presented to the state court. The state court decided this issue against Perry in finding that the Board's decision "was not arbitrary nor capricious and was not contrary to the law and was reasonable." Perry v. Board of Police Commissioners, No. 854-00278 (Mo.Cir.Ct. Oct. 22, 1986) (unpublished order). The state-court lawsuit plainly resulted in a judgment on the merits of this issue. Perry plainly was a party to the state-court lawsuit. The first three Oates conditions are therefore met, and Perry is collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue in his federal lawsuit unless it can be said that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue before the state court.
Perry takes the position that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the discriminatory punishment issue in state court because under Missouri law he could not present evidence in support of the allegations pled in his petition for review, but rather he was relegated to the state court's deferential review of the Board's decision based solely on the record developed at the administrative hearing. Perry's contention does not withstand close scrutiny.
As noted above, a state court's review of an administrative decision need not be de novo in order for the state court's judgment to be entitled to preclusive effect in federal court under Sec. 1738. More critically, Perry misconstrues the state court's ability to consider additional evidence in the course of its review of an administrative decision. By statute the Missouri circuit courts "may in any case hear and consider evidence of alleged irregularities in procedure or of unfairness by the agency, not shown in the record." Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 536.140.4 (1986). Evidence of discriminatory imposition of punishment at least arguably constitutes "unfairness" within the meaning of this provision. By statute the Missouri circuit courts "may hear and consider additional evidence if the court finds that such evidence in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have been produced ... at the hearing before the agency." Id. If, as Perry here contends, he was unable to present evidence of discriminatory discipline at the administrative hearing, 5 the circuit court at least arguably had authority to consider any...
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