Swarts v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 21 August 1987 |
| Docket Number | 86-1505,Nos. 86-1197,s. 86-1197 |
| Citation | 826 F.2d 1065 |
| Parties | Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. Michael SWARTS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Perry JOHNSON, Director, Michigan Department of Corrections; Richard Handlon, Warden, Michigan Training Unit; Rudy Davidson; and Donald E. Houseworth, Western Regional Administrator, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Before MARTIN, NELSON and BOGGS, Circuit Judges.
Michael Swarts, plaintiff-appellant, was an inmate in the Michigan Training Unit, a medium custody prison, in November 1980, when a fellow inmate, Rudy Davidson, struck Swarts, blinding him in one eye.
In November 1983, a few days before the expiration of the statute of limitations, Swarts filed suit against Perry Johnson, then Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections; Richard Handlon, the Unit's Warden in their official capacities, and against Davidson, seeking only a monetary award. Swarts argued that: 1) Johnson should have issued rules to protect the general prison populace from forseeably unreasonably dangerous inmates, and 2) Handlon knew or should have known that Davidson was violent and therefore should have removed Davidson from the general population. Thus, according to Swarts, their failure to act was both a proximate cause of his injuries and deprived him of his eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, creating liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Swarts also asserted pendent state negligence claims against them, and a pendent state assault and battery claim against Davidson.
The district court granted Johnson's and Handlon's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed without prejudice the action against Davidson. During discovery, but after the statute of limitations had expired, Swarts learned that Donald E. Houseworth (Houseworth), Western Regional Administrator for the Department of Corrections, who had final responsibility for transfers of prisoners from one facility to another, had denied Handlon's request to transfer Davidson to a more secure facility, and sued him as well. The district court dismissed that case due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. We affirm the district court in all respects.
Swarts's suit fails because the actions of the state officials alleged here do not support a Sec. 1983 claim. This court has held that prison officials' gross negligence or deliberate indifference is sufficient to support a claim against the officials, but ordinary negligence is not. Stewart v. Love, 696 F.2d 43, 44 (6th Cir.1982). See also Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720, 724 (6th Cir.1985). Swarts notes cases in other circuits which impose other standards of care, such as Fox v. Sullivan, 539 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir.1976), on remand, 558 F.2d 235 (5th Cir.1977) (negligence), and Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458 (4th Cir.1979) (dereliction of duty). However, Swarts presents no argument that this Circuit should change its standard. In any event, one panel of this court may not overrule another.
Swarts argues that the officials' failure to take steps to segregate out potentially violent inmates such as Davidson is gross negligence or deliberate indifference. However, in Stewart v. Love, 696 F.2d 43 (6th Cir.1982), an inmate, fearing for his own safety due to rumored threats against him, requested and received a transfer, and upon return to his original unit, informed the prison administration of renewed threats, but was beaten so severely as to require hospitalization. Nonetheless, this court found mere negligence. "[G]enerally, an isolated or occasional attack is not sufficient to state a claim [under the eighth amendment]." 696 F.2d at 45. The facts in Stewart parallel those in Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986), in which the plaintiff specifically identified the assailant prior to the attack, yet the Supreme Court found insufficient negligence to support an award of damages. The attack on Swarts was less forseeable than the attack on Stewart or Davidson, as Swarts does not allege that Davidson had threatened him. Thus, prison officials were at most ordinarily negligent in the present case.
Swarts claims that Johnson was negligent by failing to take steps to insure segregation of violent prisoners, and eliminate overcrowding. However, we have held that a prison official is not liable in damages for prison overcrowding and the consequences of that overcrowding. Schmidt v. Wingo, 499 F.2d 70, 74 (6th Cir.1974). Indeed, Swarts fails to demonstrate that it would have been possible to eliminate overcrowding or to segregate out all potentially assaultive prisoners.
Swarts also claims that this attack was forseeable, due to Davidson's poor record, which reflected a high risk of assault. Handlon testified, however, that...
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