Swartz v. Mathes

• Decision Date: 12 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. C00-2065-LRR.,C00-2065-LRR.
• Citation: 291 F.Supp.2d 861
• Parties: Ronald Dean SWARTZ, Petitioner, v. John MATHES, Warden, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

Page 861

291 F.Supp.2d 861

Ronald Dean SWARTZ, Petitioner, v. John MATHES, Warden, Respondent.

No. C00-2065-LRR.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern-Waterloo Division.

November 12, 2003.

Ronald Dean Swartz, pro se, Waterloo, IA, for Petitioner.

Philip B. Mears, Mears Law Office, Iowa City, IA, for Petitioner.

Robert P. Ewald, Des Moines, IA, for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

READE, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The petitioner, Ronald Dean Swartz ("Swartz"), filed the instant action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter comes before the court pursuant to the August 30, 2002 report and recommendation of United States Chief Magistrate Judge John A. Jarvey ("Judge Jarvey"). After extensive analysis, Judge Jarvey recommended Swartz's petition be denied.

On October 30, 2002, Swartz filed objections to Judge Jarvey's report and recommendation. Therefore, the court must undertake a review of Judge Jarvey's report and recommendation in light of Swartz's objections.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The standard of review to be applied by the district court to a report and recommendation of a magistrate judge is established by statute:

A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate [magistrate judge].

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). See also Fed. R.Civ.P. 72(b) (provides for review of a magistrate judge's recommendation on dispositive motions and prisoner petitions). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that it is reversible error for the district court to fail to conduct a de novo review of a magistrate judge's report where such review is required. See, e.g., Hosna v. Groose, 80 F.3d 298, 306 (8th Cir.1996) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)); Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir.1996) (citing Belk v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 803, 815 (8th Cir.1994)); Hudson v. Gammon, 46 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir.1995) (same). However, the plain language of the statute governing review provides only for de novo review of "those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Therefore, portions of the proposed findings or recommendations to which no objections were filed are reviewed only for "plain error." See Griffini v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 690, 692 (8th Cir.1994) (reviewing factual findings for "plain error" where no objections to the magistrate judge's report were filed).

B. Objections

The court notes neither party resisted or filed objections to Judge Jarvey's conclusions regarding the bill of attainder claim and due process claim. Finding no objections to, and no plain error in, his conclusions, the court shall accept the portions of Judge Jarvey's report and recommendation pertaining to them. Swartz objects to Judge Jarvey's recommendation that the habeas corpus petition be denied because no violation of the ex post facto clause occurred and because the entrapment by estoppel claim had not been fairly presented to the state courts. The court now turns to consider those objections.

1. Background

The parties do not dispute Judge Jarvey's summary of the relevant facts surrounding this case. For convenience purposes, the court restates those facts:

[Swartz] was convicted of felony breaking and entering on June 23, 1976. Iowa Code [§] 724.26 and [Iowa Code § ] 724.27¹ make it illegal for individuals convicted of a felony to possess a firearm, but these laws ... became effective on January 1, 1978. In 1981, [Swartz's] rights of citizenship were restored by then Governor Ray. The 1981 restoration of rights [form] did not contain any language regarding the prohibition of firearm possession by a felon. The form indicated that the restoration was not the equivalent of a pardon but did not specifically address the possession of firearm issue.

[Swartz] was convicted of [first] degree robbery in 1985. [Swartz's] robbery conviction was reversed on appeal of his post conviction relief proceedings. [Swartz] was retried again and found guilty, but that conviction was also reversed. In 1992, after he had served his sentence, [Swartz's] civil rights were restored by then Governor Branstad.... The 1992 restoration of rights form contained language that expressly prohibited the possession of firearms by those previously convicted of a felony. In 1998, [Swartz] was ... convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon based on his 1976 breaking and entering conviction.

2. Ex Post Facto Clause

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Thus, "[28 U.S.C. §] 2254(d) distinguishes between two types of erroneous decisions-those of law and those of fact-and treats each in separate subparagraphs." Weaver v. Bowersox, 241 F.3d 1024, 1029 (8th Cir. 2001). Claims of legal error are governed by the former while claims of factual error fall within the latter. Id. at 1029-30. Swartz seeks relief under the former-28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). He argues the Iowa courts' decisions on the issue of whether a violation of the ex post facto clause occurred were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas corpus relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court only through a showing that the state court's decision was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Williams v. Taylor ("Williams"), 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), explains the meaning of those statutory concepts and the degree of deference that must be afforded to state court determinations on the merits in federal habeas corpus proceedings concerning state prisoners under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. See Newman v. Hopkins, 247 F.3d 848, 850-52 (8th Cir. 2001) (discussing effect of Williams).

Under Williams, a state-court decision can be "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent in two ways: (1) if the state court "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law" or (2) if the state court "confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [that precedent]." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Further, "the [statutory] phrase `clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,' ... refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

An "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent can also arise in two ways. The Supreme Court explained:

First, a state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of this Court's precedent if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case. Second, a state-court decision also involves an unreasonable application of this Court's precedent if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.

Id. at 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (citing Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 869-70 (4th Cir. 1998)). Thus, where a state court "correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case," that decision "certainly would qualify as a decision `involv[ing] an unreasonable application of ... clearly established federal law.'" Id. Notably, however,

[u]nder [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d)(1)'s `unreasonable application' clause, ... a federal habeas [corpus] court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.

Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

Applying these standards to the present case, the court's inquiry must be whether the Iowa courts reached a decision contrary to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, or alternatively, whether the Iowa courts correctly identified the applicable principles of federal law but then unreasonably applied that law to the facts of Swartz's claim. See, e.g., Newman, 247 F.3d at 850-52 (discussing Williams); Weaver, 241 F.3d at 1029-30 (same); Closs v. Weber, 238 F.3d 1018, 1020 (8th Cir.2001) (same); Copeland v. Washington, 232 F.3d 969, 973 (8th Cir.2000) (same).

The United States Constitution provides that: "No ... ex post facto Law shall be passed." U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 3. The ex post facto clause prohibits the application of laws that "retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts." Collins v. Youngblood ("Collins"), 497 U.S. 37, 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990). Accordingly,...