Swartz v. Sunderland

• Decision Date: 23 March 1961
• Citation: 403 Pa. 222,169 A.2d 289
• Parties: Milton SWARTZ, Appellant, v. Steward M. SUNDERLAND.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

169 A.2d 289

403 Pa. 222

Milton SWARTZ, Appellant, v. Steward M. SUNDERLAND.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 23, 1961.

Robert Siegel, Siegel & Siegel, Lewistown, for appellant.

Albert Houck, Lewistown, for appellee.

Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and BELL, MUSMANNO BENJAMIN R. JONES, COHEN, BOK and EAGEN, JJ.

EAGEN, Justice.

If one of the two joint tort-feasors settles with the injured third party and obtains a release of all claims against both without suit or judgment having been entered, may contribution be enforced against the other wrongdoer? This is the narrow question for decision in this case.

The issue arises out of an automobile accident wherein the negligence of both the appellant and the appellee allegedly resulted in injury to the person and damage to the property of innocent third parties. The appellant settled with the aggrieved persons before the entry of suit and, in consideration gained a release of all claims against both tort-feasors. In this case, he seeks contribution from the appellee for one-half of the amount paid in settlement. The lower court sustained preliminary objections to the complaint in the nature of a demurrer and entered judgment for the defendant. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed. The rationale of both decisions is that before a tort-feasor may seek contribution by a separate suit in assumpsit, the basis for such action must be predicated on liability for the wrong established by a judgment.

It is now well established in Pennsylvania that a tort-feasor enjoys the right of contribution from his fellow joint tort-feasors. This was so, if unintentional wrongs were involved, even before the adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act of July 19, 1951, P.L. 1130, 12 P.S. § 2082 et seq., and its legislative predecessor, the Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 1075, § 1, 12 P.S. § 2081. See Goldman v. Mitchell- Fletcher Co. 1928, 292 Pa. 354, 141 A. 231; 8 P.L.E. Contribution § 4. It is not a recovery for the tort, but rather it is the enforcement of an equitable duty to share liability for the wrong done by both: Puller v. Puller, 1955, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175. "The doctrine of contribution rests on the principle that, when the parties stand in aequali jure, the law requires equality, which is equity, and one of them shall not be obliged to bear a common burden in ease of the rest": Parker to Use of Bunting v. Rodgers, 1937, 125 Pa.Super. 48, 51, 189 A. 693, 695. See also, John W. Brown, Jr. Equipment Rental Corp. v. Dickey, 1959, 397 Pa. 454, 155 A.2d 836.

Where a judgment is recovered against one of two parties guilty of joint negligence, such party, on paying the judgment has a right to have the judgment marked to his use, so as to enforce contribution by way of subrogation, or he may elect to seek recovery of a proportionate amount of the judgment in an independent action: Puller v. Puller, supra, and cases cited therein. But, we don't think that the entry of judgment is the exclusive and absolute foundation of the right to seek contribution.

Sections 1 and 2 of the Act of 1951, supra provides:

§ 1. 'For the purpose of this act, the term 'joint tortfeasors' means two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to persons or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them.'

§ 2. '(1) The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors; (2) A joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof; (3) A joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person is not entitled to recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished by the settlement.'

Section 1 pointedly states, 'Whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them.' ^[1] This language indicates the legislative intent that the entry of a judgment is not imperative and vital. In addition, a reading of the act signifies that only two conditions must exist before the right of contribution arises, namely, (1) that one joint tort-feasor has discharged the common liability or paid more than his prorata share; (2) that the liability of the other joint tort-feasor to the injured persons has been extinguished by the settlement. Both of these conditions have been met in this case.

The...