Swartz v. Superintendent

• Decision Date: 16 August 2017
• Docket Number: No. 2:17-cv-24-WTL-MPB,2:17-cv-24-WTL-MPB
• Parties: CHRISTOPHER SWARTZ, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SWARTZ, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT, Respondent.

No. 2:17-cv-24-WTL-MPB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

August 16, 2017

Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability

Once convicted and after exhaustion or waiver of any right to appeal, a defendant is presumed to stand "fairly and finally convicted." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982).

For the reasons explained in this Entry, the effort of Christopher Swartz to show otherwise with respect to his Marion County conviction fails. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus will therefore be denied. In addition, the Court finds that a certificate of appealability should not issue.

I. Background

An Indiana jury found Swartz guilty of the fatal stabbing of Jose Hernandez in June 2006. The facts and pertinent procedural history were recited in Swartz's direct appeal:

Seventeen-year-old José Hernandez was walking toward his aunt's house on the southeast side of Indianapolis at approximately 1:30 a.m. on June 24, 2006. Ken Julian and Tanya Bright were sitting on their front porch talking to Joe Culvahouse when they observed three white men approach a neighboring convenience store. One of the men, Matt Miller, entered the store and purchased beer. Swartz and Wilburn Barnard remained outside. Miller returned with the beer and the three men began walking on the sidewalk.

Thirty seconds later, Hernandez began crossing the street when Swartz, Barnard, and Miller began heckling him and shouting racial epithets. Hernandez shrugged his shoulders. At that point, Swartz walked away from Miller and Barnard and began taunting Hernandez. Eventually, Hernandez removed his shirt and approached Swartz. Swartz swung his right fist at Hernandez and Hernandez ducked. Swartz told Hernandez that he was going to "f* * * [him] up." Tr. p. 55, 60. Swartz and Hernandez began sparring, although neither landed punches. Miller and Barnard egged Swartz on by telling him to "f* * * him up." Id. at 115. Swartz eventually lifted his shirt and asked Hernandez, "What you got?" Id. at 122. Hernandez looked down, saw a knife, and jumped back. At that point, Swartz lunged forward and stabbed Hernandez in the chest with the knife. Hernandez staggered away and Swartz turned and ran. Hernandez stumbled to his aunt's front porch, where he collapsed. He later died at Wishard Hospital from a stab wound that punctured his lung and heart.

The State charged Swartz with murder on June 27, 2006. Before trial, Swartz filed two motions in limine seeking to exclude (1) a portion of a 911 audiotape in which the caller referred to Swartz as a "wannabe white boy" and (2) photographs of Swartz's upper torso depicting his tattoos "South," "Side," and "Crazy White Boy." Appellant's App. p. 111, 114. The trial court denied both motions after a hearing.

A three-day jury trial began on May 7, 2007. Swartz renewed his pretrial objections when the photographs and the objectionable portion of the 911 audiotape were admitted into evidence at trial. The jury ultimately found Swartz guilty as charged. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on June 14, 2007, and sentenced Swartz to sixty years imprisonment.

Swartz v. State, 49A04-0707-CR-393 (Ind.Ct.App. February 25, 2008). The denial of post-conviction relief, in which he claimed that he had been denied ineffective assistance from both his trial counsel and counsel in his direct appeal, was affirmed in Swartz v. State, 2016 WL 2772124 (Ind.Ct.App.), transfer denied, 57 N.E.3d 816 (Ind. 2016).

Swartz now seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The action is fully at issue and the record has been appropriately expanded.

II. Applicable Law

"[I]n all habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the successful petitioner must demonstrate that he 'is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'" Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 611 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, became effective on April 24, 1996, and governs the habeas petition in this case because Swartz filed his petition after the AEDPA's effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).

As explained by the Supreme Court, the AEDPA "places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003) ("Statutes such as AEDPA have placed more, rather than fewer, restrictions on the power of federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners.").

Recognizing that state courts are no less experienced than federal courts in dealing with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15-16, 187 L.Ed.2d 348, 2013 WL 5904117 at *4 (U.S. Nov. 5, 2013), federal law erects a high deferential standard . . . for claims that a state court erred. Federal habeas relief is available only if the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2); see also Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1786 (2013).

Bailey v. Lemke, 735 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2013). The decision made by a state court is deemed to be contrary to clearly established federal law "'if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.'" Emerson v. Shaw, 575 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2009)(quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). An "unreasonable" application of federal law is one "'so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Harper v. Brown, No. 15-2276, 2017 WL 3224907, at *2 (7th Cir. July 31, 2017) (citing Ward v. Neal, 835 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2016), and quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). "A state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of this Court's clearly established precedents if the state court applies this Court's precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 131, 141 (2005) (internal citations omitted). "Under § 2254(d)(2), a decision involves an unreasonable determination of the facts if it rests upon fact-finding that ignores the clear and convincing weight of the evidence." Goudy v. Basinger, 604 F.3d 394, 399-400 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Ward v. Sternes, 334 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2003)). "The petitioner carries the burden of proof." Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).

The Supreme Court has described AEDPA as "a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court" and has emphasized that courts must not "lightly conclude that a State's criminal justice system has experienced the 'extreme malfunction' for which federal habeas relief is the remedy." Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011)); see also Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) ("AEDPA . . . imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, and demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.") (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted).

In addition to the foregoing substantive standard, "[i]t is the rule in this country that assertions of error in criminal proceedings must first be raised in state court in order to form the basis for relief in habeas. Claims not so raised are considered defaulted." Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)).

Procedural default can occur in several ways, "but two are paradigmatic." Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258, 268 (7th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner can procedurally default a federal claim if he fails to "fairly present" it "throughout at least one complete round of state-court review, whether on direct appeal of his conviction or in post-conviction proceedings." Id. Procedural default can also occur if the state court rejects a federal claim based on a state procedural rule "that is both independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Clemons v. Pfister, 845 F.3d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Thomas v. Williams, 822 F.3d 378, 384 (7th Cir. 2016)).

Procedural default, although otherwise a bar to federal habeas review, may be excused in certain circumstances. "A federal court may excuse a procedural default if the habeas petitioner establishes that (1) there was good cause for the default and consequent prejudice, or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the defaulted claim is not heard." Johnson v. Foster, 786 F.3d 501, 504 (7th Cir.2015)(internal citations omitted). "Under this cause-and-prejudice test, a cause is defined as 'an objective factor, external to the defense, that impeded the defendant's efforts to raise the claim in an earlier proceeding.' Prejudice means 'an error which so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.'" Smith v. McKee, 598 F.3d 374, 382 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). The second exception, known as the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, requires a petitioner to show that he is actually innocent. He must show that "in light of new evidence, 'it is more likely than...