Swatzell v. Tenn. Bd. of Parole
| Decision Date | 21 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:18-cv-01336 |
| Parties | CHAD SWATZELL, Plaintiff, v. TENNESSEE BOARD OF PAROLE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Chad Swatzell, an inmate of the Tennessee Department of Correction, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Tennessee Board of Parole (the “Board”). He argues that the Board has repeatedly denied him parole in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution, by: (1) denying him parole due to the “seriousness” of his offense of conviction even though he was a juvenile at the time and despite his subsequent rehabilitation; (2) considering his juvenile age at the time of the offense as an aggravating rather than mitigating factor; and (3) applying the parole release standards after the date of his offense. The Board counters that Tennessee law and its own guidelines afford it broad discretion to deny parole. The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment are ripe for decision. (Doc. Nos. 84, 85 86, 88, 89, 90, 94, 95, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107). For the following reasons, the Board's motion will be granted, and Swatzell's motion will be denied.
Swatzell is serving a life sentence with the possibility of parole for first degree murder committed on August 29, 1988, when he was sixteen years old. (Doc. No. 101 ¶¶ 1, 3; see also Doc. No. 104 ¶ 1). He became eligible for parole in 2013 after serving 25 years in prison. (Doc. No. 101 ¶ 9). His parole file reflects that he committed the offense as a juvenile, has had no prison disciplinary infractions, and has completed educational, religious and vocational programming. .
Swatzell has made multiple requests for parole. At his first parole hearing in July 2013, the Board continued the hearing to allow Swatzell to receive a psychological evaluation. (Id. ¶ 12). At Swatzell's second parole hearing in November 2013, the Board again continued the hearing to conduct further evaluation, including to “verify and approve a release plan to include a plan for mental health treatment.” (Id. ¶ 13). In 2014, at his third parole hearing, the Board denied parole due to the “seriousness of the offense” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b)(2) (“Section 503(b)(2)”) (Doc. No. 101 ¶¶ 4-5; see also Doc. No. 104 ¶ 14). The Board again denied parole due to the “seriousness of the offense” at his fourth parole hearing, in 2016. (Doc. No. 101 ¶ 6; see also Doc. No. 104 ¶¶ 11, 25-26, 30). In April 2020, the Board continued Swatzell's next parole hearing because it failed to reach the four-vote threshold required by Tennessee law to either grant or deny parole for a person convicted of murder. (Doc. No. 104 ¶ 15). On June 29, 2020, the fourth vote was cast to deny parole, again due to the “seriousness of the offense.” (Id. ¶¶ 16-18, 25).
More recently, the Board denied parole based on the “seriousness of the offense” at Swatzell's fifth and sixth parole hearings. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 30-31). At Swatzell's fifth parole hearing on August 3, 2020, presiding hearing officer Mae Beavers noted that “I know it's been argued that you were only 16 at the time, but I'm really less concerned about the age at the time then than [sic] I am the seriousness of the crime and the viciousness of the attack.” (Id. ¶ 28; see also Doc. No. 91-12, Tr. of Aug. 3, 2020, Parole Review Hearing at 33:21-22). At Swatzell's sixth hearing, Board member Zane Duncan lauded Swatzell's lack of disciplinary infractions. (Doc. No. 104 ¶¶ 31-32). Specifically, Duncan said (Id. ¶ 31). Duncan also discussed Swatzell's “extensive vocational training during his incarceration.” (Id.; see also Doc. No. 91-12 at 30:1-15). Nonetheless, Duncan decided, along with other Board members, to deny parole due to the “seriousness of the offense.” He clarified that, “I do understand that these are tough cases where crimes are committed as a juvenile, and the Board does take those into consideration in making our decision . . . [but] that does not depreciate the seriousness of the offense whatsoever.” (Doc. No. 104 ¶¶ 32-33; see also Doc. No. 91-5, Tr. of Jan. 13, 2021, Parole Review Hearing at 35:8-15). Swatzell's next parole hearing is scheduled for July 2022. (Doc. No. 104 ¶ 34).
Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A genuine dispute of material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Griffith v. Franklin Cty., 975 F.3d 554, 566 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts.” Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “The moving party may satisfy this burden by presenting affirmative evidence that negates an element of the non-moving party's claim or by demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must review all the evidence, facts, and inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted). “And where, as here, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, ‘the court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.'” McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Taft Broad. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th Cir. 1991)). The Court does not, however, weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of the matter. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Swatzell's legal claims are grounded in the parole statutory framework. The Tennessee General Assembly authorizes the Board to grant parole to any inmate with a felony sentence of more than two (2) years. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(a). While the Board has sole discretion regarding parole decisions, State ex rel. Ivey v. Meadows, 216 Tenn. 678, 685 (Tenn. 1965) (), the Legislature has established boundaries and considerations to guide the Board's exercise of its discretion. In Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-117(a), the Legislature told the Board that:
Parole being a privilege and not a right, no prisoner shall be released on parole merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties assigned in prison, but only if the board is of the opinion that there is reasonable probability that the prisoner, if released, will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that the prisoner's release is not incompatible with the welfare of society.
Then, in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b), the Legislature reiterates that “parole is a privilege and not a right” and creates a fence within which the Board shall exercise its discretion in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b)(2). There, the Legislature makes clear what the Board may and may not do. As pertinent here, the sub-section reads:
Tenn. Code Ann. 40-35-503(b)(2)(A) and (B).
From the statutory grant of authority to the Board, the framework in which the Board must exercise its discretion is apparent. First, an inmate's good conduct and performance while in custody is only a consideration and does not alone entitle an inmate to parole. Second, parole is a privilege deserving to only those inmates that the Board believes “there is reasonable probability” will not violate the law when released or compromise the public safety. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-117(a); Id. ...
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