Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services

• Decision Date: 11 June 1990
• Docket Number: No. 880384,880384
• Citation: 795 P.2d 637
• Parties: Steven H. SWAYNE, Plaintiff, Petitioner, and Cross-Respondent, v. L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, John Doe and Jane Doe, Defendants, Respondents, and Cross-Petitioners.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 637

795 P.2d 637

Steven H. SWAYNE, Plaintiff, Petitioner, and Cross-Respondent, v. L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, John Doe and Jane Doe, Defendants Respondents, and Cross-Petitioners.

No. 880384.

Supreme Court of Utah.

June 11, 1990.

Rehearing Denied July 13, 1990.

M. David Eckersley, Billy L. Walker, Jr., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff, petitioner and cross-respondent.

David M. McConkie, Merrill F. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for defendants, respondents and cross petitioners.

ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

HALL, Chief Justice:

Plaintiff Steven Swayne challenges the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4(3) (1981), which terminates the parental rights of the father of an illegitimate child if the father fails to file a timely notice of paternity. Defendant L.D.S. Social Services seeks review of the Utah Court of Appeals decision holding that its acts constituted state, rather than private, action.

Plaintiff and a friend, Penny, began dating and engaging in sexual intercourse in 1985. In September 1986, Penny discovered she was pregnant. When plaintiff learned of Penny's pregnancy, he was shocked, upset, and confused and initially denied that he was the father of the expected child. In the last trimester of Penny's pregnancy, however, he orally acknowledged his paternity. His family held a shower to acquire gifts for the baby, and plaintiff eventually made a small payment toward Penny's doctor bill.

Plaintiff and Penny both resided in Salt Lake County immediately before and during the pregnancy. They did not live together, however, and plaintiff dated other women during Penny's pregnancy and engaged in sexual relations with them. He indicated that it was not his intention to marry Penny or live with her and the child as a family, although he did arrange for Penny to move into his mother's apartment conditioned on Penny's supporting herself and paying half the rent. Plaintiff's sister offered to care for the child while Penny was at work.

In March 1987, Penny told plaintiff that her parents wanted her to relinquish the child for adoption. Plaintiff protested and indicated that adoption was plaintiff's and Penny's decision and that if she did not want the child, she should give it to him.

The child was born on June 4, 1987. Plaintiff was present in the delivery room and visited Penny and the child every day they were in the hospital. During Penny's recovery, a hospital clerk told her that in order to have plaintiff's name appear on the birth certificate, it was necessary for him to sign a form before a notary. When plaintiff visited Penny, she told him about the form, but he did not see fit to sign it. Both plaintiff and Penny now claim that they were unaware that the form was for the purpose of registering a claim of paternity, requiring plaintiff's signature to preserve his parental rights.

On June 6, 1987, Penny was discharged from the hospital. On the late afternoon of June 8, at the instigation and in the company of her parents, she met with defendant L.D.S. Social Services to discuss placing the child for adoption. During that meeting, a counselor phoned the Utah Department of Health and found that plaintiff had not filed a notice of claim of paternity. The counselor explained to Penny that the decision to place the baby for adoption was hers alone. Penny said that she would sign papers relinquishing her parental rights, but not that evening. The counselor indicated that it was best to sign the papers then, before plaintiff had an opportunity to file paternity. Penny signed relinquishment papers that evening, June 8, 1987. Although she later claimed she was pressured, ¹ the document she signed indicates that her relinquishment was voluntary and not coerced.

Plaintiff filed a notice of claim of paternity on the first day possible after discovering Penny's relinquishment. ² In June 1987, plaintiff brought suit in federal district court, seeking custody of the child. The federal court held that defendant's acts constituted state, rather than private, action, thus invoking plaintiff's rights to due process and equal protection of the laws, but abstained from considering the constitutionality of section 78-30-4, electing to allow state court review of that issue. ³

Plaintiff filed an action in state court in September 1987. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that (1) there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, (2) defendant's acts did not constitute state action, and (3) section 78-30-4 was constitutionally valid on its face and as applied to plaintiff. In March 1988, plaintiff filed an appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals. That court reversed in part, holding that defendant's acts constituted state action, and affirmed in part, holding that section 78-30-4 was constitutionally valid on its face and as applied to plaintiff. ⁴

I. STATE ACTION

The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution states in part: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (Emphasis added.) The termination of parental rights is the deprivation of a liberty interest worthy of constitutional protection. ⁵ These protections, however, are only affected if the deprivation of the interest is the result of state, rather than private, action. ⁶

The general test for determining whether state action is involved in a deprivation was cited by both the federal district court and the Utah Court of Appeals. First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of a state-created right or privilege. Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. ⁷ The first portion of the state action test is fulfilled since plaintiff's deprivation was caused by defendant's reliance on section 78-30-4, a statute which is clearly a product of the state. The more difficult question is whether defendant may fairly be said to be a state actor.

Suffice it to say that we agree with the logic of the two opinions that have already addressed this issue. Section 78-30-4 is self-operative. When an illegitimate child is relinquished by its mother, the rights of the father are automatically terminated unless he has previously filed an acknowledgment of paternity. A parent's rights may only be so terminated through the power of the state. ⁸ When a private party facilitates a mother's relinquishment, as was the case here, the party becomes a state actor if it also effectuates the state's termination of the father's rights.

II. EQUAL PROTECTION

Plaintiff claims that section 78-30-4 discriminates on the basis of gender in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The statute requires the consent of the mother of an illegitimate child to the child's adoption, but does not require the consent of the father unless he files an acknowledgment of paternity with the Utah Department of Health. We have previously held under an equal protection analysis that "there are reasonable bases for the classifications in the statute (between unwed mothers and fathers and between fathers who file and fathers who do not) and that these classifications are reasonably calculated to serve a proper governmental objective." ⁹

Utah's registration statute was designed to facilitate permanent and secure placement of illegitimate children whose unwed mothers wish to give them up for adoption and whose unwed fathers take no steps to officially identify themselves and acknowledge paternity. ¹⁰ Because the identity of a mother of an illegitimate child is usually readily ascertainable, an unwed mother is forced to either immediately assume legal responsibility for the physical care of her child or relinquish her parental rights. Paternity, however, is more difficult to establish. ¹¹ Even a father who informally acknowledges his responsibility for a pregnancy may later deny paternity and possibly avoid legal liability for his child's care. Thus, a reasonable basis for the different classification of unwed fathers and unwed mothers in section 78-30-4 is the fact that while identification of both parents of an illegitimate child is necessary, identification of a child's mother is automatic because of her role in the birth process, while identification of the father is not. A reasonable basis for the different classification of filing and nonfiling fathers is the state's need to distinguish those fathers who have accepted legal responsibility for the care of their children from those fathers who have not. Whether section 78-30-4 utilizes the best means for accomplishing this purpose involves policy issues which lie within the prerogative of the legislature to address. Nevertheless, we are sufficiently convinced that there are reasonable bases for the classifications in section 78-30-4 and that the classifications are reasonably calculated to serve a proper governmental objective.

Plaintiff also claims that section 78-30-4 violates the uniform operation of the laws provision of the Utah Constitution. ¹² He contends that this is so because article IV, section 1 of the Utah Constitution ¹³ defines gender as an inherently suspect classification and thus gender-based discrimination of a fundamental right requires a compelling state interest--rather than a rational governmental objective--to pass constitutional muster. However, since plaintiff makes little effort to set forth an independent analysis of the appropriate state constitutional provisions, we are not bound to address his state constitutional argument. ¹⁴ Nevertheless, even if we were to accept the proposition that the Utah Constitution defines gender as an inherently suspect classification, defendant's claim would fail since "the mere existence of a biological link" by itself has...