Sweat v. Butler

• Decision Date: 09 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–1253.,14–1253.
• Citation: 90 F.Supp.3d 773
• Parties: Tara SWEAT and Jeremy Hunter Sweat, Plaintiffs, v. Officer Larry BUTLER and City of Crump, Tennessee, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

90 F.Supp.3d 773

Tara SWEAT and Jeremy Hunter Sweat, Plaintiffs

v.Officer Larry BUTLER and City of Crump, Tennessee, Defendants.

No. 14–1253.

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division.

Signed March 9, 2015.

Tara Sweat, Adamsville, TN, pro se.

Jeremy Hunter Sweat, Adamsville, TN, pro se.

Milton Dale Conder, Jr., Rainey Kizer Reviere & Bell, Jackson, TN, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS BY DEFENDANT, CITY OF CRUMP, TENNESSEE

J. DANIEL BREEN, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs, Tara Sweat and Jeremy Hunter Sweat, brought this action against the City of Crump, Tennessee, and Larry Butler, a former Crump police officer, in a complaint filed on September 26, 2014, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Tennessee tort law. (Docket Entry (“D.E.”) 1.) Before the Court is the October 20, 2014, motion of Crump to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), (D.E. 7), to which Plaintiffs have responded, (D.E. 9).

I. Legal Standard

Rule 12 permits a court to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a district court should “construe [the] complaint in the light most favorable” to the non-moving party and accept all “well-pled allegations as true.” Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272, 274 (6th Cir.2010) (citing Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 559 (6th Cir.2008) ). A claim is well-pled when “it contains ‘either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements' necessary for recovery under a viable legal theory.” Phil. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Youth Alive, Inc., 732 F.3d 645, 649 (6th Cir.2013) (quoting Terry, 604 F.3d at 275–76 ). The facts in the complaint must “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). The Court “need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences, and conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice.” Youth Alive, Inc., 732 F.3d at 649 (quoting Terry, 604 F.3d at 275–76 ). The complaint, therefore, must “contain[ ] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617, 622–23 (6th Cir.2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).¹

II. Facts Alleged

Plaintiffs made the following allegations in their complaint. On September 27, 2013, Tara Sweat was driving to work when Butler performed a traffic stop on her vehicle. (D.E. 1 ¶¶ 7–8.) After she “pulled over at the first well-lit area, a nearby gas station[,] ... Butler approached [her] vehicle with his gun drawn, telling her to ‘get the f––k out of the car.’ ” (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.) The officer would not tell her “why [she] was pulled over,” and, while “yelling, cursing, and spitting in her face,” he “forcibly pull[ed her] from the car” without allowing her to unbuckle her seatbelt, which caused “bruising and abrasions.” (Id. ¶¶ 11–12.) After Butler performed field sobriety tests, he arrested Ms. Sweat for driving under the influence. (Id. ¶ 14.) While Ms. Sweat was handcuffed in the back of Butler's patrol car, her son, Jeremy Hunter Sweat, stopped his vehicle, containing a minor passenger, at the gas station “to make sure his [m]other had not had a car accident.” (Id. ¶¶ 14–15.) Butler then “drew his firearm” on Mr. Sweat and the passenger, and he yelled, cursed, and “order[ed] them to immediately leave.” (Id. ¶¶ 16–17.) The local hospital eventually performed a consensual blood draw on Ms. Sweat. (Id. ¶ 19.)

The next day, Sweat's husband submitted a complaint with the Crump Police Department and reviewed a video recording of the events. (Id. ¶ 20.) The charges were eventually abandoned and dismissed. (Id. ¶ 21.) About a month after Sweat's arrest, Butler was “terminated for violation of the personal conduct policy” due to his involvement in a domestic dispute, during the course of which “he stated that he was ‘untouchable’ because he was a police officer.” (Id. ¶¶ 22–23.)

Plaintiffs also claim that, prior to September 27, 2013, “Butler was alleged to have provided alcohol to a minor and allowed her to drive his squad car” and that “he was reported to have purchased beer while on duty.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Further, they state that, “[u]pon information and belief,” the officer had engaged in “improper and illegal conduct while employed with other departments.” (Id. ¶ 25.) The Sweats also maintain that, “[t]o [their] knowledge, ... Butler was never meaningfully disciplined for his use of force against [them].” (Id. ¶ 26.) According to Plaintiffs, “the video depicting the incident was erased [ ]or destroyed, presumably to cover up the incident and impede civil action on it.” (Id. ¶ 27.)

III. Analysis

A. Applicable Law

The Sweats assert claims against Crump pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 arising out of violations of their rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 38–44.) Chapter 42, section 1983 of the United States Code was enacted to “protect[ ] citizens from violations of their federal rights by state officials.” Bradley v. Reno, 749 F.3d 553, 558 (6th Cir.2014). “Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) ). To invoke these remedies, “a plaintiff must set forth facts that, when construed favorably, establish (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under color of state law.”Heyerman v. Cnty. of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir.2012) (quoting Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir.2006) ).

A municipality or other local governmental entity is considered a “person” under the statute and may therefore be held liable for its actions depriving a plaintiff of her federal rights—commonly referred to as “Monell liability.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (citing Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ). A municipality will not be liable, however, simply because it employs the alleged unlawful actor. Id. (“We have consistently refused to hold municipalities liable under the theory of respondeat superior. ”). Instead, “liability only attaches where a custom, policy, or practice attributable to the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the violation....” Heyerman, 680 F.3d at 648 (quoting Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 254–55 (6th Cir.2010) ); see also Burley v. Gagacki, 729 F.3d 610, 618 (6th Cir.2013) (“A municipality can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the plaintiff can demonstrate that his civil rights have been violated as a direct result of that municipality's policy or custom or if a failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to such rights.” (quoting Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 900 (6th Cir.2004) ) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, “[u]nder § 1983, local governments are responsible only for their own illegal acts” and will not be held vicariously liable for the actions of their employees. D'Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 386 (6th Cir.2014) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) ). A plaintiff may invoke a custom, policy, or practice sufficient to state a claim for Monell liability by alleging “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance [of] or acquiescence [to] federal rights violations.” Id. at 386 (alterations in original) (quoting Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir.2013) ). Because municipalities do not incur respondeat superior

liability under § 1983, “a plaintiff must adequately plead (1) that a violation of a federal right took place, (2) that the defendants acted under color of state law, and (3) that a municipality's policy or custom caused that violation to happen” to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Bright v. Gallia Cnty., Ohio, 753 F.3d 639, 660 (6th Cir.2014) (citing Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir.2008) ).

B. Illegal Official Policy or Legislative Enactment

A government's “official policies” include “decisions of its duly constituted legislative body,” Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, as well as policies “officially adopted or established through the decision-making channels,” Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., Tenn. ex rel. Claiborne Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir.1996). The Sweats have not identified an unconstitutional decision of a legislative body, nor have they alleged that Crump, through its official decision-making process, has adopted a policy that led to the violation of their rights. Because Plaintiffs have “fail[ed] to identify any unlawful policy ... on the part of the [c]ity which authorized the police officer['s] actions,” they cannot rely on this category of Monell liability to overcome the 12(b)(6) motion. Garner v. City of Memphis, 576 Fed.Appx. 460, 462 (6th Cir.2014).

C. Inadequate Supervision and Training

Inadequate supervision and training will give rise to municipal liability, “[i]n limited circumstances, [where] a local government's decision not to train certain employees about their legal duty to avoid...