Sweat v. Darr
| Decision Date | 02 February 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 55299,55299 |
| Citation | 677 P.2d 554,9 Kan.App.2d 268 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Application of Sesmon SWEAT for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Appellant, v. Johnnie DARR, Sheriff of Sedgwick County, Kansas, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Article III of the interstate Agreement on Detainers, K.S.A. 22-4401 et seq., is applicable to a prisoner's initiation of return for disposition of untried charges lodged by another state. The prisoner's sole responsibility under Article III of the Agreement is to give his warden or other custodian a written notice of the place of his imprisonment and request for final disposition of the untried charges.
2. Article III(b) of the interstate Agreement on Detainers, K.S.A. 22-4401 et seq., imposes a statutory duty upon the warden or other custodian to promptly forward a prisoner's notice and request for disposition of charges. The burden of a state's failure to meet its obligations under the Agreement falls on the prosecution.
3. If the trial court finds that the warden or other custodian did not promptly forward the prisoner's notice and request for disposition of untried charges, then the 180-day period of Article III(a) of the interstate Agreement on Detainers, K.S.A. 22-4401 et seq., will be held to have commenced some reasonably short time after the prisoner gave his request to the warden.
4. In a case where a California prisoner gave his warden a written notice of the place of his imprisonment and request for final disposition of untried Kansas charges, and the notice and request, a certificate of the custodial official and an offer to deliver temporary custody were not sent by the warden to the Kansas district court and prosecutor, it is held the prisoner was denied a speedy trial under Article III of the interstate Agreement on Detainers, K.S.A. 22-4401 et seq., and dismissal of the Kansas charges with prejudice was required.
Eric A. Commer, of Lyle W. Britt, Chtd., Wichita, for appellant.
Geary N. Gorup, Asst. Dist. Atty., Clark V. Owens, Dist. Atty., and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before REES, P.J., MEYER, J., and RICHARD W. WAHL, District Judge assigned.
This is a habeas corpus proceeding in which petitioner claims that by operation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (K.S.A. 22-4401 et seq.) the Sedgwick County District Court was required to dismiss the criminal charges for which he was being held for trial in that court. The material facts are essentially undisputed. They are almost wholly established by documentary evidence, particularly petitioner's Exhibit 2, and to the extent they are not, they are established by the parties' stipulations.
On November 9, 1982, while in custody at the Sedgwick County jail in Wichita, petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus. It was immediately issued. At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing on November 16, 1982, the trial judge ordered the writ dissolved and that petitioner remain in the sheriff's custody for trial on the Sedgwick County charges. Petitioner appeals.
In early 1982, petitioner was a prisoner in the custody of the California Department of Corrections at the California Rehabilitation Center, Norco, California (CRC). He was serving a two-year sentence imposed following a 1981 California robbery conviction. Using IAD Form I (Notice of Untried Indictment, Information or Complaint and of Right to Request Disposition) the Superintendent of CRC informed petitioner in writing that a detainer had been lodged against him with respect to untried 1981 Sedgwick County drug charges. There is confusion in the documentation of the date petitioner was so informed, but it is clear it occurred not earlier than March 22, 1982 and not later than March 26, 1982. Petitioner signed and gave the custodial officials at CRC an IAD Form II (Inmate's Notice of Place of Imprisonment and Request for Disposition of Indictments, Informations or Complaints). Within it is recited reference to Sedgwick County Case No. 81 CR 305, identical to the same reference appearing in the IAD Form I delivered to the petitioner, and a typewritten insertion of the date of March 24, 1982. A completed IAD Form III (Certificate of Inmate Status) was signed by the Superintendent of CRC and an IAD Form IV (Offer to Deliver Temporary Custody) was executed by or on behalf of the Superintendent of CRC.
As evidenced by the postmark on the envelope used, the four completed documents, that is, IAD Forms I, II, III and IV, being the notice of untried charges, the written notice of the place of petitioner's imprisonment and request for final disposition of untried charges, the custodial official's certificate and the California authority's offer to deliver temporary custody, together with a form letter, bearing the date of March 26, 1982 and acknowledging receipt of the Sedgwick County detainer, were mailed by CRC to the Sedgwick County Sheriff on March 31, 1982 by certified mail.
The parties agree the documents were received by the sheriff but the particular date of their receipt by him is unknown. None of the documents were delivered by the Sheriff to the clerk or any other officer or employee of the Sedgwick County District Court, or the Sedgwick County District Attorney or any of his assistants or employees. For aught that appears, the documents languished in the sheriff's office from the time he received them until this proceeding was initiated. No copies of any of the documents were mailed by CRC to the Sedgwick County District Court or to the Sedgwick County District Attorney and none were received by either the court or the district attorney's office from petitioner, his attorney, or any other office or person.
Petitioner remained in custody in California on his robbery conviction from March, 1982 to October 27, 1982, when he was returned to Wichita by the Sedgwick County Sheriff upon acceptance of a California offer to deliver temporary custody issued as a result of an August 11, 1982 Article III request for final disposition of untried charges given by petitioner to his then custodial officials at the Soledad, California, Correctional Training Facility. On January 24, 1983, he went to trial on the drug charges. A jury verdict finding him guilty of possession of marijuana was returned on January 27, 1983.
There was never an acceptance by Kansas authorities of California's March, 1982 offer to deliver temporary custody. His return to Kansas was not in response to his March, 1982 disposition of charges request.
Kansas and California are party states to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Agreement). K.S.A. 22-4401 et seq.; Cal.Penal Code § 1389 et seq. (West 1982). It statutorily prescribes speedy trial rights. Article III is applicable to a prisoner's initiation of return for disposition of untried charges. Article IV is applicable to a requesting state's initiation of return for disposition of untried charges. State v. White, 234 Kan. 340, 342, 673 P.2d 1106 (1983). The time limits imposed are 180 days under Article III and 120 days under Article IV. The case before us concerns Article III and its requirement of trial within 180 days. Petitioner argues he was not brought to trial within the 180 days provided in Article III and under Article V it was the mandated duty of the Sedgwick County District Court to dismiss the charges against him in that court. Specifically, Article V provides:
....
"(c) If the appropriate [Kansas] authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in article III ... the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice ...."
It is clear that by March 26, 1982, petitioner gave to his California custodial officials his written notice of place of his imprisonment and request for return for disposition of charges. Based on that date, 228 days elapsed until he filed his application for a writ of habeas corpus. If time computation is based upon March 31, 1982, the date of the CRC mailing to the Sedgwick County Sheriff, 223 days elapsed until he filed his application for a writ of habeas corpus.
With the foregoing in mind, we turn to the heart of this litigation. It concerns Articles III(a) and III(b) of the agreement. In pertinent part they read:
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