Sweat v. Hull

Decision Date12 September 2001
Docket NumberNo. 00-CV-1680.,00-CV-1680.
Citation200 F.Supp.2d 1162
PartiesKen G. SWEAT; Sandra Bahr; David Matusow; Julie Sherman, Plaintiffs, v. Jane D. HULL, in her capacity as Governor of Arizona; Jacqueline E. Schafer, in her capacity as Director of the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality; the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality; the State of Arizona, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Arizona

Timothy Michael Hogan, Joy E. Herr-Cardillo, Arizona Center for Law In The Public Interest, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiffs.

Steven J. Burr, Office of the Attorney General, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants.

ORDER

SILVER, District Judge.

Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Having considered the arguments and evidence offered by the parties in their pleadings and at oral argument, the Court will grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and deny both of Defendants' Motions.

Background

On August 31, 2000, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendant Jane Hull ("Hull"), in her capacity as Governor of the State of Arizona, and Defendant Jacqueline Schafer ("Schafer"), in her capacity as Director of the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality ("ADEQ").1 Plaintiffs, residents of Maricopa County, Arizona, seek to enforce the requirements of the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7627. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 5.)

Pursuant to the CAA, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has established national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") for carbon monoxide and ozone as pollution limits in order to protect the public health and welfare. (Compl. ¶ 8; Answer ¶ 8.) Under the CAA, states are required to submit a state implementation plan ("SIP") to provide for the attainment of the NAAQS. (Compl. ¶ 9; Answer ¶ 9.) The EPA reviews the proposed SIPs, and approved SIPs become federally enforceable. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-11; Answer ¶¶ 10-11.)

In 1993, the state of Arizona submitted a SIP proposal ("1993 SIP") to the EPA, which was later revised. (Pl.St. Facts ¶ 18; Def.St. Facts ¶ 6.) In May 1995, the EPA approved the 1993 SIP proposal. (Pl.St. Facts ¶ 19; Def.St. Facts ¶ 9.) The approved SIP created an Enhanced Vehicle Inspection Maintenance Program ("I/M Program"), which required emissions tests for gasoline powered automobiles and a "purge and pressure" test. (1993 SIP at 2-8.) The I/M program also included a Random On-Road Testing Program ("RSD Program"), which provided for the identification of excess vehicle emissions through the use of a remote sensing device. (Pl.St. Facts ¶ 46; Def.St. Facts ¶¶ 11-12; 1993 SIP at 2-12.) The Arizona Legislature codified the RSD Program in A.R.S. § 49-542.01. (Pl.St. Facts ¶ 48.) When the EPA approved Arizona's 1993 SIP in May 1995, the RSD Program became enforceable as a matter of federal law.2 (Compl. ¶ 22; Answer ¶ 22.)

Beginning in 1998, ADEQ, Arizona's agency responsible for air pollution control under the CAA, began to question the effectiveness of the RSD Program. ADEQ found that "of vehicles that were subject to off-cycle testing as a result of remote sensing and that were not repaired ahead of time, 35 percent passed the test at the inspection station." (Def.St. Facts ¶ 18.) Further, ADEQ calculated that the cost for each high-emitting vehicle identified by the RSD Program was $323.82, and that the RSD Program cost $914,736 annually. (Id. ¶ 21; Wrona Nov. 13, 1999 Letter at 1.)

In 2000, the Arizona Legislature amended House Bill 2104 and repealed A.R.S. § 49-542.01, which effectively terminated the previously approved RSD Program. (Compl. ¶ 23; Answer ¶ 23.) Hull signed House Bill 2104 into law on April 28, 2000, and it became effective on July 17, 2000. (Compl. ¶ 23; Answer ¶ 24.) As a result, ADEQ terminated the RSD Program. (Pl. St. Facts ¶ 56.)

On June 6, 2000, Plaintiffs sent a Notice of Intent to Sue, pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 7604(b), to Hull, Schafer, and Carol Browner, Administrator of the EPA. (June 6, 2000 Notice.)

On August 31, 2000, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint alleging that by repealing Arizona's RSD Program, Hull and Schafer ("Defendants"), violated the emission standards of the CAA.3 (Compl. ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs argue that "an approved SIP remains fully in force and effect unless and until a SIP revision is submitted to and approved by EPA." (Pl. Reply at 2.) Plaintiffs request the Court to direct Defendants to "comply with its I/M commitments under the SIP pursuant to § 7604(a)(1)" and to "fully implement its commitment to administer the RSD Program as required by the I/M SIP Revision."4 (Compl. ¶ 27; at 5 ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs also seek "costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney fees" and "such other relief as the court deems just and proper." (Id.)

Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 17, 2001, and on February 20, 2001, Defendants filed a combined Response and Cross-Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment ("Response"). On March 12, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a combined Reply in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment and a Response to Defendants' Cross-Motion ("Reply"). On August 3, 2001, the Court held oral argument and advised the parties that they were permitted to file supplemental briefing on the Eleventh Amendment issue. Both parties filed Supplemental Memoranda on August 10, 2001.

Discussion
I. Legal Standard for Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with a Statement of Facts. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for Summary Judgment attaching a Statement of Facts.

A motion for summary judgment may be granted if the evidence shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The initial burden for identifying the elements of the claim in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and other evidence, which the moving party "believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact," is on the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The nonmoving party must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws any reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied. 516 U.S. 1171, 116 S.Ct. 1261, 134 L.Ed.2d 209 (1996).

II. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction5

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution bars Plaintiffs' claims. (Mot. Dismiss at 2.) Plaintiffs, however, contend that the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude this action, because the Ex Parte Young exception "was developed precisely for situations like the one presented here." (Reply at 5.) Thus, the issue before the Court is whether Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief falls within the Ex Parte Young exception.

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. amend. XI. "The Eleventh Amendment ... prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought by private citizens against state governments, without the state's consent." Natural Res. Defense Council v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 420 (9th Cir. 1996) ("NRDC") (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890)). "The Eleventh Amendment [also] bars a suit against state officials when the state is the real, substantial party in interest." Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (citations omitted). "The state is the real party in interest when the judgment would tap the state's treasury or restrain or compel government action." Almond Hill Sch. v. United States Dep't. of Agric., 768 F.2d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101, 104 S.Ct. 900). "[T]he general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter." Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101, 104 S.Ct. 900 (quoting Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58, 83 S.Ct. 1052, 10 L.Ed.2d 191 (1963)).

Plaintiffs have sued Defendants in their official capacities only, and have not attempted to evade the Eleventh Amendment by suing Defendants in their individual capacities, or by asserting that the State of Arizona is not the real party in interest. Plaintiffs argue that even though the state of Arizona is the real party in interest, because they seek only injunctive relief, "the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude this action." (See Compl.; Mot. Summ.J. at 11.) See also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101, 104 S.Ct. 900.

B. The Ex parte Young Exception to Eleventh Amendment Immunity
1. Governing Legal Principles

In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), the Supreme Court created an exception to a state official's Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits "challenging the constitutionality of a state official's action[.]" Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101, 104 S.Ct. 900. The Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment provides that "when a plaintiff brings suit against a state official...

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