Sweeney v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: STINESS, J.
• Citation: Sweeney v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 38 L.R.A. 297, 61 Am. St. Rep. 751, 36 A. 9, 19 R.I. 171 (R.I. 1896)
• Decision Date: 16 September 1896
• Parties: SWEENEY v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

36 A. 9

19 R.I. 171

SWEENEY

v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Sept. 16, 1896.

Action by Catherine Sweeney against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Verdict for plaintiff. Defendant moves for a new trial. Granted.

Samuel R. Honey, J. Stacy Brown, and Frank F. Nolan, for plaintiff.

Andrew J. Jennings, James M. Morton, Jr., and Michael W. Callaghan, for defendant.

STINESS, J. By the terms of the policies of insurance issued by the defendant, the answers and statements in the printed and written applications for the policies are made a part of the contract. The applicant declares and warrants that the representations and answers made are strictly correct and wholly true; that they shall form the basis and become part of the contract of insurance, if any be issued; and that any untrue answer will render the policy void. Whether statements which obviously cannot lie within the knowledge of the applicant, and which both parties must know are to be given upon information and belief, must be taken to be warranties, is a question which we need not decide; but that the above provisions constitute a warranty of the truth of the statements in the application, so far as they rest upon the applicant's own knowledge, is beyond question. Wilson v. Insurance Co., 4 R. I. 141; Lyons v. Insurance Co., 14 R. I. 109; Jerrett v. Insurance Co., 18 R. I. 754, 30 Atl. 793; McCoy v. Insurance Co., 133 Mass. 82; Cobb v. Association, 153 Mass. 176, 26 N. E. 230; Insurance Co. v. McTague, 49 N. J. Law, 587, 9 Atl. 766. Without multiplying citations, we quote the language of Mr. Justice Hunt in Jeffries v. Insurance Co., 22 Wall. 47: "Many cases may be found which hold that, where false answers are made to inquiries which do not relate to the risk, the policy is not necessarily avoided, unless they influenced the mind of the company; and that whether they are material is for the determination of the jury. But we know of no respectable authority which so holds where it is expressly covenanted as a condition of liability that the statements and declarations made in the application are true, and when the truth of such statements forms the basis of the contract." The statements in question in this case being warranties, we are called upon to decide whether the trial judge correctly charged the jury that the burden of proof was upon the defendant to show the falsity of any answer set up in defense. There are many cases which lay down this rule upon the principle that the burden of proving an issue is upon the party who raises it. Spencer v. Association, 142 N. Y. 505, 37 N. E. 617;. Russell v. Insurance Co. (Iowa) 50 N. W. 546; Sutherland v. Insurance Co., 87 Iowa, 505, 54 N. W. 453; Insurance Co. v. Rogers, 119 Ill. 474, 10 N. E. 242. Mowry v. Insurance Co., 9 R. I. 346, appears to be to the same effect, but that case related to the value of the plaintiff's insurable interest in the life of an uncle, for which he had taken a policy. The charge to the jury was that the plaintiff must show that he had an insurable interest in the life of the deceased, but, as the value of such interest was a matter of opinion and estimate, the burden was on the defendant to show that the alleged indebtedness and business relations out of which the interest sprung were no foundation for the estimate of the plaintiff, and the large amount of insurance obtained. Cases like those cited above rest upon a current principle when it is applied to defenses set up outside of the terms of the contract. But they leave out of view another equally correct and more pertinent principle, —that a party cannot recover upon a conditional contract until he shows that he has complied with the conditions. To depart from this principle would be to make a new contract for the parties. The rule of law is well stated by Ames, C. J., in Wilson v. Insurance Co., 4 R. I. 159, as follows: "It is clear, however, upon principle, to use the words of Mr. Justice Washington in Craig v. Insurance Co., 1 Pet. C. C. 410, Fed. Cas. No. 3,340, that where the assured has entered into a warranty, he cannot recover against the underwriters 'without first averring and proving performance of these stipulations.' And see 2 Phil. Ins. (2d Ed.) 753; 2 Arn. Ins. 1262, 1235. The burden of proving the performance of all warranties made by him rests upon the assured; and, although this burden may be lifted by presumption merely, as in case of the implied warranty of seaworthiness it is held to be, yet this cannot shift the burden, which remains, notwithstanding the prima facie case thus made out by the plaintiff, where the law first casts it, to the end of the trial." We think that this case lays down the correct rule. It is the rule which applies to all contracts, and a policy of insurance is a contract. Rules of evidence, however, involving only the mode of procedure in a case, must be largely within the discretion of the court, in order to be practicable; and so many things are allowed to go by presumption, or with slight proof, to make a prima facie case, until something appears to controvert it. But this rule of convenience does not relieve a party from any of the obligations of his contract. Thus it has become common in suits on promissory notes simply to produce the note to make out a prima facie case; the presumption of signature, consideration, and other incidents following. The same presumptions are usually admitted with reference to a deed, and other like cases are readily...