Sweeney v. State of Alabama Alcoholic Bev. Control
| Citation | 94 F.Supp.2d 1241 |
| Decision Date | 17 April 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 98-D-728-N.,Civ.A. 98-D-728-N. |
| Parties | Sandra C. SWEENEY, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF ALABAMA ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL BOARD, Defendant. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Middle District of Alabama |
Sandra C. Sweeney, Montgomery, AL, Pro se.
Jacqueline L. Mixon, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.
Robert S. Hill, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.
DE MENT, District Judge.
Before the court is Defendant State of Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board's ("ABC Board" or "Defendant") Motion For Summary Judgment ("Mot."), and Brief ("Br."), both filed February 1, 2000. On February 17, 2000, Plaintiff Sandra C. Sweeney ("Plaintiff") filed a Response And Brief To Motion For Summary Judgment ("Resp."). The ABC Board filed a Reply on February 24, 2000. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that the ABC Board's Motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part.
The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA")), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). The Parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no `genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c)).
The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based on relevant "portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'" that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c)). The mechanics of satisfying the initial burden vary, however, depending upon which party, the movant or the nonmovant, bears the burden of proof at trial. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993) ().
Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his or] her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)). In meeting this burden, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.
On October 15, 1994, Plaintiff, a black female, began working for the ABC Board as a cashier at one of its retail stores in Montgomery, Alabama. (Br., Ex. A; Am. Compl. ¶ 1.) As a cashier, Plaintiff's duties included preparing and depositing the store's daily sales proceeds at a local bank. (Resp. at 1.) On August 1, 1997, shortly after midnight, Plaintiff was robbed at gunpoint as she approached the bank's night depository to deposit the ABC Board's sales proceeds from July 31, 1997. As a result of the robbery, Plaintiff suffered physical injuries, including pain in her left arm, head and chest. Plaintiff also experienced emotional trauma. (Resp. at 2.)
Plaintiff's district supervisor, Don White ("White"), suggested that Plaintiff contact the State of Alabama Employee Assistance Program ("EAP") to seek counseling for the trauma she was experiencing from the robbery. Sam Boswell ("Boswell"), an EAP counselor, recommended that Plaintiff seek care through the Alabama Psychiatric Services. (Dillon Aff. at 1.)
Plaintiff followed Boswell's recommendation and sought treatment from Dr. Wendell Bell ("Dr.Bell"), a staff psychiatrist with the Alabama Psychiatric Services. (Pl.'s Dep. at 16-17; Dillon Aff. at 1-2.) In a letter dated August 18, 1997, Dr. Bell wrote J.E. Brown3 ("Brown") a letter regarding his treatment of Plaintiff. In this letter, Dr. Bell informed Brown of the following:
Ms. Sweeney has been evaluated by me and is under treatment with me for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTS) arising out of resent [sic] robbery at gunpoint she suffered while depositing money from the ABC store at which she works.
Happily, Ms. Sweeney is doing well and is able to return to work with the following restrictions: 1.) She needs to start work on the day shift and continue on the day shift (9 a.m. - 6 p.m.) for a period of approximately one month to reacquaint her gradually to the store and not expose her to dangerous hours; 2.) She needs to be restricted from ever depositing monies from the store, which deposit she describes as dangerous and potentially life-threatening, a conclusion with which I would concur from her description, and she should have no more trauma from being expected to do this.
However, when Plaintiff returned to work, she claims that the store manager, Emit Hardie ("Hardie"), failed to comply with the "spirit" of Dr. Bell's restrictions. (Am.Compl. Exs. D & L.) Specifically, on August 22, 1997, while Plaintiff was sweeping the store's parking lot, Hardie locked the store doors. Hardie then left to eat breakfast, leaving Plaintiff alone in the parking lot. (Am.Compl. ¶ 21 & Exs. E & N.)
Plaintiff reported Hardie's "conduct" to Dr. Bell, White and Tracey McCooey ("McCooey").4 (Am.Compl. ¶¶ 10, 22; Pl.'s Dep. at 20-22.) Based on Plaintiff's complaint, Dr. Bell wrote a second letter to Brown, dated August 26, 1997, stating as follows:
Ms. Sweeney continues in care with me for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) arising out of a recent robbery at gun point which she suffered while depositing money from the ABC store at which she works.
On August 18, 1997, I wrote to you delineating work restrictions under which Ms. Sweeney was able to return to work. Today, Ms. Sweeney was seen by me in the company of her husband and her niece. Ms. Sweeney is very upset because she has attempted to return to work but perceives that the spirit of the restrictions under which she was allowed to return to work have been violated. While the exact restrictions have not been violated, technically, her immediate supervisor has complained about the restrictions and has left her alone in the store, which situation is a dangerous situation, in light of Ms. Sweeney's reasonable fears of being robbed again or being retaliated against by the original perpetrator. Under these conditions in which Ms. Sweeney does not feel safe and supported by her colleagues and her supervisor, she is unable to return to work.
Therefore, I am recommending for Ms. Sweeney's own psychiatric health that she again stay off work until further evaluated. I must emphasize that Ms. Sweeney cannot recover from her trauma which she received while in the assigned duties at the ABC store unless she has a reasonable safe and secure place at which she can work.
I have recommended to Ms. Sweeney that she further discuss this matter with you in order that we might expedite her rapid recovery as well as her return back to work.
(Am.Compl., Ex. D.5)
Additionally, McCooey received a copy of Dr. Bell's August 26, 1997 letter. In response, McCooey wrote Brown a letter dated August 27, 1997. In that letter, McCooey stated that she "reviewed" Dr. Bell's letter and that the ABC Board failed to comply with Dr. Bell's restrictions by leaving Plaintiff "alone while at work."...
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