Sweeney v. Young

• Citation: 131 A. 155
• Parties: SWEENEY v. YOUNG et al.
• Decision Date: 03 November 1925
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

131 A. 155

SWEENEY

v. YOUNG et al.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Coos.

Nov. 3, 1925.

Transferred from Superior Court, Coos County; Marble, Judge.

Case by Martin C. Sweeney, by next friend, against William H. Young and others. Case transferred from trial term on plaintiff's exception to directed verdict. Exceptions overruled.

Case for maliciously dismissing the plaintiff from the Whitefield high school. Three of the defendants constituted the school board of Whitefield; one was the school superintendent and one the head master of the high school. The plaintiff and four other boys were implicated in having intoxicating cider at a school function. The superintendent and head master made it a matter of discipline, and requested the school board to consider it at a meeting which the boys were invited to attend. Three of the boys acknowledged their part in the affair, expressed regret, and promised their conduct would not be repeated. They were placed on probation and allowed to remain in school. The plaintiff and another boy refused to make any statement, and were dismissed for "misconduct." Later the other boy was reinstated on his admission of sharing in the enterprise and with the same promise as the boys placed on probation had given. Further facts appear in the opinion.

On motion, the jury's verdict for the plaintiff was set aside and a verdict for the defendants directed, to which the plaintiff excepted.

Shields & Conant, of St. Johnsbury, Vt, O. J. Coulombe, of Berlin, and David S. Conant, of St. Johnsbury, Vt., for plaintiff.

Shurtleff, Oakes & Hinkley, of Lancaster, E. M. Bowker, of Whitefield, and Eri Oakes, of Lancaster, for defendants.

ALLEN, J. The defendant Young, though a member of the school board, had nothing to do with the plaintiff's dismissal, being absent from the meeting at which the subject was considered and action taken. No argument has been made and no reason is suggested for his liability. The directed verdict in his favor must stand.

Regarding the liability of the members of the board who took part and acted, the principle that "all judicial officers, when acting on subjects within their jurisdiction, are exempted from civil prosecution for their acts" (Evans v. Foster, 1 N. H. 374, 377), has been generally extended in this state to apply to the acts and conduct of all public officers in their exercise of judicial authority.

"Whenever public officers are performing judicial duties, their liabilities are determined by the rules of law applicable to a judicial officer." Sargent v. Little, 72 N. H. 555, 556, 557, 58 A. 44.

"* * * From the earliest ages of the common law it has always been held that no judge is answerable in a civil action, on account of any judgment rendered by him as a judge. To this rule there is but one exception. If the judge has assumed to act as such in a case where he has no jurisdiction, his character of judge furnishes him no protection. The jurisdiction of courts and judges, and others exercising judicial powers, may be very general or very limited; limited as to place, as to person, as to subject-matters, and as to course of proceedings. * * *" Burnham v. Stevens, 33 N. H. 247, 253.

"No action, civil or criminal, can be maintained against a judicial officer for any mistake he may make in the performance of his official duties, provided he has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter. * * * He has jurisdiction of the parties when they voluntarily appear in a proceeding pending before him, as well as when they are served with process within his jurisdiction. He has jurisdiction of the subject-matter in any action pending before him if he has power to act on the general question to which the proceeding relates." Sargent v. Little, supra, p. 557 (58 A. 44).

"If the plaintiff had not been reinstated, * * * and he had applied by mandamus * * * to be restored to membership in the lodge, the right of the court to grant the relief would not involve the question here presented. He might succeed in such a proceeding and still have no right of action against the officers of the lodge for damages. His failure in this respect would be due to the rule of public policy * * * which protects judicial officers and those exercising judicial functions, having jurisdiction, from liability in actions of tort for wrongs committed by them when acting in that capacity." Moon v. Flack, 74 N. H. 140, 143, 65 A. 820, 831.

The rule that a judgment is binding only on those who are parties to it, so as to disentitle others to use it for their benefit or to the disadvantage of one who is a party to it (Lord v. Locke, 62 N. H. 566), is inapplicable in the consideration of liability for judicial acts, and exemption from liability for them is unaffected by any subsequent reversal or correction of the judgment. The duty is public in character and the parties affected ordinarily have no personal rights against the members composing the judicial body.

Whatever may be the precise line of distinction between judicial and ministerial acts, when the duty of public officers is to "pass upon evidence and decide," the performance of the duty is clearly a judicial act.

"It has been repeatedly decided in this state that, when an officer or a board is called upon to pass upon evidence and decide, their conclusion cannot be collaterally attacked, and that they are not liable to answer in a suit for their action. The reason given in the cases is that such action is judicial." State v. Corron, 73 N. H. 434, 455, 62 A. 1044, 1051 (6 Ann. Cas. 486).

Under this test the dismissal of the plaintiff was a judicial act. A hearing on the subject which the plaintiff on invitation attended resulted in the decision to dismiss, and the judgment of the board is to be treated as having the same attributes and incidents as the judgment of a court.

The statute (Laws 1921, e. 85, pt. 3, § 10) gave the school board authority to dismiss only for "gross misconduct" and violation of reasonable rules. It may be conceded that, as the school board's record shows a finding of misconduct without its being so bad as to be gross, the dismissal was not justified. Suggestion has been made that the provision, in the statute that a dismissed pupil "shall not attend the school until restored by the school board" operates to prevent corrective proceedings in the courts in the case of an illegal dismissal. If this were so, then the board would be a tribunal of last resort, and any judgment of dismissal, being final, would necessarily be valid. But the legislation was evidently intended to provide for restoration only by the school board in cases of legal dismissal; if the dismissal were set aside, it would become a void act, and the pupil's right to attend school would follow, not because of restoration by the courts, but because the order of dismissal would be vacated.

But, although there was error in connection with the order of dismissal, the order was a judgment legally binding on the plaintiff until reversed or corrected, if the board had jurisdiction to make it. Immunity from liability for judicial acts rests upon a broad ground of public policy. As already stated, liability does not arise upon a reversal or correction of an erroneous judgment. It follows that, except for the question of jurisdiction, the error in the judgment is to be disregarded, and the dismissal to be treated as though for gross misconduct. The rule against the collateral attack of judgments, although here applicable, does not need to be invoked, as in cases of malicious prosecution, where action may be brought after, but not before, the proceeding complained of is terminated in the plaintiff's favor.

In respect to jurisdiction, protection for judicial acts is withdrawn when they are outside the tribunal's jurisdiction.

"If, in such case, the proceedings are irregular or erroneous, the judgment is voidable, and not void, and stands good until revised or annulled in a proper proceeding instituted for that purpose; but when it appears that the magistrate had no jurisdiction the proceedings are void." State v. Shattuck, 45 N. H. 205, 211.

"In cases upon this subject, courts do not undertake to revise the doings of the tribunal whose acts are brought in question collaterally, but only to examine them so far...