Sweenie v. A.L. Prime Energy Consultants

• Decision Date: 28 May 2008
• Docket Number: SJC-10068.
• Citation: 451 Mass. 539,887 N.E.2d 238
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Gregory P. SWEENIE & others<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> v. A.L. PRIME ENERGY CONSULTANTS.

887 N.E.2d 238

451 Mass. 539

Gregory P. SWEENIE & others¹ v. A.L. PRIME ENERGY CONSULTANTS.

SJC-10068.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued April 7, 2008.

Decided May 28, 2008.

Howard P. Speicher, Boston, for the defendant.

Matthew C. Donahue, Lowell (Joseph W. Jussaume with him) for the plaintiffs.

Martin R. Healy & Michael K. Murray, Boston, for Massachusetts Chapter of the National Association of Industrial and Office Properties, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, CORDY, & BOTSFORD, JJ.

MARSHALL, C.J.

We revisit in this case the issue of standing to challenge a decision under the zoning laws. In 2003, the planning board of the town of Groton (planning board) issued a special permit to the defendant, A.L. Prime Energy Consultants (A.L. Prime), pursuant to § 218-30(G)(1) of the town zoning bylaw (bylaw).² The permit authorized A.L. Prime to improve and modernize a gasoline station that it operates in Groton. The plaintiffs, abutters or abutters to the abutters to the gasoline station, appealed from the decision to the Superior Court, claiming they were "aggrieved" by the planning board's decision. G.L. c. 40A, § 17.³ A judge in the Superior Court allowed A.L. Prime's motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the issuance of the special permit because they had failed to put forth credible evidence that they were "aggrieved."⁴

The Appeals Court reversed, concluding that the plaintiffs could "derive standing" on one of their claims from the language of the bylaw itself. Sweenie v. Planning Bd. of Groton, 69 Mass.App.Ct. 477, 484-485, 868 N.E.2d 1237 (2007). We granted A.L. Prime's application for further appellate review. We affirm the decision of the Superior Court.⁵

1. Background. As described more fully by the Appeals Court, Sweenie v. Planning Bd. of Groton, supra at 479-480, 868 N.E.2d 1237, A.L. Prime now operates a gasoline station that has been located on the site in Groton since the 1940's. In August, 2003, A.L. Prime applied for a special permit for the "[u]pgrade of [the] existing gasoline filling station and replacement of three (3) 5,000 gallon underground storage tanks with two (2) underground storage tanks totaling 20,000 gallons." After conducting five public hearings,⁶ at each of which at least one of the plaintiffs expressed opposition to the issuance of a special permit, in December, 2003, the planning board voted unanimously to grant a special permit to A.L. Prime. The permit authorizes the replacement of three old, single-walled gasoline storage tanks with two larger, double-walled tanks that would be capable of rapid detection of any leaks, and would comply with all Massachusetts regulations for fire prevention, spill containment, and overfill prevention. Id. at 480, 868 N.E.2d 1237. The special permit also permits A.L. Prime to raze the existing gasoline station building, replacing it with a smaller structure containing a convenience store. A six-foot high stockade fence, buffered by shrubbery, would separate the parcel from abutters.

In their appeal to the Superior Court the plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the removal of the existing storage tanks could potentially harm their drinking water, which comes from nearby residential wells.⁷ In response to discovery propounded by A.L. Prime,⁸ the plaintiffs asserted that the changes to the existing gasoline station would cause a threat of contamination of their drinking water caused by gasoline spillage during replacement and expansion of the underground storage tanks; an increase in artificial light on their properties at night; a decrease in their privacy; and an increase in traffic and related safety and noise concerns.

In June, 2005, A.L. Prime moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 365 Mass. 754 (1974),⁹ supported by affidavits and exhibits addressing each of the plaintiffs' claimed adverse impacts. These included an affidavit from the president of A.L. Prime describing the new storage tanks, including their double-walled construction and leak detective systems; a "tank plan" prepared by a professional engineer, which indicates that the "underground tank installation shall comply with all applicable regulations, all requirements of Federal, State, and local codes"¹⁰; a "lighting plan" prepared by the same engineer, which demonstrates that no light will pass further from the site than forty feet onto a vacant lot that abuts the station; a traffic impact study from the same engineer concluding that there would be no increase in traffic; and an affidavit from an acoustical engineer to the effect that the proposed improvements would cause no increase in audible noise at the plaintiffs' residences and would likely reduce the noise level. The plaintiffs opposed the motion to dismiss, but filed no affidavits or other materials either contesting the expert opinions and affidavits of A.L. Prime or supporting their own claims. In January, 2006, a judge in the Superior Court allowed A.L. Prime's motion, concluding that the "concerns" were "purely speculative" and that the plaintiffs had failed to put forth credible evidence to support any of their claims. The plaintiffs appealed.

The Appeals Court agreed, noting that the plaintiffs' "concerns" did not rise "beyond the level of speculation." Sweenie v. Planning Bd. of Groton, supra at 483, 868 N.E.2d 1237. The court nonetheless determined that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue one of their claims— their claim that the replacement and expansion of the underground storage tanks could potentially harm their drinking water—reasoning that the water contamination claim did not "require evidentiary substantiation in order to support their standing." Id. In the view of the Appeals Court, the language of the bylaw "codifies the abutters' fears," from which the plaintiffs could derive standing. Id. at 484, 868 N.E.2d 1237.

2. Discussion. Under G.L. c. 40A, § 17, only a "person aggrieved" by a decision of a permitting authority has standing to appeal from the decision to the Superior Court. See note 9, supra. A "person aggrieved" is one who "suffers some infringement of his legal rights." Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, 421 Mass. 719, 721, 660 N.E.2d 369 (1996), quoting Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 324 Mass. 427, 430, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949). The injury must be more than speculative, and plaintiffs "must put forth credible evidence to substantiate claims of injury to their legal rights." Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, supra at 723, 660 N.E.2d 369.¹¹

The bylaw at issue provides that where a special permit is sought for a site in a water resource protection overlay district, the planning board "shall give consideration to ... the degree of threat to water quality that would result if the control measures failed." See note 2, supra. The Appeals Court concluded that this required consideration of the degree of threat "necessarily" permits parties such as the plaintiffs who allege that they would be exposed to the threat of water contamination to challenge the planning board's decision in court. Sweenie v. Planning Bd. of Groton, 69 Mass.App.Ct. 477, 485, 868 N.E.2d 1237 (2007). In support of its holding, the Appeals Court pointed to Monks v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Plymouth, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 685, 642 N.E.2d 314 (1994) (Monks), deeming that case the "most closely fitting precedent." Sweenie v. Planning Bd. of Groton, supra.¹² The cases are different, however, in one crucial respect. Monks involved the potential adverse impact of a proposed cellular telephone tower on the plaintiffs' view from their home. The relevant bylaw under which the cellular telephone company obtained a permit to construct the tower conditioned the grant on a finding by the board of appeals that the proposed structure would not detract from the visual character or quality of the neighborhood. See Monks, supra at 688, 642 N.E.2d 314. While aesthetic or visual impacts generally are not cognizable injuries under zoning regulations, Martin v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 434 Mass. 141, 146-147, 747 N.E.2d 131 (2001), the Appeals Court held in Monks that, by conditioning the grant of the special permit on such a finding, the town had "created and defined a protected interest." Monks, supra. The Monks court then reviewed the summary judgment record¹³ and determined that those plaintiffs had "brought themselves within the legal scope of that protection by establishing the direct visual effect of the proposed tower" by presenting credible evidence to substantiate their claims of injury. Id.

Even if the bylaw under which the planning board granted A.L. Prime's special permit "created and defined a protected interest," Monks, supra at 688, 642 N.E.2d 314—by requiring the planning board to give consideration to the potential threat to water quality that would result if the safety elements of the gasoline storage tanks fail—this alone is not a sufficient basis on which to confer standing. In Monks the plaintiffs established the link between the bylaw and themselves by producing evidence of the actual visible impact on their property. Here, the plaintiffs produced no credible evidence to bring themselves within the legal scope of the protected interest created by the bylaw. They bear the burden, see note 11, supra, of substantiating their claims regarding any potential threat to the quality of their drinking water in order to bring themselves within the legal scope of that interest. See Standerwick v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 447 Mass. 20, 30, 849 N.E.2d 197 (2006) (referring to "our long-standing jurisprudence that standing to challenge a zoning decision is conferred only on those who can plausibly demonstrate that a proposed project will injure their...