Sweet v. Lowry

• Decision Date: 12 November 1915
• Docket Number: No. 19410[76].,19410[76].
• Citation: 154 N.W. 793,131 Minn. 109
• Parties: SWEET v. LOWRY et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

131 Minn. 109

154 N.W. 793

SWEET

v.LOWRY et al.

No. 19410[76].

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 12, 1915.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; William E. Hale, Judge.

Action by Francis W. Sweet against Beatrice Lowry and others. From an adverse order, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

See, also, 123 Minn. 13, 142 N. W. 882,47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 451.

Syllabus by the Court

If a complaint in an equitable action discloses delay in assertion of a right which, unexplained, amounts to laches, it must also allege facts excusing the delay. A person is not to be barred by laches of the assertion of a right unless he have knowledge, actual or imputed, of the existence of the right, but where the facts are such as would ordinarily be known to him he must plead want of knowledge on his part.

In order to relieve himself of the charge of laches on the ground of ignorance of the facts it is not sufficient to allege generally that he was ignorant of the facts until a given time. He must allege facts and circumstances from which the court may determine whether or not the discovery was made at the time mentioned. Booth & McDonald, of Minneapolis, for appellant.

Koon, Whelan & Hempstead, of Minneapolis, for respondents.

HALLAM, J.

In 1874 Thomas Lowry was appointed guardian of plaintiff and his brothers. Plaintiff became of age in 1892. The account of the guardian was never settled in probate court. Mr. Lowry died in 1909. His estate was probated and a final decree entered prior to February, 1912. This action was brought in June, 1914, against the defendants as devisees of Mr. Lowry to compel them to account for the value of real estate of the ward which it is alleged the guardian wrongfully permitted to be lost on mortgage foreclosure. The foreclosure occurred in 1877, now nearly 40 years ago. A former action was brought on this same alleged cause of action in 1912, and a demurrer to the complaint was sustained on the ground that the delay of 20 years after attaining majority and until after the death of the guardian, the only person on whom defendants could rely for knowledge of the facts, was such laches as barred plaintiff's right of action. This decision was predicated largely on the fact that it appeared inferentially from the complaint that at the time he became of age plaintiff knew of the guardianship. Sweet v. Lowry, 123 Minn. 13, 142 N. W. 882,47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 451.

The complaint in this action contains allegations similar to those of the complaint in the former action, with the additional allegation:

‘That plaintiff never knew or had reason to believe that he had a guardian; that he had inherited any real estate; that he had ever received from his grandfather by will any money, or that there was any reason why he should have had a guardian, until the month of February, 1912.’

Plaintiff relies on this allegation to relieve himself of the charge of laches.

[1] 1. In our opinion this allegation is not sufficient. A party is held barred by laches from the assertion of an equitable right when the delay is so long and the circumstances of such character as to establish a relinquishment or abandonment of the right, or when by reason of death of witnesses, loss of evidence, or other matter in the nature of estoppel, a situation arises which makes it clearly inequitable or unjust to enforce it. Rousch v. Griffith, 65 W. Va. 752, 65 S. E. 168. If the complaint discloses delay which, unexplained, appears to be unreasonable, it must also allege facts explaining or excusing the delay. A person is not to be barred by laches of the assertion of a right unless he have actual knowledge of the facts from which the right arises, or knowledge of such other facts as would put an ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry (Marcotte v. Hartman, 46 Minn. 202, 48 N. W. 767;Brandes v. Carpenter, 68 Minn. 388, 71 N. W. 402;Hanson v. Swenson, 77 Minn. 70, 79 N. W. 598;Schmitt v. Hager, 88 Minn. 413, 93 N. W. 110), but where the facts are such as would ordinarily be known to him, he must plead want of knowledge on his part.

[2] 2. In order to relieve himself of the charge of laches, on the ground of ignorance of the facts, it is not sufficient to allege generally...