Sweet v. State

• Decision Date: 28 February 1941
• Docket Number: 27452.
• Citation: 31 N.E.2d 993,218 Ind. 182
• Parties: SWEET v. STATE.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

31 N.E.2d 993

218 Ind. 182

SWEET v. STATE.

No. 27452.

Supreme Court of Indiana

February 28, 1941

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Appeal from Superior Court, Porter County; William J. Murray Special judge.

Oscar B. Thiel, of Gary, and T. Ernest Maholm, of Indianapolis, for appellant.

Samuel Jackson, Atty. Gen., and James Northam, Deputy Atty. Gen for appellee.

RICHMAN Judge.

Appellant was tried by a jury, convicted and sentenced to death on an indictment charging that he 'on the 27th day of June, A. D. 1939, at and in said county of La Porte and State of Indiana, aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, imprison, detain and hold one Ruth Joiner, a woman of mature years, to-wit: twenty-nine years old, at the office of Doctor P H Weeks, in the hospital of the Indiana State Prison, in Michigan City, County of La Porte and State of Indiana, for the purpose and with the intent of obtaining and securing from Alfred Dowd, Warden of Indiana State Prison, certain property or things of value, to-wit: guns and an automobile as a ransom, reward or price for the return, liberation and surrender of the said Ruth Joiner, so imprisoned, detained and held.' There were pleas of not guilty and insanity.

The pertinent portion of the statute upon which the indictment was based reads as follows: '* * * whoever shall imprison, detain or hold any person at any place in this state with the intent of obtaining from any one any money, means, property or thing of value, as a ransom, reward or price for the return, liberation or surrender of the person so imprisoned, detained or held, shall be deemed guilty of the crime of kidnaping for the purpose of ransom, and, on conviction, shall suffer death, or be imprisoned in the state prison during life.' Burns' Ann.St. § 10-2903. (Our italics.)

Appellant's view of the factual situation disclosed by the record follows: 'The evidence in this case discloses that the defendant detained one Ruth Joiner in the physician's office in the prison hospital at Michigan City, Indiana, Mr. Joiner having gone through the prison with a visiting party. The defendant informed Mrs. Joiner that he was not going to injure her but for the purpose of the guards and those outside the prison office threatened to kill her at which time he had a butcher knife and apparent ability to do so. The only thing asked in exchange for the liberation of Mrs. Joiner was that the defendant was to be given an automobile and a machine gun and that the gates of the prison were to be opened for the purpose of permitting his escape.'

While this statement omits the antecedent struggle between appellant and a prison guard, wherein the guard was severely wounded by a knife in the hands of appellant, and also disregards the fact that Mrs. Joiner was under restraint for over two hours while appellant was making known his demands and the warden was parleying until he should be able to assemble state police who released her by shooting, wounding both appellant and his victim, nevertheless the fundamental issue is presented by appellant's statement.

Among the errors assigned is the overrunling of appellant's motion for new trial which specifies error in giving and refusing instructions. As to the sufficiency of the instructions the state makes no comment, relying only on the contention that the special bill of exceptions containing the instructions is not in the record. This contention cannot be sustained. The record shows that the bill of exceptions was signed and approved by the judge on August 30, 1940, and there is an order book entry showing that thereafter on the 31st day of August in vacation the bill of exceptions was filed with the clerk of the court. This is sufficient under the statute. Burns' Stat.1933, § 9-2103, Baldwin's 1934, § 2315.

The state tendered no instructions, appellant tendered four, each of which was refused, and the court gave eighteen on his own motion. Appellant predicates error in the giving of 4, 5 and 7. No. 4 was as follows: 'In this case the defendant has filed a special plea in which he says that he was of unsound mind at the time the offense charged in the indictment was committed by him and therefore that he is not guilty by reason of that fact, to which the state has filed an answer in general denial, denying the facts set out in defendant's special plea and upon the issues thus joined it becomes your duty to determine, from all the facts and circumstances in evidence in this case, whether the defendant committed the act as charged in the indictment and, if so, whether the defendant was sane or insane at the time of the commission of the act, and if you find the defendant not guilty you will determine from the facts and circumstances in evidence whether he is not guilty by reason of the fact that he was insane at the time of the commission of the act charged in the indictment.' (Our italics.)

In 1913 an act was passed which somewhat complicates the criminal procedure where the defense of sanity is involved. Burns' Stat.1933, § 9-1703, Baldwin's 1934, § 2217. Sec. 3 is as follows: 'In all cases where a plea of insanity is interposed as a defense, it shall be the duty of the jury or the court, if tried by it, if the defendant is found not guilty, to find, and the jury or court shall be required to find, whether the defendant committed the act charged in the indictment or affidavit, and if so, whether the defendant was sane or insane at the time of the commission of the act, and whether not guilty because he was insane at the time of the commission of the act.'

The trial court evidently intended by this instruction to inform the jury of its statutory duty but by omission of important words in one place and change of wording in another he prescribed for the jury a duty which is not part of its function in determining the guilt or innocence of the person on trial.

It will be noted from the statute that only 'if the defendant is found not guilty' is there any obligation upon the jury to find:

(1) 'whether the defendant committed the act'

(2) 'Whether the defendant was sane or insane at the time of the commission of the act'

(3) 'and whether not guilty because he was insane' etc.

Under this instruction the jurors could not start with free minds to determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but were obliged at the same time to think of how they could determine the first two of these three findings. The court told them that not these two findings but only the third was to be made after they had found defendant not guilty. Were they not thus given to understand that in making up their minds as to his guilt or innocence they must have a definite opinion either that he was sane or that he was insane, and that they must forget their doubts in order to reach such a conclusion one way or the other? Under the evidence there might be no question in their minds that he did do the act. But yet they might have reasonable doubts that he was sane. To acquit, however, they must positively find him insane, which perhaps was farther than they cared to go. In this dilemma would they not be forced to lay aside their reasonable doubts as to his sanity and find him to be sane? Having done the act and having been found to be sane guilt is established, and this in spite of the fact that they may have reasonable doubts as to sanity.

No one will contend that this statute was intended in any way to conflict with the law of reasonable doubt which, though expressed in a statute, is a common law precept fundamental in our criminal jurisprudence. Yet, the application of the act of 1913, particularly when embodied in an instruction that does not follow the injunction of the statute, introduces an element that may so confuse a jury as to prevent its proper application of the law of reasonable doubt. Perhaps in any case but particularly in one involving capital punishment there should be no instruction interfering with the jury's primary function and right of deciding the issue of guilt free from any consideration of the secondary issues imposed by this statute. While it may be difficult we do not think it impossible to frame an instruction that properly separates these issues. Otherwise we would not be loathe to find, if possible, some constitutional limitation upon the legislative right to inject into the trial of a felony a question that might deter a juror from exercising his individual right not to agree upon a verdict of guilty because of his reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity.

The error in giving this instruction is emphasized by No. 5 which reads:

'The jury are instructed that the term, 'insanity' as used in the special plea and issue of insanity made by the defendant, means such perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render the person incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, or consciousness at the time of the nature of the act he was committing.

'The jury are instructed that, if you find from the evidence that at the time of the alleged commission of the offense charged in the indictment, the defendant was suffering from mental aberation or sickness of mind produced by any cause, and by reason thereof his judgment, memory and reason were so perverted that he did not realize the nature and extent of the act he was doing or that he did not realize that it was wrong, you must find that he was insane at the time of the commission of the act with which he is charged in the indictment and for that reason, not guilty.' (Our italics.)

We need not go into the question of the propriety of the definition of insanity, which is not discussed in appellant's brief, but we disapprove the instruction because it tells the jurors that on the main issue, assuming...