Sweet v. Wood

• Decision Date: 18 October 1893
• Citation: 28 A. 335,18 R.I. 386
• Parties: SWEET v. WOOD et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

28 A. 335

18 R.I. 386

SWEET

v. WOOD et al.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Oct. 18, 1893.

Action by Angell Sweet against R. S. & F. W. Wood to recover for the use of a horse alleged to have been hired of plaintiff by defendants. There was a verdict for plaintiff, and defendants petition for a new trial. Denied and dismissed.

Willard B. Tanner and Edward L. Gannon, for plaintiff.

Samuel S. Stone and Edward F. Lovejoy, for defendants.

MATTESON, C. J. The defendants petition for a new trial on the ground of erroneous rulings, and also because the verdict is against the evidence. The testimony shows that the defendants, as copartners, were engaged in keeping a general store in Burrillville, and that they had occasion to use horses in carrying on their business. The plaintiff testified that Frank W. Wood, one of the defendants, came to him, and stated that they (the defendants) were in need of a horse, and would like to get his to use for a few days; that he consented to such use; and that said Wood thereupon took the horse away. This, however, was denied by Wood, who testified that he asked the plaintiff for the use of the horse for one Walden in his laundry business, and that, with the plaintiff's permission, he took the horse to Walden's stable; that Walden continued to use the horse for several months, to the plaintiff's knowledge; that the plaintiff, at different times, took the horse from Walden's stable, and returned him there when he had done using him. The defendants requested the court to instruct the jury that, if they found that the hiring of the horse was not necessary for the carrying on of the partnership business in the ordinary way, the firm was not prima facie liable for the hiring by one partner alone. The request was refused, and the defendants excepted.

We think the request was properly refused. As the use of horses was necessary for carrying on the partnership business in the ordinary way, the hiring of a horse for that purpose was clearly within the scope of the partnership business. The rule is too well established to admit of question that the acts, admissions, and declarations of a partner during the existence of the partnership, while engaged in the transaction of its business, or relating to matters within its scope, are evidence against the firm. 17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1077, and cases cited in note 2. It was wholly immaterial whether, as a matter of fact, the hiring of a horse was or was not necessary for carrying on...