Sweeten v. State
Decision Date | 18 March 1914 |
Citation | 90 A. 180,122 Md. 634 |
Parties | SWEETEN v. STATE. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Criminal Court of Baltimore City.
"To be officially reported."
Frank B. Sweeten was convicted of violating the Hours of Labor Law and he appeals. Affirmed.
George M. Brady, of Baltimore (William Milnes Maloy and T. Howard Embert, both of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant. Edgar Allan Poe, Atty. Gen., for the State.
The appellant was tried under an indictment based upon chapter 94 of the Acts of Assembly of 1910, and which is as follows:
The indictment contains 30 counts, each of the odd numbered being exactly alike, except as to the name of the workman employed by the appellant, and each of the even numbered alike in a similar manner. The odd numbered counts are upon the theory that the appellant, a contractor engaged upon public work for the mayor and city council within Baltimore City, worked the employés, therein named, more than eight hours in a calendar day without the existence of an extraordinary emergency. The theory upon which the even numbered counts are based is that the contractor worked his employés, therein named, more than eight hours in a calendar day in a case of extraordinary emergency, but paid them less than the rate of per diem wages current in the locality based upon eight hours constituting a day's work. The defendant demurred to all of the counts. The demurrer was overruled, and the defendant filed a special plea, to which the state demurred. This demurrer being sustained, the case was tried upon an agreed statement of facts.
It appears from that statement that the parties stipulated, for the purposes of the case, that Baltimore City was a municipal corporation with authority to contract for the installing of a sewerage system; that on the 15th day of April, 1912, the appellant entered into a contract with the mayor and city council to build certain sewers; that in said work the appellant employed workmen and permitted them to work more than eight hours per calendar day, there being no extraordinary emergency; that the agreement with said workmen provided pay at 19 cents per hour, the current rate of wages for similar work in that locality being $1.90 per day of ten hours; that the appellant required his said workmen to work for ten hours in order to be entitled to $1.90 per day; that, if the appellant had been compelled to pay his workmen at the rate of $1.90 per day for eight hours' work, his compensation would have been reduced at least $100; that the workmen were not required to work more than eight hours in any one day, but did so voluntarily in order to earn $1.90 in one calendar day; that it was not the intention of the workmen that they should receive the same compensation for eight hours' work as was paid for ten hours' work to laborers doing the same kind of work for persons having contracts with private persons; that the workmen were hired without the knowledge of the city, and neither the city nor its officers had any supervision over them; that the labor performed by said workmen was healthful, out-of-door work, not hazardous or dangerous. The statement also stipulated in the same manner for those laborers who worked more than eight hours in cases of extraordinary emergencies. The defendant being found guilty and judgment having been entered thereon, this appeal was taken.
The appellant contends that the act is unconstitutional in several respects, but the main objection urged is that it is in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution and of similar provisions of the Maryland Constitution. In support of his contention, he cites numerous state decisions, wherein statutes similar in effect to the one before us have been held unconstitutional, and especially relies upon the text found in Dillon on Municipal Corporations. It must be conceded that those authorities are in direct conflict with the validity of the present statute. But there are, on the other hand, many other decisions holding the contrary view. Among the latter is a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. Atkin v Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 24 S.Ct. 124, 48 L.Ed. 148. In that case, the court, in plain and unequivocal language, held the eight-hour law of Kansas to be valid. An examination of the Kansas statute shows it to be practically identical with the one now under consideration, with the exception that it applied to laborers and mechanics employed by or on behalf of the state, or by or on behalf of any county, city, township, or other municipality therein, whereas the Maryland ...
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