Sweeton v. Brown
| Decision Date | 17 September 1991 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 90-1800,90-1807,s. 90-1800 |
| Citation | 944 F.2d 905,1991 WL 181751 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. ames Anthony SWEETON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, v. Robert BROWN, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Before DAVID A. NELSON and RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judges, and HIGGINS, District Judge *.
The defendants (appellants) appeal and the plaintiffs (appellees) cross-appeal the district court's order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss and partially modifying a consent decree issued in 1981. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
This appeal arises out of a final consent judgment entered into between the State of Michigan Department of Corrections and a class of inmates and approved by the district court on August 28, 1981. This action was brought in September 1977 by a class of inmates within the jurisdiction of the State of Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), whose parole eligibility is determined by the State of Michigan Parole Board. The defendants/appellants are the director of the MDOC and the members of the Michigan Parole Board. The suit challenges the practices of the MDOC and the Parole Board concerning the timeliness of hearings and decisions and the lack of guidelines in the parole decision-making process. This action does not concern the actual granting of parole, but only the procedures in making and implementing parole decisions. The inmate class asserts that the MDOC and Parole Board have violated their rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
A review of the history of this action is helpful in understanding the lower court's rulings concerning the consent decree and the most recent ruling granting a modification.
The complaint was filed by the inmate class on September 15, 1977, addressing the issues discussed above.
In March 1978, the appellants filed their first motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment for failure to state a federally cognizable cause of action. In August 1978, the district court (Feikens, J.) granted the appellants' motion to dismiss as to the claims raised under the Constitution of the United States, but denied the alternative motion as to the claim that the State of Michigan was not complying with its own statutes and regulations when deciding whether to grant parole. In granting the motion, the lower court held that the Supreme Court of the United States and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had previously established that the requirements of due process are not applicable to parole release hearings. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appellees' claims that the procedures employed by the State of Michigan violated their rights to due process under the Constitution of the United States. Therefore, the only issue that the court left open was whether there arose a state-created liberty interest by way of statutes, rules or procedures that would entitle the appellee class to due process protections. The appellee class did not appeal this ruling.
In October 1979, the appellants filed another motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for abstention order. The appellants argued that the issues presented in the action were dependent upon a judicial interpretation of state statutes, rules, policies and regulations, which are all matters more properly within the domain of the state courts. Alternatively, the appellants asserted that the district court should abstain from ruling in the action, pending resolution of the issues by state tribunals. In March 1980, after the case was subsequently reassigned to the Honorable Anna Diggs Taylor upon her appointment to the federal bench, the court heard oral argument and denied the appellants' motion.
The parties stipulated to a series of partial consent judgments in March and April 1980. These partial consent judgments were consolidated and, after notice to all class members, the district court approved a final partial consent judgment in December 1980.
Thereafter, cross-motions for summary judgment were filed concerning the appellees' access to their MDOC records. These claims were resolved in the appellees' favor by the court's order dated March 31, 1981. In this order and opinion, many of the due process issues that the appellants presently raise are addressed. The district court stated:
Most importantly, the law of this case, as formulated by Judge Feikens more than two years ago when this litigation was on his docket, is that the existence of state statutes, regulations and policies regarding the parole system as a whole impart independent liberty interests to those inmates participating in the system. (emphasis in original).
The appellants appealed the above ruling. On August 28, 1981, the court signed a final order approving a final consent judgment. This final consent judgment was a consolidation of the earlier final partial consent judgment, the court's March 31, 1981, order and stipulations of the parties. Also on August 28, 1981, the court amended its order of March 31, 1981. In December 1981, the appellants dismissed their appeal because the terms of the final consent judgment were satisfactory to all parties and the basis for their appeal no longer existed.
The final consent decree provided for a monitoring period of thirty months, which the court later extended until December 1984. The monitoring provision also deals with jurisdiction. Paragraph VIII(L) provides:
Plaintiffs' participation in monitoring described in this section shall continue for 30 months, unless the Court extends this period for good cause shown. The Court shall retain jurisdiction of this cause for the pendency of this monitoring period, and shall have the power to make further orders consistent with this decree.
In February 1984, the appellants filed their first motion to vacate the final consent judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. The appellants claimed, inter alia, that:
1. the consent judgment was based exclusively on state law and thus the lower court lacked jurisdiction to enter it;
2. prior to entering the 1981 judgment, the lower court did not have a full opportunity to review the impact of the Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979); and
3. the consent judgment should be vacated because of statutory changes that were not in effect at the time of the court's earlier decision.
In November 1984, after briefing and argument by the parties, the lower court denied the appellants' motion to vacate the final consent judgment. The appellants did not seek rehearing or appeal this decision.
At the hearing on the appellants' motion, the district court (Taylor, J.) stated:
The Court's jurisdiction over this case is and was proper, and this judgment may not now be vacated under the Federal Rules as being void. The Federal Court has jurisdiction to determine its own judicial authority. So, if the defendant has challenged the Court's subject matter jurisdiction and the Court issue has been resolved against defendant by a final judgment, the judgment is not void but is Res Judicata on the issue of jurisdiction.
In this case the Defendants have challenged the Court's subject matter jurisdiction at least three times, and ruled [sic] against at least that many times on, specifically, the question of whether this Court had jurisdictional authority to hear and decide this case.
Transcript, May 31, 1984.
A final monitor's report was submitted in June 1985. On June 18, 1985, the parties stipulated to termination of the monitoring period.
In August 1987, the lower court reopened this case and appointed substitute counsel to represent the inmate class in light of indications that the appellants had not complied with the final consent decree. The appellants did not respond to the reopening of the case. The appellees then began discovery and renewed monitoring the appellants' compliance with the consent judgment.
In June 1988, after a hearing, the district court imposed sanctions on the appellants for failure to comply with an order to compel discovery and answer interrogatories. The court also found the appellants to be in noncompliance with the final consent judgment and ordered a reinstitution of the formal monitoring process for a period of one year. The appellants neither sought rehearing nor appealed this ruling.
In January 1990, the appelles filed a monitoring report, and, in February 1990, they filed a motion for an order finding the appellants in noncompliance with the consent judgment and for appointment of a special independent master or monitor. The monitoring report showed that the appellants failed to implement parole guidelines as required by the consent decree.
In March 1990, the appellants filed another motion to vacate the final consent judgment and dismiss the action. The appellants again asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the final order and that it was void as a matter of law. The appellants' motion sought, alternatively, to modify the consent order to reflect the state statutory changes that had occurred since the consent decree was entered. The appellants based their motion on Rule 60(b)(4), Fed.R.Civ.P., for lack of jurisdiction, and Rule 60(b)(5), Fed.R.Civ.P., for modification of the consent judgment.
In May 1990, the district court entered an order specifically finding that it had jurisdiction and granting one modification to the consent decree in order to comport with the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bauman v. City of Cleveland
...decrees relating to institutions are 'fundamentally different' from those between private parties." Sweeton v. Brown, 944 F.2d 905 (Table), 1991 WL 181751, at *9 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1991) (quoting Heath, 888 F.2d at 1109). "This is because these types of decrees 'reach beyond the parties in......