Sweezy v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 04 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 8:20-cv-1623-TPB-SPF |
| Parties | MICHAEL SWEEZY, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Michael Sweezy, a Florida prisoner, timely filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Having considered the petition Respondent's response in opposition (Doc. 7), and Sweezy's reply (Doc. 12), the Court DENIES the petition.
Sweezy was charged with one count of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm, one count of false imprisonment, and two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. (Doc. 7-2 Ex. 7.) Following a jury trial, Sweezy was convicted of (1) aggravated battery and (2) assault as a lesser included offense of one of the aggravated assault counts. (Id., Ex. 10.) He was acquitted of false imprisonment and the other aggravated assault count. (Id.) The state trial court sentenced Sweezy to fifteen years' imprisonment on the aggravated battery count and time served on the assault count. (Id., Ex. 12.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed the convictions. (Id., Ex. 21.)
Sweezy filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, followed by several amended motions. (Doc. 7-3, Exs. 23, 26, 29, 32.) The state postconviction court ultimately denied relief on all grounds. (Id., Exs. 25, 28, 31, 34, 36, 38.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed the denial of postconviction relief. (Id., Ex. 43.)
Factual Background and Trial Testimony[1]
This case arises from a physical altercation between Sweezy and his exgirlfriend, Connie Kolk. In late 2014, Sweezy and Kolk broke up. By early February 2015, Sweezy was living in an RV behind his friend's house in Polk County, and Kolk was living with her parents. Around this time, Kolk regularly used methamphetamine.
Kolk testified at trial that, on the evening of February 9, 2015 she visited the RV after Sweezy and his friends “repeatedly” called her. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. 9, pp. 279-80.) When Kolk arrived, Sweezy said he would “leave [her] alone” if she “agreed to talk to him.” (Id., p. 280.) Kolk sat down on the couch. Sweezy began playing games on his laptop at the other end of the sofa. Kolk eventually told Sweezy that she would leave if they “weren't going [to] talk.” (Id., p. 281.)
At this point, Sweezy began yelling at Kolk. According to Kolk, she stood up, walked to the door, and told Sweezy she was leaving. Kolk testified that Sweezy grabbed her from behind, “snatched [her] out of the doorway,” and threw her on the couch, causing her to hit her head on the “wooden end” of the sofa. (Id., pp. 282-83.) Sweezy then tried to pin her down by twisting her hands and grabbing her head. He also told her she could not leave. During the scuffle, Kolk retrieved a “razor knife” from her purse and cut Sweezy with it. (Id., p. 284.) Sweezy became “enraged.” (Id.) He choked Kolk, pulled her hair, threw her on the floor, and got on top of her. While she was pinned down, Sweezy punched her in the head multiple times, causing her to black out.
When she came to, Kolk tried to leave the RV, but Sweezy picked her up and threw her on the bed. Kolk spent most of the next day in bed, going in and out of consciousness. At the time, her head hurt so much that she “couldn't even lay it down.” (Id., p. 287.) When she screamed, Sweezy told her to “shut up.” (Id.) He also said that she “was to stay in the bed until [she] got better or until [she] was dead.” (Id.) The next day, Kolk tried to leave again, but Sweezy said she was “not going to go home.” (Id.) At some point, Kolk testified, Sweezy threatened her with a “carpenter's level” and a knife. (Id., pp. 287-89.)
Sweezy did not fall asleep until February 12. That morning, Kolk woke up, saw that Sweezy was sleeping, and snuck out of the RV. She ran to the nearest gas station and called her family. Kolk's sister picked her up at the gas station, took her home, and called the police. An ambulance took Kolk to the hospital, where she received treatment for her injuries, which included multiple facial fractures.
Sweezy testified at trial and offered a different account of the incident. According to him, Joshua Wright-the owner of the property where the RV was parked-visited the RV shortly after Kolk arrived. During his visit, Wright told Sweezy that he “wanted everybody to clear out.” (Id., p. 443.) Sweezy then told Kolk that “she had to go.” (Id.) According to Sweezy, Kolk became angry, got off the couch, and “cut [him] with a razor knife.” (Id., pp. 444-45.) When Sweezy noticed he was bleeding, Kolk allegedly “tried to hit [him] again.” (Id., p. 446.) Sweezy “smacked” her because he “didn't want to be cut again.” (Id., pp. 446-47.) Then, to get the knife out of Kolk's hand, Sweezy grabbed her and “took her to the floor.” (Id., pp. 450-51.) Sweezy ultimately got hold of the knife and threw it down the hallway.
Sweezy also claimed that, following the altercation, he never told Kolk she could not leave, he did not threaten her with a knife or a carpenter's level, and he left her alone in the RV several times without locking the door. Sweezy acknowledged that he did not call the police after the incident, but he claimed to be worried that the two of them would get in trouble if law enforcement got involved. According to Sweezy, Kolk was “sleeping for days” after the altercation because she was “coming down off of meth.” (Id., p. 457.) Sweezy also testified that he “offered [Kolk] food and she wouldn't take it.” (Id.)
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) governs this proceeding. Carroll v. Sec'y, DOC, 1354 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2009). Habeas relief can be granted only if a petitioner is in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d) provides that federal habeas relief cannot be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication:
A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id.
AEDPA was meant “to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). Accordingly, “[t]he focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, and . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one.” Id. at 694; see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) ().
The state appellate court affirmed Sweezy's convictions, as well as the denial of postconviction relief, without discussion. These decisions warrant deference under § 2254(d)(1) because “the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due.” See Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002). When a state appellate court issues a silent affirmance, “the federal court should ‘look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale” and “presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
Sweezy alleges some claims involving ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the test established in Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland requires a showing of deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. Id. at 687. Deficient performance is established if, “in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. However, “counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id.
Sweezy must show that counsel's alleged error prejudiced the defense because “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” See id. at 691. To demonstrate prejudice, Sweezy must show ...
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