Swift & Co. v. Doe
| Decision Date | 10 March 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 88,A,D,No. 45973,AFL-CI,88,45973,1 |
| Citation | 311 S.W.2d 15 |
| Parties | 41 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2689, 34 Lab.Cas. P 71,346 SWIFT & COMPANY, a Corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, and Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, a Corporation, Intervening Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John DOE et al. (whose names are otherwise unknown to plaintiff); Nicholas M. Blassie; August Gieseke, individually and as representatives of Local Union; and Local Union, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers Workmen of North America,efendants-Appellants |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Norman W. Armbruster, Harry H. Craig, St. Louis (Wiley, Craig, Armbruster, Schmidt & Wilburn, of counsel), St. Louis, for appellants.
G. Carroll Stribling, Harold A. Thomas, Jr., Fordyce, Mayne, Hartman, Renard & Stribling, St. Louis, for respondent, Swift & Co.
Harold L. Harvey, St. Louis, for respondent, Missouri Pac. R. Co.
HOLMAN, Commissioner.
Plaintiff, Swift & Company, instituted this action to enjoin the defendants from picketing its St. Louis, Missouri plant which is known as the St. Louis Independent Packing Company. The trial court granted a permanent injunction and defendants have duly appealed from that decree.
Since we have determined that we do not have appellate jurisdiction of this case, our factual statement will not be as complete as it would otherwise be. However, we will attempt to state such portions of the pleadings and evidence as to disclose the issues determined in the trial court and the issues briefed and preserved for review in this court.
The plant involved in this case is one of the largest packing plants in the country and plaintiff employs, in the operation thereof, approximately 2,400 employees. About 2,000 of its employees belong to the Packing House Workers Union and its truck drivers (about 40) are represented by Local 700, Packing House Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. No dispute existed between plaintiff and the aforementioned unions at the time of the occurrences hereinafter detailed. The testimony indicated that plaintiff had on hand in its St. Louis plant approximately 12 million pounds of meat products at all times which were in various stages of processing involving from a few days to as long as 120 days. Its cold storage capacity was 3,800,000 pounds and the same was substantially full at all times.
The defendants are officers and members of Local Union 88, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers Workmen of North America, hereinafter referred to as the Union. That union is not incorporated and the defendants were named as representatives of the entire membership of the union. In the spring of 1952, the union started upon a campaign to organize the 'whitecollar salesmen' employed by various St. Louis packing houses. The employees involved in this case are plaintiff's thirty-one city salesmen who call upon the retail stores in the greater St. Louis area.
On May 15, 1952, the secretary of the union sent a letter to the plaintiff advising that the union was interested in persuading these salesmen to apply for membership in the union and that the union was contemplating establishing a picket line at the company premises in an effort to enlist public support and influence in bringing about the affiliation of these employees with the union. However, the union did not picket at that time but temporarily changed its method of approach and requested its members that were employed in markets in the St. Louis area to solicit the salesmen to become union members. In the following fifteen months the union was successful in organizing the salesmen of all but the three largest packing plants in the St. Louis area. That campaign involved picketing at the plant of the Krey Packing Company.
On September 2, 1953, the secretary of the union sent another letter to the plaintiff advising that the union intended to begin picketing the premises on September 10 for the purpose of publicizing the fact that plaintiff's salesmen were nonunion. He also stated that notice of the intention to picket was given at that time in order that plaintiff could make arrangements for handling its perishable products. On September 10, 1953, pickets were placed at transportation entrances into the plaintiff's premises and the picketing was maintained on a 24-hour basis. No pickets were placed at entrances used by the 2,400 employees of the plant or the entrance to the company's test kitchen which is visited by large numbers of housewives. The result of the picketing was to make it difficult for plaintiff to make delivery of its products to retail outlets. The company's forty truck drivers refused to cross the picket line, as did a large percentage of the drivers for commercial trucking companies. Pickets had been placed on Spring Avenue just north of the Missouri Pacific Railroad track which entered the plaintiff's plant. Ordinarily, the railroad would handle the switching involved in icing, loading, reicing and shipping out approximately 200 refrigerator cars of meat per day from that plant. As a result of the picketing the regular crews of the railroad refused to cross the picket line and, after some delay, the railroad company was able to obtain supervisory employees who handled at least a part of that switching. As a result of the picketing plaintiff was unable to obtain transportation facilities for a considerable part of its products that were ready for shipment to purchasers.
On the following day, September 11, plaintiff filed the instant action and obtained a temporary restraining order, as a result of which the pickets were withdrawn about 7 p. m. on that day.
Plaintiff in its petition alleged that 'the sole purpose of the picketing activities of defendants herein described is to force, influence, threaten, coerce, and intimidate the said salesmen employed by plaintiff to join defendant union, contrary to the express provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) [29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 141 et seq.], and the law of the State of Missouri, and to force, influence, threaten, coerce, and intimidate plaintiff to influence and coerce the said salesmen to join the said defendant union, contrary to the express provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act and the law of the State of Missouri, and Section 29 of Article I of the Constitution of Missouri [V.A.M.S.].' It was also alleged by plaintiff and admitted by defendants that 'plaintiff is engaged in Interstate Commerce and that both plaintiff and its employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act).'
On October 22, 1953, the court made an order permitting the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company to file a petition as an intervening plaintiff. In that petition the railroad company alleged that the defendants had established the picket line knowing that the employees of the intervening plaintiff would not pass such pickets and that establishment of said picket line would prevent the intervening plaintiff from complying with its duty to serve Swift & Company; that by the terms of certain designated laws of the State of Missouri and of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1 et seq., intervening plaintiff was compelled to render efficient and indiscriminate service to plaintiff; that in an effort to comply with the law, the railroad used certain of its managerial officers in switching crews to serve said plant, but that the railroad could not continue to use such officers for that purpose for the reason that in the safe and efficient operation of the railroad its officers could not be taken from their important supervisory work to perform such switching services, and hence the railroad sought injunctive relief against such picketing.
Defendants in their answer admitted that they did not represent any of plaintiff's employees and did not claim the right to bargain for said employees. It was further alleged that if the allegations of plaintiff's petition as to the purpose of the picketing were true, such would constitute a violation of Section 7, as well as Section 8(b)(1)(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, and such acts would constitute unfair labor practices and that, under the provisions of said Act, the means are provided for the prevention and correction of said unfair labor practices and that the processes of the Act are exclusive for the prevention and correction of said unfair labor practices; that 'the field has been occupied and preempted by Congress, and that this court is therefore without jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's petition.'
It was further alleged that the picketing was done for the purpose of informing the public generally of the fact that plaintiff's salesmen were nonunion, and that the picketing was conducted in a peaceful, orderly, and lawful manner. It was also alleged that any order of the court denying defendants the right to picket under the circumstances existing would deprive defendants of their rights under certain designated sections of the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Missouri.
It is tacitly admitted that the picketing in this case was peaceful and orderly. It was admitted by the officials of the union that no steps had been taken to organize these city salesmen by talking with them, inviting them to meetings, or in any other way explaining the advantages they contended would result from union membership. After the temporary restraining order was entered there was considerable evidence to indicate that the officials of the union requested its 1,650 members who own, or are employed in, markets in the St. Louis area not to purchase products from plaintiff's salesmen, and the evidence indicates that this campaign was rather successful.
In the early part of November 1953 Judge Flynn, of the St. Louis Circuit Court, heard evidence on the question of whether or not a temporary injunction should be granted and the cause was taken under...
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