Swift Company v. Hocking Valley Railway Company
Decision Date | 06 March 1917 |
Docket Number | No. 376,376 |
Citation | 37 S.Ct. 287,243 U.S. 281,61 L.Ed. 722 |
Parties | SWIFT & COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. HOCKING VALLEY RAILWAY COMPANY |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. M. Hampton Todd and William L. Day for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. C. M. Horn and James H. Hoyt for defendant in error.
[Argument of Counsel from page 282 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the court:
The National Convention of Railway Commissioners, an association comprising the commissioners of the several states, adopted in November, 1909, a Uniform Demurrage Code. This action was based upon extensive investigations and thorough discussion, participated in by the railroad commissioners, commercial organizations, representatives of railroads, and individual shippers from all parts of the country. On December 18, 1909, the Interstate Commerce Commission indorsed the rules so adopted, and recommended 'that they be made effective on interstate transportation throughout the country.' Re Demurrage Investigation, 19 Inters. Com. Rep. 496.
These rules provide that after two days' free time 'cars held for or by consignors or consignees for loading' or unloading shall (with certain exceptions not here material) pay a demurrage charge of $1 per car per day. Private cars are specifically included by the following note:
NOTE.—Private cars while in railroad service, whether on carrier's or private tracks, are subject to these demurrage rules to the same extent as cars of railroad ownership.
In 1910 the Hocking Valley Railway Company, an interstate carrier, inserted in its freight tariff duly filed and published as required by the Act to Regulate Commerce, the demurrage rules and charges, including that relating to private cars, quoted above. Thereafter, Swift & Company, Chicago meat packers, established on the line of that railroad at Athens, Ohio, a warehouse to which it made, from time to time, shipments in private cars. These cars, which were placed on the switch used in connection with the warehouse, were not unloaded within the forty-eight hours' free time allowed by the tariff; and demurrage charges were assessed by the Railway Company. Payment being refused, this action was brought in the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county, Ohio, to recover the amount. The amended petition alleged, among other things, that the demurrage rules and charges had been
Swift & Company demurred; and defended on the single ground that the cars in question were its private cars, standing on its 'private track;' contended that the demurrage rule which required payment of charges under such circumstances was an arbitrary imposition; that it was unlawful and void; and that it was subject to collateral attack, even though included in a tariff duly filed and published under the Act to Regulate Commerce. Two lays after the case had been heard on demurrer in the court of common pleas, counsel filed a stipulation as follows:
'For the purpose only of reviewing the judgment of the common pleas court on defendant's demurrer to the amended petition, it is stipulated by the parties hereto that the track on which the cars in question were placed was the private track of Swift & Company.'
The next day judgment was rendered for the Railway Company. It was affirmed both by the court of appeals of Cuyahoga county and by the supreme court of Ohio. 93 Ohio St. 143, L.R.A. ——, ——, 112 N. E. 212.
The supreme court of Ohio assumed the track in question to be a 'private track,' as stipulated by the parties, and declared that
The case was then brought to this court on writ of error. The errors assigned were, in substance, that the demurrage rule was repugnant to the Act to Regulate Commerce, and that the decisions below deprived Swift & Company of its property without the due process of law guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.
Prior to the bringing of this action the Interstate Commerce Commission had held in Procter & G. Co. v. Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. 19 Inters. Com. Rep. 556, that carriers were 'within their lawful rights in establish- ing and maintaining' the above rule for demurrage charges on private cars. The commerce court approved the finding. Procter & G. Co. v. United States, 188 Fed. 221, 227. An effort to secure a review of these decisions by this court failed. Procter & G. Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 282, 56 L. ed. 1091, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 761.
We do not find it necessary to decide whether the ruling of the supreme court of Ohio was correct; or whether the rule concerning demurrage charges on private cars is in all respects valid; or whether a shipper who has delivered private cars to a carrier, knowing such rule to be in force, is in a position to question its validity in an action for charges accruing thereunder. For the record discloses, contrary to the statement in the stipulation, that the track in question was not a 'private track.'
The facts which determine the character of the switch and the relation to it of carrier and shipper were carefully set forth in the amended petition and the 'license' annexed, copied in the margin.1 Under it Swift & COMPANY occupied a part of the railway company's premises for its warehouse and office and enjoyed the rights in the switch from its main lines. The 'license' recites, among other things, the licensee's desire 'to occupy a track of ground belonging to the Railway Company . . . for the purpose of maintaining thereon a warehouse and office . . . in such a manner as not in any way to interfere with the . . . tracks . . . of the Railway Company . . .;' that the premises lie on 'the north side of the Railway Company's siding, known as the 'Bank Track' . . .;' that 'the switch of the Railway Company hereby let and connected with its main line shall at all times be under control of the Railway Company;' and that 'the Railway Company shall have the right at all times to enter upon the premises hereby let, for the purpose of repairing or maintaining the track thereon, or switching or removing cars thereover.' A rental of $30 per annum is provided for; but the license is terminable on thirty days' notice.
These facts were admitted by the demurrer, upon them the case was heard by the court of common pleas, and upon them the case must be decided in this court, unaffected by stipulation of counsel made 'for the purpose only of reviewing the judgment of the common pleas court.' The construction and effect of a written instrument is a question of law. Dillon v. Barnard, 21 Wall. 430, 437, 22 L. ed. 673, 676. Clearly the track in question was not a private track of the shipper, but a track of the carrier,—like the spur passed upon in National Ref. Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R....
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