Swift v. Dodson
Decision Date | 13 April 1967 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 1839,No. 2,2 |
Citation | 149 N.W.2d 476,6 Mich.App. 480 |
Parties | Thelma D. SWIFT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wayne W. DODSON and Bernice Dodson, Defendants-Appellants |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Matthew Davison, Jr., Gault, Davison & Bowers, Flint, for appellants.
Howard C. Fisher, Flint, for appellee.
Before T. G. KAVANAGH, P.J., and GILLIS and McGREGOR, JJ.
Plaintiff filed her complaint for personal injury on May 14, 1963. The cause was tried to a jury which returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $7,500. Judgment was entered on November 19, 1965. Plaintiff then filed a motion asking that the court assess interest on the judgment from the date the suit commenced until payment in accordance with C.L.S.1961 600.6013, as amended by P.A.1965, No. 240 (Stat.Ann.1965 Cum.Supp. § 27A. 6013), which became effective on July 21, 1965 and reads:
The former statute, C.L.S.1961 § 600.6013 (Stat.Ann.1962 Rev. § 27A. 6013), differed from the amended statute in two respects. First, interest was to be calculated from the date of judgment rather than from the date of filing the complaint. Second, there was no provision whatever regarding disallowance of interest in the event of a written offer of settlement.
Defendants paid the amount of the judgment and costs, and the trial court entered an order that such payment constituted satisfaction of the judgment and costs except for plaintiff's claim for interest. Defendants contended that interest should be determined in accordance with the former statute. The court granted plaintiff's motion and assessed interest from May 14, 1963 the date the complaint was filed, which sum amounted to $954.16. Defendants' motion for rehearing was denied and they appeal.
The sole question before us is whether this interest statute, as amended, is retroactive as to suits commenced prior to July 21, 1965, so that the trial court's allowance of interest from May 14, 1963 was proper.
The general rule in this state is that all statutes are prospective except where a contrary intent of the legislature clearly appears from the context of the statute itself. See Briggs v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co. (1966), 2 Mich.App. 204, 139 N.W.2d 336; Bullinger v. Gremore (1955), 343 Mich. 516, 72 N.W.2d 777; In re Davis' Estate (1951), 330 Mich. 647, 48 N.W.2d 151.
In Hansen-Snyder Co. v. General Motors Corporation (1963), 371 Mich. 480, 124 N.W.2d 286, the Supreme Court of...
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