Swinney v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 November 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action File No: 1:09–CV–0585–JEC.
• Citation: 829 F.Supp.2d 1358
• Parties: Deborah SWINNEY, as surviving spouse and administrator of the estate of Michael Andre Swinney, Plaintiff, v. SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC., and Allen Douglas Ledford, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

829 F.Supp.2d 1358

Deborah SWINNEY, as surviving spouse and administrator of the estate of Michael Andre Swinney, Plaintiff,

v.SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC., and Allen Douglas Ledford, Defendants.

Civil Action File No: 1:09–CV–0585–JEC.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia,Atlanta Division.

Nov. 8, 2011.

Daryl Von Yokely, Law Office of Daryl Von Yokely, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

John D. Dixon, R. Clay Porter, Dennis Corry Porter & Smith, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER and OPINION

JULIE E. CARNES, Chief Judge.

This case is presently before the Court on defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment [111] and defendants' Objection to the Affidavit of Harry Edmondson [118]. The Court has reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties and, for the reasons set out below, concludes that defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment [111] should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and defendants' Objection to the Affidavit of Harry Edmondson [118] should be SUSTAINED.

BACKGROUND

This action arises from an accident that occurred on I–285 in June of 2008. Plaintiff is the surviving spouse of Michael Swinney, who died in the accident. (Compl. at ¶¶ 1–2, attached to Notice of Removal [1] as Ex. A.) Defendant Allen Ledford allegedly caused the accident in the course of his employment as a truck driver for defendant Schneider National Carriers, Inc. (“Schneider”). ( Id. at ¶¶ 3–4.) The case was removed from Fulton County Superior Court on the grounds of diversity jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal [1].)

Many of the facts surrounding the accident are in dispute. Construing the evidence in favor of plaintiff, Swinney's car broke down in the far right travel lane of I–285 East sometime before 4:00 a.m. on the morning of June 21, 2008. ( See Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts (“PSMF”) [114] at ¶¶ 2, 12 and Stanley Dep. [111] at 22–39.) Although the area was poorly lit, Swinney's headlights were on and his car was visible for at least 250 feet. (PSMF [114] at ¶¶ 3, 14–16.)

The accident occurred when Ledford's Schneider truck collided with Swinney's stopped car. (Defs.' Statement of Material Facts (“DSMF”) [111] at ¶ 10 and Pl.'s Initial Disclosures [65] at 5.) As a result of the collision, Swinney was struck either by Ledford's truck or by his own car, which had been set in motion by Ledford's truck. (Harper Dep. [111] at 30.) Following the collision, Swinney's body was thrown onto the roadway and run over by several other vehicles. (Stanley Dep. [111] at 42.) The medical examiner concluded that Swinney died on account of being “struck multiple times by multiple objects.” (Smith Dep. [111] at 17–18.)

During the subsequent investigation, Ledford initially told the police that Swinney's car “c[ame] around him on the right shoulder” and “jump[ed] out in front of him, causing him to hit the vehicle.” (Stanley Dep. [111] at Ex. 1.) After learning that Swinney's car was in fact stopped at the time of the collision, Ledford changed his story. (Ledford Dep. [116] at 73–75.) At his deposition, Ledford explained that he didn't see Swinney's car because he was looking in his rearview mirror. ( Id. at 71–76.) Witness LeeMurray White, who had been driving behind Ledford for a few miles, offered another explanation. (PSMF [114] at ¶ 25.) He testified that Ledford had been weaving among lanes just before the accident, as if he was dozing off. ( Id.)

In addition to Ledford's culpability for the accident, a key point of dispute between the parties is where Swinney was located at the time of the collision. Plaintiff, in reliance upon her expert Harry Edmondson, contends that Swinney was standing in front of the car when it was struck by Ledford' s truck. (Pl.'s Resp. [113] at 7–8.) Based on the damage to Swinney's car, and the fact that the car did not hit any other object, Edmondson opines that “more likely than not, Mr. Swinney was standing in front of the [car] and ... it was his body that caused the damage to the [car].” (Edmondson Aff. [113] at ¶¶ 16–17, 19.) More specifically, Edmondson believes that upon its impact with Ledford's truck, the car was pushed into Swinney's body, forcing the hood of the car inward and causing Swinney to slam into the windshield. ( Id. at ¶¶ 18, 20.) After hitting the windshield, Edmondson theorizes that Swinney “either rolled or flipped onto the roadway or into [Ledford's truck].” ( Id. at ¶ 20.)

Unfortunately, none of the investigating officers could corroborate Edmondson's opinions. (DSMF [111] at ¶ 16.) Investigating Officer Harper stated that he believes the right side of Ledford's truck ran over Swinney's body and “twisted him up pretty badly.” (Harper Dep. [111] at 30.) However, even the Georgia State Patrol's special crash reconstruction team could not conclusively determine where Swinney was located when the accident occurred or whether he died as a result of an impact with his own car, Ledford's truck, or another vehicle. (Barnes Dep. [116] at 16–18 and Smith Dep. [111] at 17–18.)

An autopsy revealed the presence of both alcohol and cocaine in Swinney's system on the night of the accident. (DSMF [111] at ¶¶ 9, 32–34.) Swinney's blood alcohol concentration was 0.12 grams, above the maximum legal level of .08 grams. (Defs.' Supplemental Initial Disclosures [45] at 3.) Swinney's wife later informed the investigating officers that Swinney had been at a party the previous night and was running late for work on the morning of the accident. ( Id.) Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the alcohol or drugs in Swinney's system contributed to the accident. (PSMF [114] at ¶¶ 8–9.)

Plaintiff alleges that Ledford's negligent driving caused Swinney's death. (Compl. [1] at ¶¶ 7–8.) In her complaint, plaintiff asserts a negligence claim against both Ledford and his employer, Schneider, for Swinney's wrongful death. ( Id.) Assuming that she prevails on her negligence claim, plaintiff seeks damages on behalf of herself, for the value of Swinney's life, and on behalf of Swinney, for pain and suffering and pre-impact fright and shock. ( Id. at 3.)

Defendants have filed an objection to the expert opinion of Harry Edmondson and a renewed motion for summary judgment.¹ (Defs.' Obj. [118] and Renewed Mot. for Summ. J. [111].) Assuming that Edmondson's testimony is excluded, defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted because there is no evidence to show proximate cause, which is an essential element of plaintiff's negligence claim. (Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Summ. J. (“Defs.' Br.”) [111] at 12–16.) In addition, defendants contend that they are entitled to partial summary judgment on the issues of (1) pre-impact damages for Swinney's fright, shock, pain and suffering and (2) Swinney's negligence per se. ( Id. at 16–22.)

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants' Objection To Edmondson's Testimony

Defendants argue that Edmondson's opinion should be excluded under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. (Defs.' Obj. [118].) Rule 702 provides that:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a knowledge, education, opinion or witness qualified as an expert by skill, experience, training, or may testify thereto in the form of an otherwise.

Fed.R.Evid. 702. Pursuant to Rule 702, expert testimony is only admissible if: (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently, (2) his methodology is reliable, and (3) the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue in the case. Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir.1999).

The proponent of expert testimony has the burden of showing that the testimony complies with Rule 702. Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1108 (11th Cir.2005). To meet that burden, plaintiff must demonstrate that Edmondson's proffered opinion satisfies each of the above prongs. Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., Inc., 609 F.3d 1183, 1194 (11th Cir.2010). Assuming the basic requirements of Rule 702 are satisfied, “it is not the role of the district court to make ultimate conclusions as to the persuasiveness” of plaintiff's testimony. Quiet Tech. DC–8, Inc. v. Hurel–Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir.2003). Rather, “ ‘[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible’ ” expert testimony. Id.

A. Edmondson's Qualifications

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Edmondson is qualified by his education and experience to render an expert opinion in this case. Edmondson has a degree in mechanical engineering from Georgia Tech. (Edmondson Resume [65] at 14.) He has worked as a professional engineer for forty years and has extensive experience in the fields of forensic engineering and accident reconstruction. ( Id.) During his career, Edmondson has taken numerous courses in accident reconstruction and conducted multiple computerized crash simulations. (Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Obj. [120] at 2 and Edmondson Aff. [113] at ¶¶ 3–4.)

B. Reliability

Nevertheless, the Court agrees with defendants that Edmondson's proffered opinions are unreliable. In ascertaining the reliability of an expert's opinion, it is the district court's role to act as a “gatekeeper[ ]” to ensure that groundless or speculative testimony is not admitted. McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir.2002). The Supreme Court has identified several nonexclusive factors as relevant to the inquiry, including: (1) whether the expert's methodology can be and has been tested, (2) whether the methodology has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) the known or potential rate of error of the particular scientific technique, and (4) whether the expert's technique is generally accepted in the scientific community. Daubert v....