Swinton Creek Nursery v. EFC

• Citation: 334 S.C. 469,514 S.E.2d 126
• Decision Date: 01 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 24910.,24910.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: SWINTON CREEK NURSERY and James M. Futch III, Petitioners, v. EDISTO FARM CREDIT, ACA, E. Lawton Huggins and Jerry S. Bishop, Defendants, of whom Edisto Farm Credit, ACA, is Respondent.

334 S.C. 469

514 S.E.2d 126

SWINTON CREEK NURSERY and James M. Futch III, Petitioners, v. EDISTO FARM CREDIT, ACA, E. Lawton Huggins and Jerry S. Bishop, Defendants, of whom Edisto Farm Credit, ACA, is Respondent.

No. 24910.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard January 7, 1999.

Decided March 1, 1999.

G. Thomas Hill, of Hill, Hill & Hill, of Johns Island, for petitioners.

Marvin C. Jones and Jennifer E. Duty, of Bogoslow & Jones, P.A., of Walterboro, for respondent.

TOAL, Justice:

In this case, we granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' opinion in Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, ACA, 326 S.C. 426, 483 S.E.2d 789 (Ct.App.1997). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1980, James M. Futch, III, ("Owner") began a nursery business near the small town of Hollywood, South Carolina.¹ As a result of his efforts, Owner created the Swinton Creek Nursery ("Swinton Creek"). Swinton Creek was mainly a wholesale operation that sold azaleas to such stores as Wal-Mart and K-Mart. In an effort to expand the nursery, Owner borrowed $30,000 from the South Atlantic Production Credit Association in November 1989. In April of 1991, South Atlantic Production Credit merged with several other credit associations to become the Edisto Farm Credit ("EFC"). From April 1991 forward, Owner's loan was handled by EFC. Owner obtained his initial loan from EFC's Summerville branch, which was managed by Jerry Bishop. As a borrower, Owner also became a stockholder of EFC.²

In July of 1989, Owner became delinquent on his note with EFC. Bishop requested that Owner pay the interest on the loan.³ Owner subsequently went to see Bishop at his office in Summerville to discuss the default. EFC ultimately agreed to renew the $30,000 principal on Owner's note to be due May 1, 1991. However, in May, Owner again went into default. Owner agreed to make a payment of $8,000 and work on a plan to liquidate the assets of the nursery to pay off his debt to EFC.

In late May of 1991, Owner encountered Durwood Collins, Sr., in a convenience store on Edisto Island. Collins owned the pavilion at Edisto Beach and had known Owner since they were children. Owner told Collins that he was thinking of liquidating or down-sizing some of Swinton Creek. Collins told Owner that his son, Durwood Collins, Jr., ("Buyer") was graduating from college and was interested in the nursery business. Collins asked Owner if he was interested in selling all of Swinton Creek. Owner said no, but he would sell some of Swinton Creek's assets and equipment to Buyer.

During the summer of 1991, Buyer began working for Owner at Swinton Creek to learn the nursery business.⁴ Buyer also began negotiations with Owner concerning the sale of Swinton Creek's assets. Owner and Buyer agreed on a price of $97,500.⁵

In August of 1991, Buyer went with his father to EFC's Walterboro office seeking a loan for the acquisition of Swinton Creek's assets and equipment. E. Lawton Huggins was the senior loan officer at the Walterboro branch and handled Buyer's loan application for EFC. As part of the application process, Buyer provided Huggins with his financial statement, tax returns, and a projected income statement of his proposed nursery.

In early September of 1991, Huggins received an appraisal of Swinton Creek's equipment and nursery stock from William West, an EFC appraiser. Huggins subsequently visited Swinton Creek to look at the equipment and nursery stock and to re-check the serial numbers on West's appraisal. Huggins testified he had a "side bar conversation" with Owner while visiting Swinton Creek. Huggins stated that Owner inquired as to the time table for closing and indicated that time was of the essence because he had other pressing financial obligations, including a past due loan. Owner conceded Huggins visited Swinton Creek, but denied having the "side bar conversation" with him at the nursery.

On September 10, 1991, Huggins wrote a letter to Buyer concerning Buyer's loan application. The fourth paragraph of the letter stated:

I would like to address ... the weaknesses present due to your limited financial strength and questionable repayment capacity. Your limited asset base does not provide a tangible secondary source of repayment should the nursery fail to generate earnings as projected. In other words, you have no assets which may be converted in order to satisfy the obligation to my organization. This is extremely important since the projected income for the nursery is not supported by a successful earnings trend. In fact, the operation you are purchasing has been under financial duress. Your forecast for generating adequate earnings may materialize, however, there is adequate risk for concern on my part.

Huggins testified that, in the letter, the "earning trend" comment was in reference to Buyer's projected income for the nursery. Huggins claimed he had no knowledge of Swinton Creek's earning trend and was only referring to Buyer's trend. However, Huggins admitted the "financial duress" comment was in reference to Swinton Creek. Huggins testified his comment was based solely on his observations during his visit at Swinton Creek and his conversation with Owner. Huggins further testified the letter was sent first class mail to Buyer and was not copied to anyone else.

After receiving the letter, Buyer went to see Owner and explained that he would be unable to purchase the assets of the nursery for the amount they had originally agreed on. Buyer showed Owner the letter from Huggins and told Owner that he did not believe he would be able to come up with the money. Buyer eventually obtained a loan from EFC's Summerville branch⁶ and purchased the Swinton Creek assets for $77,500—$20,000 less than originally agreed on.⁷

Owner sued EFC, Huggins, and Bishop, alleging libel, slander, invasion of privacy, interference with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and civil conspiracy. Before trial, the trial court granted EFC's motion for summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The other claims were preserved for trial.

At the close of plaintiff's case, the trial court directed a verdict for EFC on the theories of civil conspiracy, slander, and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In addition, the trial court, finding no evidence of tortious action by Bishop, dismissed Bishop as a defendant in the case. At the close of all the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the remaining defendants on the libel claim. Thus, only the claims of invasion of privacy, interference with contract, and interference with prospective economic advantage went to the jury.

The jury returned a verdict for defendants EFC and Huggins as to the claims of interference with contract and interference with prospective economic advantage, and for defendant Huggins on the claim of invasion of privacy, but found that EFC was liable to Owner for invasion of privacy in the amount of $55,000. Both Owner and EFC appealed. EFC argued the trial court erred by not granting its directed verdict motion on the invasion of privacy claim. Owner, on the other hand, argued the trial court should not have granted directed verdicts on his claims for libel, civil conspiracy, and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of EFC on all arguments; the court reversed the trial court's failure to direct a verdict on the invasion of privacy claim and affirmed the directed verdicts on the other claims. Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, ACA, 326 S.C. 426, 483 S.E.2d 789.

We granted Owner's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider the following issues:

(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court's denial of EFC's motion for directed verdict on the invasion of privacy claim?

(2) Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's grant of EFC's motion for directed verdict on the libel claim?

(3) Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's grant of EFC's motion for directed verdict on the breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim?

LAW/ANALYSIS

In ruling on a motion for directed verdict, a court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Quesinberry v. Rouppasong, 331 S.C. 589, 503 S.E.2d 717 (1998); Gamble v. International Paper Realty Corp., 323 S.C. 367, 474 S.E.2d 438 (1996). When the evidence yields only one inference, a directed verdict in favor of the moving party is proper. Id. The trial court can only be reversed by this Court when there is not evidence to support the ruling below. Creech v. South Carolina Wildlife & Marine Resources Dep't, 328 S.C. 24, 491 S.E.2d 571 (1997).

A. INVASION OF PRIVACY

Owner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's denial of EFC's directed verdict motion on his invasion of privacy claim. We disagree.

The origins of the tort of invasion of privacy are found in the famous law review article written in 1890 by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193 (1890).⁸ In their article, Warren and Brandeis advocated an extension of common law privacy rights to protect individuals from what they saw as the advancing threat of a gossip-consumed, technological society. See Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of Personal Information, 65 Tex. L.Rev. 1395, 1405 (1987) ("Warren and Brandeis found the legal basis for the right to privacy by coupling common-law doctrines with the notion that technological advances and social changes had made it necessary to recognize the new right."). Warren and Brandeis...